Business exit and strategic change: Sticking to the knitting or striking a new path?

The purpose of this study is to examine the potential of business exit for initiating strategic change in divesting parent firms. In contrast to prior literature that mainly investigates the impact of different antecedents on the likelihood of business exit in general, this study additionally tests the influence of these antecedents on the choice between two exit types with a cross‐industry sample of divesting firms listed in the German CDAX over the time period 1999–2004. A divestiture involving strategic change is a strategic business exit; otherwise it is denoted as status quo preserving. The findings reveal that a relatively highly dissipated focus does not automatically enhance the likelihood of business exit in general and status‐quo‐preserving business exit in particular. CEO turnover and pressures exerted by institutional investors predict neither strategic nor status‐quo‐preserving business exit. Low firm performance does not nurture the likelihood of business exit per se but especially promotes status‐quo‐preserving business exit

Presidential Exit

The biggest problem that we\u27re facing right now has to do with George Bush trying to bring more and more power into the executive branch and not go through Congress at all, and that\u27s what I intend to reverse when I\u27m president of the United States of America. Why is @BarackObama constantly issuing executive orders that are major power grabs of authority? President Trump signed the 30th executive order of his presidency on Friday, capping off a whirlwind period that produced more orders in his first 100 days than for any president since Harry Truman. The rash of executive orders underlines Trump\u27s focus on reversing as much of the Obama administration\u27s policy agenda as he can

Business exit and strategic change: Sticking to the knitting or striking a new strategic path?

The purpose of this study is to examine the potential of business exit for initiating strategic change in divesting parent firms. In contrast to prior literature that mainly investigates the impact of different antecedents on the likelihood of business exit in general, this study additionally tests the influence of these antecedents on the choice between two exit types with a cross-industry sample of divesting firms listed in the German CDAX over the time period 1999-2004. A divestiture involving strategic change is a strategic business exit; otherwise it is denoted as status quo-preserving. The findings reveal that a relatively highly dissipated focus does not automatically enhance the likelihood of business exit in general and status quo-preserving business exit in particular. CEO turnover and pressures exerted by institutional investors predict neither strategic nor status quo-preserving business exit. Low firm performance does not nurture the likelihood of business exit per se but especially promotes status quo-preserving business exit

A European Exit Strategy

This Policy Brief was adapted from a paper written by the three authors and presented by Bruegel Director Jean Pisani-Ferry at the informal ECOFIN Council meetings in Gothenburg, Sweden, on 1 Oct. In the brief, the authors argue that bank recapitalisation and restructuring should be a matter of urgency for EU member states and that governments should not undertake the necessary fiscal and monetary policy exit until problems within the financial sector are addressed. The authors also recommend that European states set debt targets to be reached by the end of 2014 and explain that proper incentives are necessary to ensure that an exit strategy, once implemented, is done so in coordination between various institutional actors. Such a policy framework should be in place by summer 2010, the authors say, in order to avoid a buildup of financial instability during the process.

Exit strategies

We study alternative scenarios for exiting the post-crisis fiscal and monetary accommodation using the model of Angeloni and Faia (2010), that combines a standard DSGE framework with a fragile banking sector, suitably modified and calibrated for the euro area. Credibly announced and fast fiscal consolidations dominate – based on simple criteria – alternative strategies incorporating various degrees of gradualism and surprise. The fiscal adjustment should be based on spending cuts or else be relatively skewed towards consumption taxes. The phasing out of monetary accommodation should be simultaneous or slightly delayed. We also find that, contrary to widespread belief, Basel III may well have an expansionary macroeconomic effect. Keywords: Exit Strategies , Debt Consolidation , Fiscal Policy , Monetary Policy , Capital Requirements , Bank Runs JEL Classification: G01, E63, H1

Thirty Years After Michael E. Porter: What Do We Know About Business Exit?

Although a business exit is an important corporate change initiative, the buyer’s side seems to be more appealing to management researchers than the seller’s because acquisitions imply growth, i.e., success. Yet from an optimistic viewpoint, business exit can effectively create value for the selling company. In this paper we attempt to bring the relevance of the seller’s side back into our consciousness by asking: What do we know about business exit? We start our exploration with Porter (1976), focusing on literature that investigates the antecedents of, barriers to, and outcomes of business exit. We also include studies from related fields such as finance and economics.1 Through this research we determine three clusters of findings: factors promoting business exit, exit barriers, and exit outcomes. Overall, it is the intention of this paper to highlight the importance of business exit for research and practice. Knowing what we know about business exits and their high financial value we should bear in mind that exit need not mean failure but a new beginning for a corporation

Venture capital exit rights

Theorists argue that exit rights can mitigate hold-up problems in venture capital. Using a hand-collected data-set of venture capital contracts from Germany we show that exit rights are included more frequently in venture capital contracts when a hold-up problem associated with the venture capitalist's exit decision is likely. Examples include drag-along and tag-along rights. Additionally, we find that almost all exit rights are allocated to the venture capitalist rather than to the entrepreneur. In addition, we show that besides the basic hold-up mechanism there are other mechanisms such as ex-ante bargaining power and the degree of pledgeable income that drive the allocation of exit rights. JEL Classification: G24, G34, D8