Together forever? Explaining exclusivity in party-firm relations

Parties and firms are the key actors of representative democracy and capitalism respectively and the dynamic of attachment between them is a central feature of any political economy. This is the first article to systematically analyse the exclusivity of party-firm relations. We consider exclusivity at a point in time and exclusivity over time. Does a firm have a relationship with only one party at a given point in time, or is it close to more than one party? Does a firm maintain a relationship with only one party over time, or does it switch between parties? Most important, how do patterns of exclusivity impact on a firm’s ability to lobby successfully? We propose a general theory, which explains patterns of party-firm relations by reference to the division of institutions and the type of party competition in a political system. A preliminary test of our theory with Polish survey data confirms our predictions, establishing a promising hypothesis for future research

Privatizing Monopolies in Developing Countries: The Real Effects of Exclusivity Periods in Telecommunications

When reforming their network utility industries, many developing countries give the newly-privatized incumbent exclusive rights to serve a particular market. These "exclusivity periods" are especially common in telecommunications. Research to date has explored the effects of privatization, competition, and to a lesser extent, regulation. We know very little, however, about the effects of the details of privatization transactions themselves and, in particular, how exclusivity periods matter. I use an original, new dataset to explore the costs and benefits of this approach to privatization. I find that exclusivity periods are associated with significant increases in the firm's sale price. The increased revenues to the government come with a cost, however. Exclusivity periods are correlated with a significant decrease in the incumbent's investment in the telecommunications network, payphones, mobile telephone penetration, and international calling.

Exclusivity as Inefficient Insurance

It is well established that an incumbent firm may use exclusivity contracts so as to monopolize an industry or deter entry. Such an anticompetitive practice could be tolerated if it were associated with sufficiently large efficiency gains, e.g. insuring buyers against price volatility. In this paper we study the trade-off between positive effects (risk sharing) and negative effects (exclusion) of exclusivity contracts. We revisit the seminal model of Aghion and Bolton (1987) under risk-aversion and show that although exclusivity contracts induce optimal risk-sharing, they can be used not only to deter the entry of a more efficient rival on the product market but also to crowd out financial investors willing to insure the buyer at competitive rates. We further show that in a world without financial investors, purely financial bilateral instruments, such as forward contracts, achieve optimal risk sharing without distorting product market outcomes. Thus, there is no room for an insurance defense of exclusivity contracts.exclusivity;contracts;monopolization;risk-aversion;risk-sharing;damages

Do Exclusivity Arrangments Harm Consumers?

This paper explores welfare implications of exclusivity arrangements, e.g. iPhone?s part- nership with wireless carriers. Two ?rms compete in a primary good market, while a monop- olistic ?rm o¤ers a value-adding good. The primary good can be consumed alone, while the value-adding good must be consumed with the primary good. The monopolistic ?rm forms an exclusivity partnership with one of the primary good providers. Buyers are able to consume the value-adding good only if they patronize the monopolistic ?rm?s exclusive partner. This practice allows the monopolistic ?rm to extract surplus from the primary good market. Sur- prisingly, consumers bene?t from the exclusivity arrangement. However, overall social welfare declines, despite improvements to consumer welfare.exclusivity, consumer welfare, market efficiency, hotelling

The exclusivity principle forbids sets of correlations larger than the quantum set

We show that the exclusivity (E) principle singles out the set of quantum correlations associated to any exclusivity graph assuming the set of quantum correlations for the complementary graph. Moreover, we prove that, for self-complementary graphs, the E principle, by itself (i.e., without further assumptions), excludes any set of correlations strictly larger than the quantum set. Finally, we prove that, for vertex-transitive graphs, the E principle singles out the maximum value for the quantum correlations assuming only the quantum maximum for the complementary graph. This opens the door for testing the impossibility of higher-than-quantum correlations in experiments.Comment: REVTeX4, 4 pages, one new result (Result 2) and two new authors, title changed accordingl

An Analysis of the Impact of Social Factors on Purchase Behavior

Consumers purchase conspicuous goods to satisfy not just material needs but also social needs such as prestige. In an attempt to meet these social needs, marketing managers of conspicuous goods like cars, perfumes, and watches employ several strategies to highlight the exclusivity of their products. These strategies include using exclusive distribution, charging high prices, and limiting production. Further, marketing textbooks suggest that the demand curve for prestige goods could be upward sloping and therefore firms should not set prices which are ``too low''. In this paper we examine whether the desire for exclusivity can lead to an upward-sloping demand curve. We also investigate how social factors such as the desire for exclusivity and conformity affect prices and firms' profits. To analyze these issues, we develop a model of conspicuous consumption using the rational expectations framework. We consider two different market structures: monopoly and duopoly. Our results shows that the desire for exclusivity can lead to an upward-sloping demand curve when there is a segment of consumers who are (weakly) conformists. The impact of exclusivity and conformity on prices and profits varies with the market structure. Interestingly, an increase in perceived functional differentiation of products consumed by snobs could decrease firms' profits and prices. In the laboratory, we observe an upward sloping demand curve for snobs, in both the monopoly and duopoly setting. We also track consumer's expectations, and find on average that subjects' beliefs are consistent with the observed outcome and the rational expectations equilibrium solution.Game Theory, Experimental Economics, Consumer Behavior, Rational Expectations, Prestige Pricing,

A Note on the Convergence to Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Moral Hazard

asymmetric information; exclusivity; convergence