A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries

This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication of this view is that squatters “squeeze” the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer, however, ensures that this squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners (defensive expenditures by squatter households also help to forestall eviction). Because eviction is thus absent in equilibrium, the model differs crucially from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability.

A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries

This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication of this view is that squatters ``squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer, however, ensures that this squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners (defensive expenditures by squatter households also help to forestall eviction). Because eviction is thus absent in equilibrium, the model differs crucially from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability.Squatting; Formalization

Stationary Distribution of a Generalized LRU-MRU Content Cache

Many different caching mechanisms have been previously proposed, exploring different insertion and eviction policies and their performance individually and as part of caching networks. We obtain a novel closed-form stationary invariant distribution for a generalization of LRU and MRU caching nodes under a reference Markov model. Numerical comparisons are made with an "Incremental Rank Progress" (IRP a.k.a. CLIMB) and random eviction (a.k.a. random replacement) methods under a steady-state Zipf popularity distribution. The range of cache hit probabilities is smaller under MRU and larger under IRP compared to LRU. We conclude with the invariant distribution for a special case of a random-eviction caching tree-network and associated discussion

Moving costs, security of tenure and eviction

We contrast equilibrium and welfare analysis in the rental housing market under two property rights regimes – eviction rights and security of tenure – when tenants face moving costs. A tenant’s idiosyncratic benefit from his unit and a landlord’s idiosyncratic profit from conversion are treated as private information. The two regimes differ when a tenant wants to stay in his unit but the landlord wants to redevelop it. North American housing markets have been characterized by eviction rights and many European housing markets by security of tenure. Under eviction rights, a landlord who evicts a tenant imposes a negative externality on him, which can be imperfectly internalized through a demolition (conversion) tax. Similarly, under security of tenure efficiency can be improved by subsidizing the moving costs of tenants.Moving costs, eviction, tenure security, rental housing markets

Losing a home : does the current housing possession process provide effective access to justice?

In brief: • There is a lack of joined up thinking within the housing possession process. • The amount of time and resources devoted to these cases fails to recognise the importance that occupiers attach to the prospect of losing a home, as well as the wider social and economic implications of eviction. • A working group has been set up in the Departments for Communities and Local Government to look into how the eviction process can be speeded up, but more radical reform could be needed

RI Tenant Stabilization Project Aims to Help Eviction and Homelessness Issues for Low-Income Tenants

RWU Law students gain legal experience helping low-income tenants avoid eviction, while also forging longer-term solutions to Rhode Island’s ongoing housing crisis

Eviction Threats and Investment Incentives

We show that the effect of eviction threats on unobservable investment effort can be positive. We demonstrate this apparently counter-intuitive result in a model of tenancy where investment by a tenant in the current period raises the chances of doing well in the next period, and therefore retaining the job in the period after next period. If the tenant earns rents, the landlord can partly substitute eviction threats for the crop share as an incentive device. This makes it more attractive for him to elicit investment effort. However, there is a direct negative effect of eviction threats on the tenant's discount factor. We find conditions under which the former effect dominates and eviction threats can increase investment incentives.Sharecropping tenancy, eviction threats, investment incentives.

Keeping Your Home: A Guide to Foreclosure Prevention and Assistance in Prince George's County, MD

Offers step-by-step guidance on avoiding foreclosure and negotiating with lenders. Explains foreclosure and eviction procedures. Includes lists of housing counseling agencies, emergency service organizations, and government programs