What Can Information Encapsulation Tell Us About Emotional Rationality?

What can features of cognitive architecture, e.g. the information encapsulation of certain emotion processing systems, tell us about emotional rationality? de Sousa proposes the following hypothesis: “the role of emotions is to supply the insufficiency of reason by imitating the encapsulation of perceptual modes” (de Sousa 1987: 195). Very roughly, emotion processing can sometimes occur in a way that is insensitive to what an agent already knows, and such processing can assist reasoning by restricting the response-options she considers. This paper aims to provide an exposition and assessment of de Sousa’s hypothesis. I argue information encapsulation is not essential to emotion-driven reasoning, as emotions can determine the relevance of response-options even without being encapsulated. However, I argue encapsulation can still play a role in assisting reasoning by restricting response-options more efficiently, and in a way that ensures which options emotions deem relevant are not overridden by what the agent knows. I end by briefly explaining why this very feature also helps explain how emotions can, on occasion, hinder reasoning

The Neuroethical Role of Narrative Identity in Ethical Decision Making

An increasingly blurred understanding of the moral significance of narrative identity for a robust perception of self, other, and community suggests a critical need to explore the inter-relationships shared between autobiographical memory, emotional rationality, and narrative identity, particularly as it bears on decision making. This essay argues that (i) the disintegration of autobiographical memory degenerates emotional rationality; (ii) the degeneration of emotional rationality decays narrative identity; and (iii) the decay of narrative identity disables one to seek, identify, and act on the good. After demonstrating that narrative identity is best understood as the product of autobiographical memory and emotional rationality, which in turn is indispensable to substantive ethical decision making, the essay concludes by suggesting that narrative identity may be successfully employed as a justificatory framework for ethical decision making, providing both education to, and rigor for, substantive moral judgment

Emotions and Process Rationality

ABSTRACT Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015, 2016; Moss 2015]; others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes [Podgorski 2017]. This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski’s argument from rational delay to argue that many emotional norms are fundamentally concerned with emotional processes. I also claim that the main response available to the synchronist about belief is not available to the synchronist about emotions and, therefore, fundamental process norms are more plausible than epistemologists tend to believe

Prejudecata, societatea şi tradiţia în filosofia polititică a lui Edmnund Burke

At a first level of interpretation Burke's work might be considered a masterpiece of the conservatory ideology, but thanks to its profound reflections about the human nature, the state, history, and society, it becomes an authentic political philosophy. Burkes political philosophy is built on two fundamental conceptual pillars: prejudice and emotional rationality. These pillars ensure a logical and systematic unit to the diverse themes of his writings. The study is going to interpret the Burke’s philosophical contributions in the context of the conservative ideology. By questioning metaphysics through emotional rationality and not trough transcendental criticism, Burke finds a genuine way to establish his political philosophy leaving an open gate for liberty and progres

Reason to be Cheerful

This paper identifies a tension between the commitment to forming rationally justified emotions and the happy life. To illustrate this tension I begin with a critical evaluation of the positive psychology technique known as ‘gratitude training’. I argue that gratitude training is at odds with the kind of critical monitoring that several philosophers have claimed is regulative of emotional rationality. More generally, critical monitoring undermines exuberance, an attitude that plays a central role in contemporary models of the happy life. Thus, prominent notions of what it takes to maintain emotion rationality and what it takes to maintain happiness are in tension. To resolve this tension, I argue that some people have good reason to depreciate critical monitoring—even while maintaining the requirement of emotion rationality that we be sensitive to facts about how our concerns are faring

Cultivating Teachers’ Morality and the Pedagogy of Emotional Rationality

Teachers are expected to act ethically and provide moral role models in performing their duties, even though teacher education has often relegated the cultivation of teachers’ ethical awareness and moral development to the margins. When it is addressed, the main theoretical assumptions have relied heavily on the cognitivist developmental theories of Piaget and Kohlberg. A major pedagogical problem in adopting these theories of moral reasoning is that they may not help teachers to act as moral agents in real-life classrooms. This paper argues that one underlying difficulty is the insufficient attention given to the role of emotion in moral reasoning, even though it is increasingly accepted that rationality is laced with emotions and, moreover, emotions are crucial in brain functioning. This paper presents recent empirical findings, viewing them through the lens of dynamic systems theory, and discusses how they may help to inform and strengthen moral cultivation in teacher education

What Not to Make of Recalcitrant Emotions

Recalcitrant emotions are emotions that conflict with your evaluative judgements, e.g. fearing flying despite judging it to be safe. Drawing on the work of Greenspan and Helm, Brady argues these emotions raise a challenge for a theory of emotion: for any such theory to be adequate, it must be capable of explaining the sense in which subjects that have them are being irrational. This paper aims to raise scepticism with this endeavour of using the irrationality shrouding recalcitrant episodes to inform a theory of emotion. I explain how ‘recalcitrant emotions’ pick out at least two phenomena, which come apart, and that there are different epistemic norms relevant to assessing whether, and if so how, subjects undergoing recalcitrant bouts are being irrational. I argue these factors result in differing accounts of the precise way these emotions make their bearers irrational, which in turn frustrates present efforts to adjudicate whether a given theory of emotion successfully meets this challenge. I end by briefly exploring two possible ways a philosophy of emotion might proceed in the face of such scepticism

The Artistic Turn

We are living in an increasingly complex world. How are we able to cope with this complexity and the difficulties that arise from it? Can philosophy and art, classified as the two utmost useless and pointless disciplines, have any (positive) influence on the urgent and pressing problems at hand? And, related to this, if the two have more than just their uselessness in common, how, then, are philosophy and art related? In this article, I will argue that although ‘useless’ disciplines such as philosophy and art have no direct influence on our complex world, they are nonetheless the most important ones, because those working within them practice their insights in an indirect way. Indirect influence may take a little longer, but the impact is much stronger, affecting our thinking and our attitudes from within, as it were. This indirect approach has everything to do with the sort of questions philosophers and artists occupy themselves with. I will show how both address, albeit each in their own way, fundamental questions, and thereby make use of thought experiments. Intuition and imagination play a decisive part in the creative processes that are involved in thought experiments and thinking. It is argued that we all are able to learn a ‘delayed unconscious thinking’ that leads to an artistic attitude; one that will activate an artistic turn