Regulation of transmission expansion in Argentina Part II: Developments since the Fourth Line

Argentina’s 1992 transmission expansion policy was subsequently modified by, for example, including provision for transmission companies and proposing quality and substation expansions. There have been several such expansions, and no lack of investment in quality and reliability of supply. In 1999, reflecting a decision to give greater weight to political considerations, a Federal Transmission Plan was introduced to build lines designated by the federal and provincial governments. The original reform led to less investment in major transmission lines but more intensive use of existing lines. Competition to construct expansions developed, leading to lower construction costs. Thus the Argentine transmission expansion mechanism was a considerable success in terms of meeting the requirements of users efficiently. This experience suggests that involving users in the regulation of monopoly networks is feasible, and the scope for it may be greater than generally appreciated. However, the reconciliation of economic and political considerations needs further consideration.Argentina, electricity, transmission, regulation

A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior In California’s Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000

During the Summer of 2000, wholesale electricity prices in California were nearly 500% higher than they were during the same months in 1998 or 1999. This price explosion was unexpected and has called into question whether electricity restructuring will bring the benefits of competition promised to consumers. The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors that explain this increase in wholesale electricity prices. We simulate competitive benchmark prices for Summer of 2000 taking account of all relevant supply and demand factors --- gas prices, demand, imports from other states, and emission permit prices. We then compare the simulated competitive benchmark prices with the actual prices observed. We find that there is a large gap between our benchmark competitive prices and observed prices, suggesting that the prices observed during summer 2000 reflect, in part, the exercise of market power by suppliers. We then proceed to examine supplier behavior during high-price hours. We find evidence that suppliers withheld supply from the market that would have been profitable for price-taking firms to sell at the market price.electricity, market power, deregulation

Retail Competition and Electricity Contracts

Long-term contracts for electricity can counter market power and reduce prices in short-term markets. If electricity retailers face competition, however, companies signing long-term contracts are exposed to the risk that a fall in short-term prices would allow rivals to buy on the spot market and undercut them. Could this lead to less contracting and higher prices? This paper combines a model of electricity retailing and a Cournot model of competition in the wholesale markets to estimate the size of this effect, and finds that it could raise wholesale prices by two or three percent.Electricity, contract markets, retail competition

Electricity transmission: an overview of the current debate

Electricity transmission has emerged as critical for successfully liberalising power markets. This paper surveys the issues currently under discussion and provides a framework for the remaining papers in this issue. We conclude that signalling the efficient location of generation investment might require even a competitive LMP system to be complemented with deep connection charges. Although a Europe-wide LMP system is desirable, it appears politically problematic, so an integrated system of market coupling, possibly evolving by voluntary participation, should have high priority. Merchant investors may be able to increase interconnector capacity, although this is not unproblematic and raises new regulatory issues. A key issue that needs further research is how to better incentivize TSOs, especially with respect to cross-border issues.Electricity, Transmission, Regulation, Prices, Merchant Investment

Electricity Reform in Chile: Lessons for Developing Countries

Chile was the first country in the world to implement a comprehensive reform of its electricity sector in the recent period. Among developing countries only Argentina has had a comparably comprehensive and successful reform. This paper traces the history of the Chilean reform, which began in 1982, and assesses its progress and its lessons. We conclude that the reform has been very successful. We suggest lessons for the generation, transmission and distribution sectors, as well as the economic regulation of electricity and the general institutional environment favourable to reform. We note that while the initial market structure and regulatory arrangements did give rise to certain problems, the overall experience argues strongly for the private ownership and operation of the electricity industry.Chile, electricity, restructuring, regulation, privatisation.

Market-based Investment in Electricity Transmission Networks: Controllable Flow

This paper discusses unregulated market-based electricity transmission investment by third parties as opposed to regulated investment by designated transmission system operators. The analysis is set against a European and Australian institutional background and focuses on interconnection of different systems. The paper explores four areas: economies of scale, market power, detrimental investment and risks. The analysis argues for restricting market-based investment to controllable flow (DC or FACTS) only. This is in line with what seems to take place in practice in Europe and Australia, it strikes a balance between pros and cons of market-based investment and draws a sharp line between regulated and unregulated investments.electricity, transmission, merchant, investment

‘Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries: A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Determinants and Performance’

This paper reviews the empirical evidence on electricity reform in developing countries. We find that country institutions and sector governance play an important role in success and failure of reform; reforms appear to have increased operating efficiency and expanded access to urban customers; they have to a lesser degree passed on efficiency gains to customers, tackled distributional effects, or improved rural access. Moreover, some of the literature is not methodologically robust or on a par with general development economics literature and findings on some issues are limited and inconclusive while some important areas are yet to be addressed. Until we know more, implementation of reforms will be more based on ideology and economic theory rather than solid economic evidence.Electricity, reform, developing countries

The More Cooperation, the More Competition? A Cournot Analysis of the Benefits of Electric Market Coupling

Market coupling in Belgian and Dutch markets would permit more efficient use of intercountry transmission, 1) by counting only net flows against transmission limits, 2) by improving access to the Belgian market, and 3) by eliminating the mismatch in timing between interface auctions and the energy spot market. A Cournot market model that accounts for the region’s transmission pricing rules and limitations is used to simulate market outcomes with and without market coupling. This accounts for 1) and 2). Market coupling improves social surplus in the order of 108 €/year, unless it encourages the largest producer in the region to switch from a price-taking strategy in Belgium to a Cournot strategy due to a perceived diminishment of the threat of regulatory intervention. Benefit to Dutch consumers depends on the behavior of this company. The results illustrate how large-scale oligopoly models can be useful for assessing market integration.Electric power, Electric transmission, Liberalization, Oligopoly, Complementarity models, Computational models, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Market Coupling

Issues and Options for Restructuring Electricity Supply Industries

The electricity supply industry is highly capital-intensive, whose success depends critically upon the management of its investment. In most developing countries investment is poorly managed, poorly maintained, and often inadequate. Inadequate regulation or political control lead to low prices that undermine the finance of investment and give poor incentives for management and operation. The paper argues that regulation must be carefully designed to provide efficient incentives and adequate guarantees to sustain investment and operations and only then will privatisation improve performance and benefit consumers. The paper discusses the evidence for these claims, the circumstances required for full unbundling and liberalisation to be successful, and those where the Single Buyer Model or continued, ideally reformed, state ownership, may be preferable, at least until conditions improve.Electricity, reform, restructuring, regulation, developing countries

Does Competition Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on U.S. Electric Generation Efficiency

This paper explores the empirical effects of competition on technical efficiency in the context of electricity industry restructuring. Restructuring programs adopted by many U.S. states made utilities residual claimants to cost savings and increased their exposure to competitive markets. We estimate the impact of these changes on annual generating plant-level input demand for non-fuel operating expenses, the number of employees and fuel use. We find that municipally-owned plants, whose owners were for the most part unaffected by restructuring, experienced the smallest efficiency gains over the past decade. Investor-owned utility plants in states that restructured their wholesale electricity markets had the largest reductions in nonfuel operating expenses and employment, while investor-owned plants in nonrestructuring states fell between these extremes. The analysis also highlights the substantive importance of treating the simultaneity of input and output decisions, which we do through an instrumental variables approach.Efficiency, Production, Competition, Electricity restructuring, Electric Generation, Regulation