Are magnetic monopoles hadrons?

The charges of magnetic monopoles are constrained to a multiple of $2\pi$ times the inverse of the elementary unit electric charge. In the standard model, quarks have fractional charge, raising the question of whether the basic magnetic monople unit is a multiple of $2 \pi/e$ or three times that. A simple lattice construction shows how a magnetic monopole of the lower strength is possible if it interacts with gluonic fields as well. Such a monopole is thus a hadron. This is consistent with the construction of magnetic monopoles in grand unified theories.Comment: Poster presented at Lattice2004(topology), Fermilab, June 21-26, 2004. 3 pages, 5 figure

Theory of disorder-induced multiple coherent scattering in photonic crystal waveguides

We introduce a theoretical formalism to describe disorder-induced extrinsic scattering in slow-light photonic crystal waveguides. This work details and extends the optical scattering theory used in a recent \emph{Physical Review Letter} [M. Patterson \emph{et al.}, \emph{Phys. Rev. Lett.} \textbf{102}, 103901 (2009)] to describe coherent scattering phenomena and successfully explain complex experimental measurements. Our presented theory, that combines Green function and coupled mode methods, allows one to self-consistently account for arbitrary multiple scattering for the propagating electric field and recover experimental features such as resonances near the band edge. The technique is fully three-dimensional and can calculate the effects of disorder on the propagating field over thousands of unit cells. As an application of this theory, we explore various sample lengths and disordered instances, and demonstrate the profound effect of multiple scattering in the waveguide transmission. The spectra yield rich features associated with disorder-induced localization and multiple scattering, which are shown to be exasperated in the slow light propagation regime

Holographic analyzer and image scanner

The characteristics, components, and operating procedures are described for a holographic camera real images projection displayer and scanner unit having the capability to upgrade to multiple types of automated raster scan patterns. Schematics of the optical components are included with a diagram of the electric circuit connections

Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging

The rapid increase in the popularity of electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) is expected to place a considerable strain on the existing electricity grids, due to the high charging rates these vehicles require. In many places, the limited capacity of the local electricity distribution network will be exceeded if many such vehicles are plugged in and left to charge their batteries simultaneously. Thus, it will become increasingly important to schedule the charging of these vehicles, taking into account the vehicle owners’ preferences, and the local constraints on the network. In this paper, we address this setting using online mechanism design and develop a mechanism that incentivises agents (representing vehicle owners) to truthfully reveal their preferences, as well as when the vehicle is available for charging. Existing related online mechanisms assume that agent preferences can be described by a single parameter. However, this is not appropriate for our setting since agents are interested in acquiring multiple units of electricity and can have different preferences for these units, depending on factors such as their expected travel distance. To this end, we extend the state of the art in online mechanism design to multi-valued domains, where agents have non-increasing marginal valuations for each subsequent unit of electricity. Interestingly, we show that, in these domains, the mechanism occasionally requires leaving electricity unallocated to ensure truthfulness. We formally prove that the proposed mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive compatible, and furthermore, we empirically evaluate our mechanism using data from a real-world trial of electric vehicles in the UK. We show that our approach outperforms any fixed price mechanism in terms of allocation efficiency, while performing only slightly worse than a standard scheduling heuristic, which assumes non-strategic agents