Electoral Acceleration: The Effect of Minority Population on Minority Voter Turnout

Political outcomes are well understood to depend on the spatial distribution of citizen preferences. In this paper, we document that the same holds for the individual decision to be politically active. Using both cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence on turnout, we show that citizens are more likely to vote if they live in a jurisdiction with a larger number of persons sharing similar political preferences. As a result, changes in the identity of a district's median citizen lead to even larger changes in the identity of its median voter, a phenomenon we term electoral acceleration. We present evidence that electoral acceleration is in part due to the structure of media markets. Candidates find it easier to direct campaign efforts at larger groups because many existing media outlets cater to this audience.

Voting Leaders and Voting Participation

We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner take all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campain spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. In the unique Nash equilibrium larger elections are characterized by a higher participation rate. Moreover, no matter what the voters' preferences are, parties spend exactly the same amounts for their campain in equilibrium. Platforms converge to the center (median voter) and spending increases as the uncertainty over voters' preferences decreases.Voter's Paradox, Aggregate Uncertainty.

Comment on Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor (2008): “Are voters sensitive to terrorism? Direct evidence from the Israeli electorate”

In “Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate,“ Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor analyze the causal effects of terrorist attacks on the political preferences of the Israeli electorate. In this comment, I discuss Berrebi and Klor's empirical approach - especially their treatment of possible reverse causality between voters' preferences and the occurrence of terrorist attacks - and make suggestions for improvement.terrorism; voter behavior; elections; electoral behavior; political economy; security policy

Campaign Promises and Political Factions

This paper builds a dynamic model of electoral competition with nonbinding campaign promises. We find that campaign promises by a candidate for office signal her political preferences and public policy that she intends to implement. The reason is that electoral competition induces her to pander campaign promises to political interests by a minimal majority of citizens. If their votes bring her in office, she has to raise them once again in order to be re-elected. For that, she needs to fulfill her electoral promises. To minimize the cost of pandering to re-election if in office, a candidate gives campaign promises that she would like to fulfill the most. She fulfills them if in office, unless the cost of fulfillment lies above the benefit from re-election. We show, furthermore, that representatives by a minimal majority of citizens form a faction to coordinate their electoral strategies, and we investigate the consequences of such political collusion.Electoral promises, pork-barrel politics, political parties

Optimal Inflation Targets, Inflation Contracts and Political Cycles

It has been widely accepted that politically induced variance can be generated when the wage contract is written before an election. In this paper, we show that inflation contracts and inflation targets can eliminate both the inflation bias and politically induced variance, if electoral uncertainty is merely due to different preferences. In contrast to the independent central bank that is based on cooperation between competing parties prior to the target can be delegated by the winning party after election. Concern for reputation can lead to the convergence of the inflation targets assigned by different parties. We also consider the case where uncertsinty is caused not only by different preferences, but also by different desired rates inflation. We show that it is quite possible to reduce inflation but increase the variances of inflation and output by adopting the inflation target regime.central bank independence; inflation contract; inflation target; and electoral uncertainty.

Individual preferences, social mobility and electoral outcomes

This paper models data for the Netherlands in the 1970s on prestige of male's occupation, occupational prestige of the father and ‘left/right’ score of the political party he prefers. One set of hypotheses holds that individuals behave according to economic self-interest, another set postulates a status motive. The former specify additive effects, the latter interaction effects. It is argued that these hypotheses have to be tested with Diagonal Mobility Models. A result of their application is that an economic diagonal model fits best.\ud \ud This paper also discusses macroimplications of these models for individual data. To determine macroeffects of status models, it is necessary to ascertain the total percentage of mobile persons in a society. For the macro-application of economic models, the amount of mobility necessitated by a country's opportunity structure is relevant. The latter is much smaller than the former. As an economic model was corroborated, macroeffects of social mobility on a society's political outcome are smaller than might have been suspected

Endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multi-party system with two dominant parties

We develop a model of endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multiparty system with two dominant parties, in an environment of uncertainty about the outcome of the election. Using quasi-lexicographic preferences over the number of seats necessary for a party to form a single-party government we explore the choice of the electoral law by the parties. We show that the minor parties never agree to an electoral reform that distorts the Proportional Representation system (PR). We also show that when the electoral competition among the two dominant parties is non-trivial there exists a unique and stable equilibrium: a unique new electoral rule is being adapted by the parliament in substitution of the PR rule. That is we show that when uncertainty about the outcome of the elections is present and if the dominant parties have a strong desire for single-party governments then strategic incentives to collude between them and distort the PR rule kick in. Hence, by colluding they also increase the probability that the winner will form a single-party government. The paper in e¤ect shows that under an uncertain political environment the two dominant parties have an incentive to collude in favour of stability (single-party governments) by eliminating the e¤ect of the third party in the formation of government. To conclude we also show that the equilibrium with the above characteristic is also unique. In an extension we use the timing of the electoral reform as a strategic variable