The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Regulation of the Internet: Are Laws Protecting Minors From Sexual Predators Constitutionally Different Than Those Protecting Minors From Sexually Explicit Materials?

Several states have enacted statutes to protect minors from harmful or obscene materials disseminated over the Internet, as well as from pedophiles seeking to use the Internet to lure them into sexual conduct. State and federal courts have diverged in their analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause\u27s impact on state regulation in these areas. While state courts have held that the Dormant Commerce Clause does not invalidate state luring statutes, federal courts have been consistent in finding state dissemination statutes unconstitutional. This iBrief summarizes recent state and federal jurisprudence in this area and concludes that state courts have not been successful in distinguishing state luring statutes from federal case law on state dissemination statutes. Therefore, state courts have prematurely aborted the Dormant Commerce Clause examination

Escaping the \u3cem\u3eSporhase\u3c/em\u3e Maze: Protecting State Waters within the Commerce Clause

Eastern states, though they have enjoyed a history of relatively abundant water, increasingly face the need to conserve water, particularly to protect water-dependent ecosystems. At the same time, growing water demands, climate change, and an emerging water-oriented economy have intensified pressure for interstate water transfers. Thus, even traditionally wet states are seeking to protect or secure their water supplies. However, restrictions on water sales and exports risk running afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause. This Article offers guidance for states, partciularly eastern states concerned with maintaining and improving water-dependent ecosystems, in seeking to restrict water exports while staying within the confines of the Dormant Commerce Clause

The Enigma of Wynne

The five-justice Wynne majority used that case to make a major statement about the dormant Commerce Clause. In many respects, Wynne is an enigma that perpetuates an inherent problem of the Courts dormant Commerce Clause doctrine: the Court declares some ill-defined taxes as unconstitutionally discriminatory because they encourage in-state investment, while other economically equivalent taxes and government programs that similarly encourage intrastate economic activity are apparently acceptable under the dormant Commerce Clause. Wynne is thus more important than the immediate situation it addresses, and will have consequences beyond the immediate circumstances it addresses. A decision as enigmatic as it is important, Wynne raises as many questions as it answers. Among these are the continuing viability of external consistency and apportionment, concepts that have been central to the Courts formulation ofthe dormant Commerce Clause. Wynne also undermines the Courts traditional tolerance of the double state income taxation of dual residents because such double taxation can encourage a dual resident to undertake single-taxed in-state economic activity rather than make investments subject to such double taxation

How to Avoid Constitutional Challenges to State Based Climate Change Initiatives: A Case Study of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey and New York State Programs

Considering the decision in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey and the EPA\u27s actions in accordance with the President\u27s Plan, this comment will outline best practices states can use in creating climate initiatives based on the challenges California faced in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey. Part II of this comment will analyze the reasoning in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey. Although certiorari was denied in the case, Part II will analyze recent Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to determine which cases are relevant to consider when analyzing a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to state based climate initiatives. Part III will discuss the current Federal Climate Action Plan and relevant provisions of the CAA, focusing on 111(d), and what states should consider when implementing climate initiatives to avoid constitutional challenges. Part IV will highlight New York State based climate initiatives as a case study. Like California\u27s LCFS, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) and New York\u27s Renewable Portfolio Standard (hereinafter “NYS RPS”) faced scrutiny as to whether the regulations violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Part IV will also discuss how RGGI and the NYS RPS demonstrate how States can act locally and regionally applying best practices to create legally defensible climate initiatives

The Smalling of America?: Growth Management Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause

When we start talking about quality of life, they start talking about cheap underwear. And I keep saying, You cannot buy small-town quality of life at a Wal-Mart; they don\u27t sell it.

Great Beer, Good Intentions, Bad Law: The Unconstitutionality of New York’s Farm Brewery License

In January 2013, New York joined a recent legislative trend and adopted into law a farm brewery license. The law seeks to protect and promote New York’s brewery-related agricultural sectors by creating a new and cheaper “farm brewery” license that grants special privileges to licensees while mandating that they brew with in-state ingredients. This Note argues that, although well-intentioned, this legislative adaption to the craft beer revolution is a protectionist violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. In doing so, this Note provides a background to alcohol regulation in the United States, outlines the tensions these regulations have with the Commerce Clause, and concludes that although states should promote craft brewing, they must do so legally, uniformly, and non-discriminatorily

The Dormant Commerce Clause as a Limit on Personal Jurisdiction

For over 70 years, the Due Process Clause has defined the law of personal jurisdiction. This makes sense, because being forced to stand trial in a far-off state will sometimes be fundamentally unfair. What does not make sense, however, is the Dormant Commerce Clause’s apparent irrelevance to personal jurisdiction. The Dormant Commerce Clause addresses state laws affecting interstate commerce, and a plaintiff’s choice of forum is often a commercially driven choice between different state courts. So why isn’t the Dormant Commerce Clause part of personal jurisdiction doctrine? This Article makes the case for its relevance, and demonstrates how the Dormant Commerce Clause can resolve a new and vexing personal jurisdiction issue. Since the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman—a personal jurisdiction case that significantly curtailed options for forum shoppers— plaintiffs across the country have been attempting to establish jurisdiction using a company’s registration to do business in a state, even when the suit has nothing to do with the company’s business there. Focusing solely on the Due Process Clause, courts across the country have split on the issue. The Dormant Commerce Clause, however, presents a clear answer. This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of how the Dormant Commerce Clause impacts personal jurisdiction. It argues that jurisdiction based on a company’s registration to do business violates the Dormant Commerce Clause— but only in cases where the lawsuit has no connection to the forum. It also demonstrates how personal jurisdiction comports with the Dormant Commerce Clause in most situations deemed constitutional under the Due Process Clause. In certain general jurisdiction cases (to the extent any remain after Daimler) and transient jurisdiction cases, however, this Article argues that the Dormant Commerce Clause renders personal jurisdiction unconstitutional