Pensions in the laboratory: the role of commitment and reputation for deferred compensation in multi-period labor contracts

This paper examines the relationship between firms‘ wage offers and workers‘ supply of effort in a multi-period environment. If firms are able to commit to a schedule of wage payments, in equilibrium they will offer deferred compensation: first-period productivity is positive and wages are zero, while last-period productivity is zero and wages are positive. Workers respond to deferred compensation by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. In the absence of commitment, firms pay zero wages and workers supply low effort. The experiment produces strong evidence of these predictions. With commitment, we frequently observe deferred compensation and relatively high worker effort. In the absence of commitment, we observe no deferred compensation, much lower wages, and little worker effort. A third treatment where commitment is not possible, but firms are able to build a reputation, produces an intermediate result. Finally, we also find some evidence of gift exchange, in particular in the absence of commitment when deferred compensation does not work

The Practice and Tax Consequences of Nonqualified Deferred Compensation

Although nonqualified deferred compensation plans lack explicit tax preferences afforded to qualified plans, it is well understood that nonqualified deferred compensation results in a joint tax advantage when employers earn a higher after-tax return on deferred sums than employees could achieve on their own. But the joint tax advantage depends critically on how plans are operated; chiefly how plan sponsors use or invest deferred compensation dollars. This is the first Article to systematically investigate nonqualified deferred compensation practices. It shows that joint tax minimization historically has taken a backseat to accounting priorities and participant diversification concerns. In recent years, the largest source of joint tax advantage likely stems from use of corporate owned life insurance (COLI) to informally fund nonqualified deferred compensation liabilities. To be sure, the reduction in corporate tax rates enacted in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act increases the joint tax benefit of nonqualified deferred compensation. Nonetheless, this Article recommends a measured response focusing first on COLI reform and an extension of the application of the Affordable Care Act’s Net Investment Income Tax to nonqualified deferred compensation earnings, before considering fundamental reform of the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation. This Article also reveals that nonqualified deferred compensation results in an undisclosed advantage to corporate executives, as it provides what are effectively above-market returns on retirement savings, and that, at least in recent years, shareholders, not taxpayers, have provided the bulk of the subsidy for nonqualified deferred compensation

Time to Start Over on Deferred Compensation

Government regulators would do well to follow simple heuristics like that. Writing good regulations-- good in the sense of promoting the public interest--always presents challenges. Regulators must hit a small but important target where private conduct is brought within appropriate government control, but unnecessary compliance burdens and other deadweight costs are minimized. Even if they see the government\u27s objectives clearly, regulators often have only a limited understanding of the underlying private activities. Moreover, regulators may be unaware of how their rules disrupt or distort those activities in socially harmful ways. Regulators occasionally hit the target exactly. More often, they miss--though not by an intolerably wide margin (good enough for government work, as the saying goes). However, sometimes regulators miss the mark so badly that the only responsible next step is to acknowledge the failure. That is the case with the final regulations under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 409A. Those regulations are irreparably flawed--so flawed that the best members of the practicing bar cannot make sense of them for basic transactions. When the government issues rules that even experts cannot understand, the government should start over

Technical Bulletins: Qualifications of Companies Providing Deferred Compensation Plan for Employees of Municipality Must Be Determined by Specified State Officials

MTAS issued this Technical Bulletin to inform municipalities of an opinion of the Attorney General of Tennessee that under T.C.A. section 8-4303, the Commissioner of Finance and Administration, the Chairman of the Finance, Ways and Means Committee of the Senate, and the Chairman of the Finance, Ways and Means Committee of the House are required to determine the qualifications of each company providing a deferred compensation plan established pursuant to the Government Employees Deferred Compensation Act (T.C.A. sections 8-4301, et seq.), and that this includes deferred compensation plans for municipal employees

The Employment Consequences of Seniority Wages

This paper combines two strains of the literature on the employment effects of deferred compensation. The first strain separates seniority and job matching wage effects on the basis of individual data, but cannot look at employment consequences. The second strain explains the employment structure on the basis of establishment data, but cannot properly calculate seniority wages. This paper uses linked employeremployee data, aggregates individual seniority wages to the establishment level, and correlates them with the establishment employment structure. According to the deferred compensation hypothesis this paper finds that establishments with stronger seniority wages have a higher tenure but hire less older employees. --Seniority Wages,Employment Structure,Linked Employer-Employee Data

Deferred compensation and gift exchange: an experimental investigation into multi-period labor markets

This paper examines the relationship between firms’ wage offers and workers’ supply of effort using a three-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first period productivity is positive and wages are zero, while third period productivity is zero and wages are positive. The experiment produces strong evidence that deferred compensation increases worker effort; in about 70 percent of cases subjects supplied the optimal effort given the wage offer, and there was a strong effort response to future-period wages. We also find some evidence of gift exchange; worker players increased the effort levels in response to above equilibrium wage offers by a human, but not in response to similar offers by a computer. Finally, we find that firm players who are initially hesitant to defer compensation learn over time that it is beneficial to do so

Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethicsof Financial Regulation

Defects in the corporate governance of government-owned enterprises tempt opportunistic officials to breach duties of public stewardship. Corporate-governance theory suggests that incentive-based deferred compensation could intensify the force that common-law duties actually exert on regulatory managers. In principle, a forfeitable fund of deferred compensation could be combined with provisions for measuring, verifying, and rewarding multiperiod performance to make top regulators accountable for maximizing the long-run net social benefits their enterprise produces. Because government deposit-insurance enterprises are purveyors of credit enhancements for which private substitute and reinsurance markets exist, their performance could be measured accurately enough to make employment contracts for deposit-insurance CEOs a promising place to experiment with this kind of accountability reform.

Executive Compensation Reform and the Limits of Tax Policy

The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 includes a major attempt to reform the tax rules for deferred compensation arrangements covering corporate managers. This paper examines the tax policy and corporate-governance policy objectives of the reform effort, explores the shortcomings of the legislation, and outlines a different approach for future executive compensation reform