Blue velvet: The rise and decline of the new Czech right

In Comparative terms, the Czech centre-right (principally the Civic Democratic Part - ODS - of Václav Klaus) represents an intermediate case between those of Hungary and Poland. Although Klaus's ODS has always been a large, stable and well-institutionalized party, avoiding the fragmentation and instability of the Polish right, the Czech centre-right has not achieved the degree of ideological and organization concentration seen in Hungary. A number of factors are commonly used to explain party (and party system) formation in the region in relation to the Czech centre-right. These include both structural-historical explanations and 'political' factors such as macro-institutional design, strategies of party formation in the immediate post-transition period, ideological construction and charismatic leadership. In fact, both the early success and subsequent decline of the Czech right were rooted in a single set of circumstances: (1) the early institutionalization of ODS as the dominant party of the mainstream right; and (2) the right's immediate and successful taking up of the mantle of market reform and technocratic modernization. © 2004 Taylor and Francis Ltd

The myth of the Great Patriotic War as a tool of the Kremlin’s great power policy. OSW Commentary NUMBER 316 31.12.2019

The sacralised Soviet victory over Nazism is a central element of the politics of memory, as utilised by the Russian state today. It constitutes an important theme in the Kremlin’s ideological offensive that is intended to legitimise Russia’s great-power ambitions. The messianic myth of saving the world from absolute evil is supposed to cover up the darker chapters of Soviet history and to legitimise all subsequent Soviet or Russian wars and military interventions, starting with Hungary, through Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and ending with Ukraine and Syria. According to the current neo-Soviet interpretation, all these military actions were purely defensive and justified by external circumstances. The glorification of the “Yalta order” and the justification of the use of force in foreign policy is intended to legitimise Moscow’s pursuit of its current strategic aims, first and foremost of these being hegemony in the post-Soviet area and revision of the European security architecture. The war mythology and Russia’s great-power ambitions continue to resonate with the wider Russian public; thus contributing to legitimisation of the authoritarian regime in the eyes of a large swathe of society and offsetting the effect of growing socio-economic problems. The myth of a wartime ‘brotherhood of arms’ has a smaller impact on other post-Soviet states, which have increasingly been distancing themselves – especially since 2014 – from Moscow’s neo-imperial historical narrative. The use of historical myths as a form of soft power finds even less resonance in Europe and the US. Nevertheless, low susceptibility in the West to Russian historical propaganda does not diminish the gravity of the challenge posed by Russian information-psychological warfare, resorting to historical falsehoods and specious analogies between the current international situation and political-military tensions of the 1930s

System Transformation: Achievements and Social Problems in Poland

The present book “Poland – History, Culture and Society. Selected Readings” is the third edition of a collection of academic texts written with the intention to accompany the module by providing incoming students with teaching materials that will assist them in their studies of the course module and encourage further search for relevant information and data. The papers collected in the book have been authored by academic teachers from the University of Łódź, specialists in such fields as history, geography, literature, sociology, ethnology, cultural studies, and political science. Each author presents one chapter related to a topic included in the module or extending its contents. The book contains the extensive bibliography

Ukraine–Hungary: the intensifying dispute over the Hungarian minority’s rights. OSW Commentary NUMBER 280 | 14.08.2018

For nearly one year relations between Hungary and Ukraine have been plunged in the worst crisis since the collapse of the USSR. The main cause of the tension has been the Education Act passed by the Ukrainian parliament in September 2017 which envisages a comprehensive reform of the education system and at the same time imposes serious restrictions on the use of the languages of national minorities, including Hungarian, in school education. In response to this, Budapest severely criticised Kyiv and took measures to block the establishment of closer relations between Ukraine and NATO, insisting that the act be changed. In turn, Ukraine took steps to soften Budapest’s stance and asked the Venice Commission to evaluate the act and then declared that it would follow the recommendations provided in the evaluation. The deficit of trust which has existed for years and the fact that neither of the parties had taken real steps to reach a compromise prevented them from reaching an agreement that had seemed close in May and June this year. The conflict was escalated further when the Hungarian government appointed a ministerial commissioner for the development of Zakarpattia Oblast (in Ukraine), which met with a harsh reaction from Kyiv and was interpreted as interfering with Ukraine’s internal affairs. The dispute over the Hungarian minority’s rights in Ukraine is about historical and identity related issues that are very important to both sides, and it is highly unlikely that it will be resolved in the coming months. While these issues have always been at the core of Budapest’s foreign policy, especially with regard to the countries where the Hungarian minorities live, Kyiv neglected them until 2014. However, since the Russian annexation of Crimea and the aggression in the Donbass, Ukraine has been taking comprehensive measures aimed at decommunisation and derussification. The consequences of this include on the one hand a Ukrainisation of the public space, the media and the education system, and on the other restricting national minorities’ rights in Ukraine as regards the use of their language in the education system. For those reasons, both sides are likely to firmly stick to their stances and to be looking for current political benefits resulting from the conflict rather than taking action to reach a compromise

Київ як центр святості

Огляд Києва як так званого другого Єрусалиму, символічного центру святості

Semi-presidentialism and democratisation in Poland

Polish semi-presidentialism evolved from a pacted transition between the leadership of the communist regime and the Solidarity opposition movement. The mechanics of semi-presidentialism, as well as its effect on democratisation, depend upon the constitution, the party system and the personality of the president. Poland has had three semi-presidential constitutions, a variety of relationships between president and government as well as government and parliament, and two very different presidents. In the early years, the absence of the conditions for stable semi-presidentialism had a negative effect on democratisation. Later on, conditions were more supportive, and semi-presidentialism began to play a more positive role. Before the introduction of semi-presidentialism in November 1990, Polish elites had already established a firm consensus on democracy, which was buttressed by consensus on the economic system and international relations. Therefore, the conflicting legitimacies generated by semi-presidentialism delayed but did not prevent, or seriously threaten, democratic consolidation in Poland

Introduction - Vers une pérennisation des configurations post-2014 ?

Les configurations issues de la crise ukrainienne de 2014 continuent à structurer les évolutions de l’espace postsoviétique. La rupture entre l’Ukraine et la Russie, qui a contraint Moscou à se recentrer sur des projets plus limités qu’elle définit à présent dans un cadre eurasien, s’ancre dans l’espace. La conflictualité russo-occidentale marque toujours de son empreinte les rapports avec et entre les Etats de la région, et favorise une réorientation des territoires. Les conflits du Moyen-Orient, la montée en puissance de la Chine et l’imprévisibilité des Etats-Unis de Donald Trump sont d’autres facteurs d’évolution de la région

Polish lustration and the models of transitional justice

Transitional justice in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe concentrates on the problem of the lustration of former secret service officers and their clandestine collaborators and on the question of access to files created by the communist political police. The aim of the article is to present the Polish experience in this field in view of the theoretical framework available in transitional justice literature. Thus, the text begins with definitions of some basic notions connected with dealing with the past. The article also proposes three basic models of transitional justice. The third part offers an account of Polish lustration and public disclosure measures and assigns those instruments to the models of transitional justice. The final section presents some concluding remarks on the evolution of Polish lustration

Getting the right right: Redefining the centre-right in post-communist Europe

Existing literature on the centre-right in Eastern and Central Europe is small and fragmentary, in contrast with the voluminous, detailed and often sophisticated comparative literatures on the Left and the Far Right in the region. A review and synthesis of the existing literature suggests the possibility of a definition of the Right and Centre-Right in the region, which can both accommodate its diversity and provide a shared framework for analysis. The Centre-Right should be understood as neither an atavistic throwback to a pre-communist past nor a product of the straightforward assimilation of Western ideologies. Rather, it is a product of the politics of late communism, domestic reform, European integration and post-Cold War geopolitical realignment, which has powerfully reshaped historical influences and foreign models. © 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd

Are the Exceptions Really the Rule? Questioning the Application of 'Electoral-Professional' Type Models of Party Organization in East Central Europe

Much writing on party organisational development in post-communist East Central Europe has argued that, with the partial exception of successor parties to former regime parties, political parties in the region will be state-centred, low-membership organisations dominated by political elites, which loosely approximate to the ‘cartel’ and ‘electoral-professional’ models of party identified by some scholars in Western Europe. This pattern of development in East Central Europe is seen as reflecting the specific opportunity structures of post-communist societies, which both shape politicians’ organisational strategies and determine available resources for party building. Using a detailed re-examination of the Czech case, this paper questions the applicability of such models. It argues that their use is problematic not simply because of inherent difficulties of model fitting, but because they underestimate the path dependent character of party organisational development in the region and, especially the extent to which viable parties appear to have drawn on organisational resources accumulated under the old regime and during transition. The combination of path dependency and post-communist opportunity structures, it is argued, tends to create hybrid party organisations, which are removed from ‘electoral professional’ type parties in a number of ways. The paper concludes by suggesting possible avenues for rethinking party organisational development in the region