Greek Debt: The Endgame Scenarios

Perhaps Greece -- a country with a debt to GDP already approaching 150 percent and set to move even higher -- avoids a debt restructuring. Perhaps not. What are the possible scenarios if Greece cannot return to the capital markets to refinance this gargantuan debt stock once its EU/IMF bailout package expires in two years time? What would a Greek debt restructuring look like after mid-2013? And (sharp intake of breath here) what would happen if such a debt restructuring were undertaken before that point

How to Restructure Greek Debt

Plan A for addressing the Greek debt crisis has taken the form of a €110 billion financial support package for Greece announced by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund on May 2, 2010. A significant part of that €110 billion, if and when it is disbursed, will be used to repay maturing Greek debt obligations, in full and on time. The success of Plan A is not inevitable; among other things, it will require the Greeks to accept - and to stick to - a harsh fiscal adjustment program for several years. If Plan A does not prosper, what are the alternatives? And how quickly could a Plan B be mobilized and executed? This paper outlines the elements of one possible Plan B, a restructuring of Greece’s roughly €300 billion of government debt. Prior sovereign debt restructurings provide considerable guidance for how such a restructuring might be shaped. But several key features of the Greek debt stock could make this operation significantly different from any previous sovereign debt workouts. To be sure, a restructuring of Greek debt will not relieve the country from the painful prospect of significant fiscal adjustment, nor will it displace the need for financial support from the official sector. But it may change how some of those funds are spent (for example, backstopping the domestic banking system as opposed to paying off maturing debt in full). This paper does not speculate about whether a restructuring of Greek debt will in fact become necessary or politically feasible. It focuses only on the how, not the whether or the when, of such a debt restructuring

Sequential Restructuring of Debt Classes, Absolute Priority Violation and Spread Reversals Under Chapter 11

Under U.S. Bankruptcy Code, equity holders can restructure different debt classes at a time. Recognizing this allows us to endogenize, in continuous time, not only the restructuring threshold but also the restructuring order of senior and junior classes. Unlike previous studies, sequential restructuring explains absolute priority violation (APV) not just among debt and equity but also among debt classes. The extent of APV leads to positive credit spreads even if senior creditors are fully secured and virtually immune to default risk. Moreover, sequential restructuring can lead to reversals in the credit spreads. We provide sufficient conditions for avoiding reversals.Strategic debt service, bankruptcy, Nash Bargaining, debt priority structure, geometric Brownian motion

Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison

The recent financial woes of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and other nations have reinvigorated the debate over whether to bail out defaulting countries or, instead, restructure their debt. Bailouts are expensive, both for residents of the nation being bailed out and for parties providing the bailout funds. Because the IMF, which is subsidized by most nations (including the United States), is almost always involved in country debt bailouts, we all share the burden. Yet bailouts are virtually inevitable under the existing international framework; defaults are likely to have systemic consequences, whereas an orderly debt restructuring is currently impractical. This article analyzes and compares debt restructuring alternatives to bailouts. Under a free-market option, sovereign debtors and their creditors attempt to consensually negotiate a debt restructuring, aided by collective-action clauses and by exchange offers with exit consents. Under a statutory option, sovereign debtors and their creditors would be bound by an international convention that sets forth a process to facilitate debt restructuring. The absence of any systematic comparison of these options has made it difficult to facilitate country debt restructurings. This article attempts to provide that comparison

Toward a Cosmopolitan Ethic in Debt Restructuring

Corrales discusses the sovereign debt restructuring process. Process -- or the series of actions, actors, and influences involved in a transaction -- is rarely examined in law. But the dynamics of process and the unspoken codes that affect it are, nonetheless, key to complex transactions and sovereign debt restructuring

The Problem of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructuring

The Eurozone official sector has declared that the belated restructuring of Greek bonds held by private sector creditors in 2012 was a “unique and exceptional” event, never, ever to be repeated in any other Eurozone country. Maybe so. But if this assurance proves in time to be as fragile as the official sector’s prior pronouncements on the subject of “private sector involvement” in Eurozone sovereign debt problems, any future Eurozone debt restructuring will be surely plagued by the problem of non-participating creditors --- holdouts. Indeed, it is the undisguised fear of holdouts and the prospect of a messy, Argentine-style debt restructuring in the belly of Europe that has been one of the principal motivations for the official sector’s willingness to use its taxpayer money to repay, in full and on time, all of the private sector creditors of Eurozone countries receiving bailouts (the belated Greek restructuring being the sole exception). This article argues that a simple amendment of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (the Eurozone’s new bailout facility) could immunize within the confines of the Eurozone the assets of a Eurozone country receiving ESM bailout assistance from attachment by litigious holdout creditors. By thus increasing the difficulties that holdouts would face in enforcing court judgments against a debtor country, the objective of the amendment is to deflate creditor expectations that staying out of an ESM-supported sovereign debt restructuring will lead to a preferential recovery for the holdouts. This measure would also, when taken together with the other steps that the Eurozone has already implemented, substantially replicate the important features of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism proposed by the IMF in 2002

Debt Restructuring

What difference does it make, and for whom, whether the nonperforming debts of emerging market borrowers are restructured? This paper begins by positing a set of counterfactual conditions under which restructuring would not matter, and then shows how several ways in which the actual world of international lending departs from these conditions give both lenders and borrowers ample reason to care whether nonperforming debts are restructured. One implication of the way in which debt restructuring matters is that restructuring should not be too' easy. Further, with a greater frequency of defaults, some credit flows to emerging market countries would not be extended in the first place. An important element driving this line of argument is moral hazard, but (unlike in much of the recent literature of emerging market debt problems) what is central here is not the availability of credit from the IMF or other official lenders but the more fundamental moral hazard inherent in all uncollateralized borrower-lender relationships.

A Model-Law Approach to Restructuring Unsustainable Sovereign Debt

Unresolved sovereign debt problems are hurting debtor nations, their citizens and their creditors, and also can pose serious systemic threats to the international financial system. The existing contractual restructuring approach is insufficient to make sovereign debt sustainable. Although a more systematic legal resolution framework is needed, a formal multilateral approach, such as a treaty, is not currently politically viable. An informal model-law approach should be legally, politically and economically feasible. This informal approach would not require multilateral acceptance. Because most sovereign debt contracts are governed by either New York or English law, it would be sufficient if one or both of those jurisdictions enacted a proposed Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law as their domestic law

Sovereign Debt Restructuring and English Governing Law

The problem of sovereign indebtedness is becoming a worldwide crisis because nations, unlike individuals and corporations, lack access to bankruptcy laws to restructure unsustainable debt. Decades of international efforts to solve this problem through contracting and attempted treaty-making have failed to provide an adequate debt-restructuring framework. A significant amount of outstanding sovereign debt is governed, however, by English law. This Article argues that the U.K. Parliament has the extraordinary power to help solve the problem of unsustainable country debt by changing English law to facilitate fair and consensual debt restructuring. This Article also proposes modifications to English law that Parliament could consider, based on a model law for sovereign debt restructuring

Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy

Sovereign debt crises occur regularly and often violently. Yet there is no legally and politically recognized procedure for restructuring the debt of bankrupt sovereigns. Procedures of this type have been periodically debated, but so far been rejected, for two main reasons. First, countries have been reluctant to give up power to supranational rules or institutions, and creditors and debtors have felt that there were sufficient instruments for addressing debt crises at hoc. Second, fears that making debt easier to restructure would raise the costs and reduce the amounts of sovereign borrowing in many countries. This was perceived to be against the interests of both the providers of both creditors and major borrowers. This report argues that both the nature and our understanding of sovereign debt problems have changed, over the course of the last decade, in a direction that creates a much stronger case for an orderly sovereign bankruptcy regime today than ten years ago. Pre-crisis policy mistakes are now recognized to be a much more severe problem for borrowing countries than the costs or limited availability of private financing. Recent court rulings – particularly a recent U.S. ruling that gives holdout creditors that decline a restructuring offer the right to interfere with payments to the creditors that accept such an offer. This will complicate efforts to resolve future debt crises on an ad hoc basis. Finally, sovereign debt crises are no longer just a problem in emerging markets, but a core concern in advanced countries as well – particularly in the Euro area. If the Euro is to survive, this will require both better ways to resolve debt crises and stronger, market-based incentives that prevent debt problems from occurring in the first place. To address these problems, policy proposals are presented at two levels: for the Euro area, and globally. A Euro area sovereign debt restructuring regime could be developed by amending the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). This would both restrict the scope for lending to highly indebted countries without also restructuring their debts, and protect Euro area members receiving ESM financial assistance from legal action by holdout creditors. At the global level, a number of proposals are discussed, ranging from a coordinated introduction of aggregate collective action clauses that would allow a supermajority of bondholders across all bonds to amend bond payment terms to an amendment of the IMF articles that would limit the legal remedies of holdouts when a debt restructuring proposal has been accepted both by a majority of creditors and endorsed by the IMF