Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids: Information Flows and Strategic Behavior in the Government of Canada Securities Auctions

Is order-flow an important component of private information possessed by traders in government securities markets? Utilizing a detailed data set on Government of Canada securities auctions, we argue that the answer is yes. Direct participation in these auctions is limited to government securities dealers. However, non-dealer customers can also submit bids through dealers. We document patterns of strategic behavior by both sides of the market, dealers and customers, that support the hypothesis that customer bids provide valuable order-flow information to dealers. Dealer bids respond to privately observed customer bids, and dealers observing customer bid can predict the auction cutoff price better. Customers also respond strategically to dealers' use of the information contained in their bids.

Preferencing, internalization and inventory position

We present a model of market-making in which dealers differ by their current inventory positions and by their preferencing agreements. Under preferencing, dealers receive captive orders that they guarantee to execute at the best price. We show that preferencing raises the inventory holding costs of preferenced dealers. In turn, competitors post less aggressive quotes. Since price-competition is softened, expected spreads widen. The entry of unpreferenced dealers, or the ability to route preferenced orders to best-quoting dealers, as internalization does restore price competitiveness. We also show that a greater transparency may negatively affect expected spreads, depending on the scale of preferencing.Internalization; Inventory Control; Market Microstructure; Preferencing; Transparency

Crashes and recoveries in illiquid markets

We study the dynamics of liquidity provision by dealers during an asset market crash, described as a temporary negative shock to investors’ aggregate asset demand. We consider a class of dynamic market settings where dealers can trade continuously with each other, while trading between dealers and investors is subject to delays and involves bargaining. We derive conditions on fundamentals, such as preferences, market structure and the characteristics of the market crash (e.g., severity, persistence) under which dealers provide liquidity to investors following the crash. We also characterize the conditions under which dealers’ incentives to provide liquidity are consistent with market efficiency.Asset pricing ; Portfolio management ; Financial crises ; Liquidity (Economics)

Dealers' hedging of interest rate options in the U.S. dollar fixed-income market

Despite investors' willingness to hold a variety of financial assets and risks, a significant share of interest rate options exposures remains in the hands of dealers. This concentration of risk makes the interest rate options market an ideal place to explore the effects of dealers' dynamic hedging on underlying markets. Using data from a global survey of derivatives dealers and other sources, this article estimates the potential impact of dynamic hedging by interest rate options dealers on the fixed-income market. The author finds that for short-term maturities, turnover volume in the most liquid hedging instruments is more than large enough to absorb dealers' dynamic hedges. For medium-term maturities, however, an unusually large interest rate shock could lead to hedging difficulties.Hedging (Finance) ; Options (Finance)

Do FX traders in Bishkek have similar perceptions to their London colleagues? Survey evidence of market practitioners' views

We ask whether FX dealers from Kyrgyzstan, a low income country, have similar perceptions to FX dealers from other international financial centers. Perceptions of Kyrgyz FX dealers in the interbank market are tested using detailed survey data against survey information from five major financial centers. The survey evidence finds that the FX dealers' responses from the Kyrgyz interbank market differ from those from other international financial centers. Stark differences arise in the perceptions concerning the effectiveness of central bank interventions and the influence of speculation.foreign exchange traders, survey study, microstructure, FX interventions

Search in Asset Markets

This paper investigates how the degree of trading frictions in asset markets affects portfolio allocations, asset prices, efficiency, and several measures of liquidity, such as execution delays, bid-ask spreads, and trade volumes. To this end, we generalize the search-theoretic model of financial intermediation of Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005) to allow for more general preferences and idiosyncratic shock structure, unrestricted portfolio choices, aggregate uncertainty, and entry of financial intermediaries (dealers). Investors are subject to shocks that periodically change their desired asset holdings, and contact dealers to rebalance their portfolios. Investors and dealers are matched bilaterally according to a stochastic, time-consuming process, and the latter have instantaneous access to a competitive (inter-dealer) market for the asset. We study the model with a fixed measure of dealers and show that a steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique. We provide a simple condition on preferences under which a reduction in trading frictions (e.g., a reduction in execution delays) will lead to an increase in the price of the asset. We also study the connection between the volatility of asset prices and the degree of trading frictions. From a normative standpoint, we find that the asset allocation is constrained-inefficient unless investors have all the bargaining power in bilateral negotiations with dealers. We also analyze the model with entry of dealers, thereby endogenizing the extent of the trading frictions. We show that the dealers' entry decision introduces a feedback that can give rise to multiple equilibria, and construct examples. With entry, we find that both the portfolio allocation across investors and the number of dealers are socially inefficientSearch, asset markets

Learning from Prices, Liquidity Spillovers, and Market Segmentation

We describe a new mechanism that explains the transmission of liquidity shocks from one security to another (“liquidity spillovers”). Dealers use prices of other securities as a source of information. As prices of less liquid securities convey less precise information, a drop in liquidity for one security raises the uncertainty for dealers in other securities, thereby affecting their liquidity. The direction of liquidity spillovers is positive if the fraction of dealers with price information on other securities is high enough. Otherwise liquidity spillovers can be negative. For some parameters, the value of price information increases with the number of dealers obtaining this information. In this case, related securities can appear segmented, even if the cost of price information is small.Liquidity spillovers, Liquidity Risk, Contagion, Value of price information, Transparency, Colocation

Completing contracts ex post: How car manufacturers manage car dealers

This article illustrates how contracts are completed ex post in practice and, in so doing, indirectly suggests what the real function of contracts may be. Our evidence comes from the contracts between automobile manufacturers and their dealers in 23 dealership networks in Spain. Franchising dominates automobile distribution because of the need to decentralize pricing and control of service decisions. It motivates local managers to undertake these activities at minimum cost for the manufacturer. However, it creates incentive conflicts, both between manufacturers and dealers and among dealers themselves, concerning the level of sales and service provided. It also holds potential for expropriation of specific investments. Contracts deal with these conflicts by restricting dealers’ decision rights and granting manufacturers extensive completion, monitoring and enforcement powers. The main mechanism that may prevent abuse of these powers is the manufacturers’ reputational capital.Franchising, incomplete contracts, self-enforcement, automobile