The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act

The secured creditor enjoys several advantages over his unsecured brethren. If the debtor defaults on his obligation, the secured creditor is sometimes empowered to take matters in his own hands, sell the property covered by his security, and reimburse himself out of the proceeds without the time and expense of the lawsuit to which the unsecured creditor must resort. If the debtor disposes of all of his property, the secured creditor\u27s claim, if properly perfected, follows the property into the hands of the transferee and may be satisfied therefrom without the necessity of litigation to establish that the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance. If unsecured creditors go after property of the debtor to satisfy their claims, the secured creditor\u27s interest in the property covered by his security, if properly perfected, is immune from their levies. And if the debtor goes into bankruptcy, the secured creditor has first claim on the proceeds of the property covered by his security, after which he shares pro rata on any unpaid balance with the full claims of unsecured creditors in the remainder of the debtor\u27s assets

Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals

We analyze the optimal debt structure of multinational corporations choosing between centralized or decentralized borrowing. We identify how this choice is affected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial incentives and coinsurance considerations. We find that partially centralized borrowing structures are optimal with either weak or strong creditor rights. For intermediate levels of creditor rights fully decentralized (centralized) borrowing structures are optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire building dencies. Decentralized borrowing is more attractive for companies focussing on short-term profitability. Credits are rather taken in countries with better creditor rights and more efficient insolvency systems

Rights of Creditors to Collect Marital Debts After Divorce in Community Property Jurisdictions

The primary thrust of this Article is to address the post-divorce liability issue outlined in Part III from the perspective of debtor-creditor law. The rules adopted in most of the community property jurisdictions with respect to this issue appear to be primarily focused on the perspective of marital property and family law without regard to general debtor-creditor law principles and policies. For example, basic fraudulent transfer law has been ignored in those jurisdictions and not applied in the usual manner. As a result, the rules developed in those jurisdictions with regard to the post-divorce liability issue are not consistent with the basic principles and policies of debtor-creditor law. Part IV of this Article will discuss basic debtor-creditor law as it relates to this issue, and will propose a set of rules which could and should be adopted by the community property jurisdictions consistent with debtor-creditor law as it applies generally

Creditor Rights and Debt Allocation within Multinationals

We analyze the optimal debt structure of multinational corporations choosing between centralized or decentralized borrowing. We identify how this choice is affected by creditor rights and bankruptcy costs, taking into account managerial incentives and coinsurance considerations. We find that partially centralized borrowing structures are optimal with either weak or strong creditor rights. For intermediate levels of creditor rights fully decentralized (centralized) borrowing structures are optimal if managers have strong (weak) empire building dencies. Decentralized borrowing is more attractive for companies focussing on short-term profitability. Credits are rather taken in countries with better creditor rights and more efficient insolvency systems.Multinational corporations; capital structure; creditor rights; coinsurance; internal capital markets

The Impact of Creditor Protection on Stock Prices in the Presence of Credit Crunches

Data show that better creditor protection is correlated across countries with lower average stock market volatility. Moreover, countries with better creditor protection seem to have suffered lower decline in their stock market indexes during the current financial crisis. To explain this regularity, we use a Tobin q model of investment and show that stronger creditor protection increases the expected level and lowers the variance of stock prices in the presence of credit crunches. There are two main channels through which creditor protection enhances the performance of the stock market: (1) The credit-constrained stock price increases with better protection of creditors; (2) The probability of a credit crunch leading to a binding credit constraint falls with strong protection of creditors. We find strong empirical support for both predictions using data on stock market performance, amount and cost of credit, and creditor rights protection for 52 countries over the period 1980-2007. In particular, we find that crises are more frequent in countries with poor creditor protection. Using propensity score matching we also show that during crises stock market returns fall by more in countries with poor creditor protection.liquidity crisis, creditor protection, stock volatility, credit crunch

Creditor protection and financial markets: empirical evidence and implications for Latin America

Although Latin American countries have made significant strides in reforming their financial markets, these markets remain shallow, implying a need for further reform. Stronger protection of creditor rights can improve the size and stability of credit markets and provide greater access to capital for small and medium-sized enterprises that operate under greater financial strictures. ; In discussing creditor protection’s impact on the size of financial markets, the authors first document the state of Latin American creditor protection. They then discuss the effect of enhanced creditor rights on small and medium-sized firms and how the dynamics of financial markets are affected by the regulation of creditor rights. To examine the effects of adverse economic shocks on creditors, the authors study the credit cycle in various countries. ; In addition to increasing the size of financial markets and stimulating economic growth, reforms that strengthen creditor protection can affect credit allocation, the authors find. Their research suggests that the rules and regulations concerning the seizure of collateral need reforming and, more importantly, that the judicial system must become more agile to assure prompt, effective, and less expensive enforcement of creditor rights. The authors note that the successful introduction of these reforms may require convincing the citizenry that creditor protections benefit not only the financial sector but the economy overall.Economic stabilization

Private Credit in 129 Countries

We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. We find that both creditor protection through the legal system and information sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to GDP, but that the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms also shows that improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing precede faster credit growth. We also find that creditor rights are extremely stable over time, contrary to the convergence hypothesis. Finally, we find that legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and information sharing institutions.

The impact of creditor protection on stock prices in the presence of credit crunches

Data show that better creditor protection is correlated across countries with lower average stock market volatility. Moreover, countries with better creditor protection seem to have suffered lower decline in their stock market indexes during the current financial crisis. To explain this regularity, we use a Tobin q model of investment and show that stronger creditor protection increases the expected level and lowers the variance of stock prices in the presence of credit crunches. There are two main channels through which creditor protection enhances the performance of the stock market: (1) The credit-constrained stock price increases with better protection of creditors; (2) The probability of a credit crunch leading to a binding credit constraint falls with strong protection of creditors. We find strong empirical support for both predictions using data on stock market performance, amount and cost of credit, and creditor rights protection for 52 countries over the period 1980-2007. In particular, we find that crises are more frequent in countries with poor creditor protection. Using propensity score matching we also show that during crises stock market returns fall by more in countries with poor creditor protection.Economic stabilization ; Stocks - Rate of return

Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Sovereign Bond Markets: A Unified Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence

This paper critically evaluates the existing empirical literature on creditor moral hazard in sovereign bond markets, proposes a unified theoretical approach to test for IMF-induced creditor moral hazard, and provides empirical evidence, using daily sovereign bond market spreads of Indonesia and Korea. The results suggest that IMF-related news regarding program negotiations and approval may be associated with creditor moral hazard, but their impact on spreads is short-lived, indicating that creditor moral hazard could be best described as a short-run phenomenon.Creditor moral hazard, financial markets, the IMF, and news

When do creditor rights work?

Creditor-friendly laws are generally associated with more credit to the private sector and deeper financial markets. But laws mean little if they are not upheld in the courts. The authors hypothesize that the effectiveness of creditor rights is strongly linked to the efficiency of contract enforcement. This hypothesis is tested using firm level data on 27 European countries in 2002 and 2005. The analysis finds that firms have more access to bank credit in countries with better creditor rights, but the association between creditor rights and bank credit is much weaker in countries with inefficient courts. Exploiting the panel dimension of the data and the fact that creditor rights change over time, the authors show that the effect of a change in creditor rights on change in bank credit increases with court enforcement. In particular, a unit increase in the creditor rights index will increase the share of bank loans in firm investment by 27 percent in a country at the 10th percentile of the enforcement time distribution (Lithuania). However, the increase will be only 7 percent in a country at the 80th percentile of this distribution (Kyrgyzstan). Legal protections of creditors and efficient courts are strong complements.Debt Markets,,Banks&Banking Reform,Emerging Markets,Labor Policies