Counter-intelligence in a command economy

We provide the first thick description of the KGB’s counter-intelligence function in the Soviet command economy. Based on documentation from Lithuania, the paper considers KGB goals and resources in relation to the supervision of science, industry, and transport; the screening of business personnel; the management of economic emergencies; and the design of economic reforms. In contrast to a western market regulator, the role of the KGB was to enforce secrecy, monopoly, and discrimination. As in the western market context, regulation could give rise to perverse incentives with unintended consequences. Most important of these may have been adverse selection in the market for talent. There is no evidence that the KGB was interested in the costs of its regulation or in mitigating the negative consequences

Counter-intelligence in a command economy

This article provides the first thick description of the counter-intelligence function in a command economy of the Soviet type. Based on documentation from Soviet Lithuania, the article considers the KGB (secret police) as a market regulator, commissioned to prevent the disclosure of secret government business and forestall the disruption of government plans. Where market regulation in open societies is commonly intended to improve market transparency, competition, and fair treatment of consumers and employees, KGB regulation was designed to enforce secrecy, monopoly, and discrimination. One consequence of KGB regulation of the labour market may have been adverse selection for talent. Here it is argued that the Soviet economy was designed to minimize costs

Military Intelligence

Reviews of: F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War. Volume 4: Security and Counter-intelligence. London: HMSO, 1990 and Michael Howard. British Intelligence in the Second World War. Volume 5: Strategic Deception. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990

Intelligence cycle

The intelligence cycle is a set of processes used to provide useful information for decision-making. The cycle consists of several processes. The related counter-intelligence area is tasked with preventing information efforts from others. A basic model of the process of collecting and analyzing information is called the "intelligence cycle". This model can be applied, and, like all the basic models, it does not reflect the fullness of real-world operations. Through intelligence cycle activities, information is collected and assembled, raw information is transformed into processed information, analyzed and made available to users. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25665.8176

USBcat - Towards an Intrusion Surveillance Toolset

This paper identifies an intrusion surveillance framework which provides an analyst with the ability to investigate and monitor cyber-attacks in a covert manner. Where cyber-attacks are perpetrated for the purposes of espionage the ability to understand an adversary's techniques and objectives are an important element in network and computer security. With the appropriate toolset, security investigators would be permitted to perform both live and stealthy counter-intelligence operations by observing the behaviour and communications of the intruder. Subsequently a more complete picture of the attacker's identity, objectives, capabilities, and infiltration could be formulated than is possible with present technologies. This research focused on developing an extensible framework to permit the covert investigation of malware. Additionally, a Universal Serial Bus (USB) Mass Storage Device (MSD) based covert channel was designed to enable remote command and control of the framework. The work was validated through the design, implementation and testing of a toolset.Comment: In Proceedings AIDP 2014, arXiv:1410.322

Hide seek and negotiate: Alfred Cope and counter intelligence in Ireland 1919–1921

British intelligence in Ireland between 1919 and 1921 has been characterized as a toxic mix of incompetence and mendacity. This article will challenge this judgement by examining the activities, impact and consequences of a British civil servant, Alfred Cope, who between 1920 and 1921 was an Assistant Under Secretary in Dublin Castle. Using the three criteria of counter-intelligence operations: the ability to locate, identify and neutralize a target, it will be shown that within months of his posting to Dublin British intelligence, albeit inadvertently, had located and identified him as passing classified information to Sinn Fein. Political patronage meant the ability of the intelligence community to neutralize his impact was nugatory. Latterly Cope recognized the consequences of his actions reverberated beyond the period of his time in Ireland

Informative safety in crisis management of enterprise

Визначено задачі і об’єкти інтересу конкурентної розвідки та контррозвідки в антикризовому менеджменті.The article defines the tasks and objects of interest, competitive intelligence and counter-intelligence in crisis management

The Criminalization Of Trade Secret Theft: The Economic Espionage Act Of 1996

The collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in far-reaching changes in the global environment. One of the immediate effects of the demise of what Ronald Reagan dubbed the Evil Empire was the need to find useful work for the army of FBI agents who formerly were assigned to counter-intelligence

Heavy context dependence---decisions of underground soldiers

An attempt is made to simulate the disclosure of underground soldiers in terms of theory of networks. The coupling mechanism between the network nodes is the possibility that a disclosed soldier is going to disclose also his acquaintances. We calculate the fraction of disclosed soldiers as dependent on the fraction of those who, once disclosed, reveal also their colleagues. The simulation is immersed in the historical context of the Polish Home Army under the communist rule in 1946-49.Comment: 7 pages, 5 figures, for the European Conference on Modelling and Simulation (ECMS 2015

Western Intelligence and Counter-intelligence in a Time of Russian Disinformation

Western European countries rely on intelligence to collect information on the capabilities and intentions of friends and foes alike. They also perform counter-intelligence missions in order to hinder the intelligence operations of others. This policy brief highlights how the Russian disinformation campaign strives to enhance Russian deterrence of unfavourable policy responses to its foreign policy actions. It also illustrates how it affects intelligence and counterintelligence missions undertaken by Western European countries in at least two ways. The first involves increasing the so-called noise-tosignal ratio via the dissemination of preferred narratives through media outlets, Internet trolling on social media, the cultivation of friendly populists in Western Europe, and the manipulation of complex ethnic grievances in Eastern Europe. The second involves creating potential, and exploiting existing, barriers to cooperation between national intelligence agencies via the use of Edward Snowden, WikiLeaks, and its potential violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Western European countries must deepen their cooperation in order to prevent Russia from being successful in its divisiveness