Corporatism and Economic Performance

This paper models corporatism as affecting both the preferences of the parties involved as well as the rules of the game. The analysis is conducted in a union-government game on determining wages and unemployment benefits. The result indicates that international conditions might be important for the functions of the concept of corporatism. It may also serve as an explanation to the poor performance on production and employment in some of the former so successful European corporatist states in the 1990s. The implication of this is that corporatism might not be a successful social organisation in the globalised economy.Corporatism; Interest groups; Labour unions

From Corporatism to Governance: Dimensions of a Theory of Intermediary Institutions

Intermediary institutions are a multi-facetted phenomenon which has taken many different forms in the course of social evolution. This is also being testified by the evolutionary trajectories from corporatism through neo-corporatism to governance in the European settings from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Against this background, this chapter seeks to outline the key parameters of a theoretical framework suitable for approaching and analysing intermediary institutions. The chapter pins down five central dimensions of intermediary institutions. This is done under the headings: Context, Function, Evolution, Order, and Compatibility

Is corporatism feasible?

In this paper we consider a standard policy game between the Government and a union. In such a framework, we first investigate the effects of corporatism on macroeconomic performance vis-à-vis different kinds of non-co-operative equilibria. Afterwards, we introduce in the literature the issue of the feasibility of corporatism, i.e., whether and under what conditions it is in the interest of both agents to implement a corporatist approach to economic policies. We find that it is difficult to implement corporatism, although it generally increases social welfare, since it often reduces the union’s utility. In particular, we show that a micro-founded union will never find it profitable to co- operate with the Government, unless side-payments are considered. The study of this last issue is however beyond the scope of this paper.employment, inflation, trade unions, government, corporatism, policy game, feasibility

Wage moderating effects of corporatism: Decentralized versus centralized wage setting in a union, firm, government context

Trade Unions;Corporatism;labour economics

Is there any scope for corporatism in stabilization policies?

This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. We show that if negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are nevertheless commonly observed in this context, we discuss possible explanations that reconcile the theory with actual observations. The policy implications of these explanations are also discussed.Social pacts; axiomatic bargaining; unions; issue linkage

The changing patterns of group politics in Britain

Two interpretations of ways in which group politics in Britain have presented challenges to democracy are reviewed: neo-corporatism or pluralistic stagnation and the rise of single issue interest groups. The disappearance of the first paradigm created a political space for the second to emerge. A three-phase model of group activity is developed: a phase centred around production interests, followed by the development of broadly based 'other regarding' groups, succeeded by fragmented, inner directed groups focusing on particular interests. Explanations of the decay of corporatism are reviewed. Single issue group activity has increased as party membership has declined and is facilitated by changes in traditional media and the development of the internet. Such groups can overload the policy-making process and frustrate depoliticisation. Debates about the constitution and governance have largely ignored these issues and there is need for a debate

Fading Corporatism: Israel\u27s Labor Law and Industrial Relations in Transition

[Excerpt] This book surveys Israeli labor law from 1920 to the present. The process of writing and publishing a book does not always conform to the pace of events, particularly when the subject matter is contemporary history. The book is therefore updated until the end of 2005. References to court cases and events that began before 2005 were updated at the end of 2006. However, no developments since that time have been integrated into the text. In my opinion, no such event undermines the central argument of the book; several reinforce it. Presenting a book in English that focuses on Israel\u27s labor law presents many editorial dilemmas. Moreover, the book\u27s claim is that Israeli law developed on the basis of continental European systems and is now adopting features of American law. Hence it is difficult to determine how to translate the law and how to convey a feel of the Israeli story. While providing a consistent method was the most important goal, I have also attempted to keep the book as simple and user-friendly as possible

The Evolution of Intermediary Institutions in Europe: From Corporatism to Governance

This book investigates the consecutive shifts between three types of intermediary institutions in the European context: Corporatist, Neo-corporatist and Governance institutions. It develops a new conceptual framework for understanding the function and position of intermediary institutions in society, as well as a vocabulary capable of explaining the causes and consequences of these shifts for politics, economy and society at large. The book is designed to fill a gap in three rather distinct, yet also overlapping bodies of literature: European Political Economy, European Integration and governance studies, and socio-legal studies in the European context. Reviews: - Anne Guisset: Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 22, 3, 427-429, 2016. - Ian Bruff, Capital & Class, 40, 3, 555 – 57, 2016

The Law of Political Economy: An Introduction

The law of political economy is a contentious ideological field characterised by antagonistic relations between scholarly positions which tend to be either affirmative or critical of capitalism. Going beyond this schism, two particular features appear as central to the law of political economy: the first one is the way it epistemologically seeks to handle the distinction between holism and differentiation, i.e., the extent to which it sees society as a singular whole which is larger than its parts, or, rather, as a mere collection of parts. Different types of legal and political economy scholarship have given different types of answers to this question. The second feature of the law of political economy is the way in which it conceives of the relation between hierarchical and spontaneous dimensions of society, i.e., between firms and the market, or between public institutions and public opinion. The two distinctions can, however, be overcome through a third-way, emphasising the strategic role of law in mediating between holism and differentiation and hierarchy and spontaneity. This is demonstrated through a historical re-construction of the evolution of corporatist, neo-corporatist, and governance-based institutional set-ups of political economy