Cost savings of contracting out refuse collection

The article discusses the possible cost savings of contracting out refuse collection in the Netherlands. According to foreign econometric studies, contracting out refuse collection leads to cost savings of approximately 20%. Our findings indicate that similar cost savings apply to the Netherlands. However, different production technologies apply to internal or external refuse collection. The Chow test, which examines whether the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables are the same, reveals that different cost functions have to be estimated for the sub-samples. We show that the postulated cost savings can even be larger, when taking account of effects of different production technologies. Though significant cost savings exist on contracting out waste collection, households will not experience these cost savings on a one to one basis. Private refuse collection firms must pay VAT while public firms are exempted. At present the Dutch fiscal system hinders a more pronounced role for private refuse collection firms.Refuse collection, cost estimation, Chow stability test, pooling, VAT

Contracting Out Temporary Help Services in Germany

Since 2003 the German Public Employment Service (PES) has been experimenting with the contracting out of various services. One of the new labour market programmes is the Personnel Service Agencies, which provide client firms with jobseekers on a temporary assignment basis and are responsible for integrating jobseekers into non-subsidised employment. By contracting out employment services, the PES seeks to exploit efficiency gains characteristic of enterprises that compete in quasi-markets. In order to integrate jobseekers as rapidly as possible, a result-oriented system of incentives has been developed. This paper describes the institutional setting and examines its appropriateness for efficient job placement services.contracting out, quasi-markets, temporary agency work, Personnel Service Agency

A small estimated Euro area model with rational expectations and nominal rigidities

In this paper we estimate a small model of the euro area to be used as a laboratory for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary policy strategies. We start with the relationship between output and inflation and investigate the fit of the nominal wage contracting model due to Taylor (1980)and three different versions of the relative real wage contracting model proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981)and estimated by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) for the United States. While Fuhrer and Moore reject the nominal contracting model in favor of the relative contracting model which induces more inflation persistence, we find that both models fit euro area data reasonably well. When considering France, Germany and Italy separately, however, we find that the nominal contracting model fits German data better, while the relative contracting model does quite well in countries which transitioned out of a high inflation regime such as France and Italy. We close the model by estimating an aggregate demand relationship and investigate the consequences of the different wage contracting specifications for the inflation-output variability tradeoff, when interest rates are set according to Taylor 's rule

Legislative Alert: FY12 Agriculture Appropriations Bill

[Excerpt] The AFL-CIO urges conferees to the FY 12 Agriculture Appropriations Bill to retain a common-sense reporting requirement, one which was first included by House Republicans in the FY04 bill: Provided, That no funds made available by this appropriation may be obligated for FAIR Act or Circular A-76 activities until the Secretary has submitted to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives a report on the Department\u27s contracting out policies, including agency budgets for contracting out

Contracting out Employment Services Involving Temporary Agency Work in Germany

Since 2003 the German Public Employment Service has been experimenting with the contracting out of various services. One of the new labour market programmes is Personnel Service Agencies, which provide client firms with jobseekers on a temporary assignment basis and are responsible for integrating jobseekers into non-subsidised employment. By contracting out employment services, the Public Employment Service seeks to exploit efficiency gains characteristic of enterprises that compete in quasi-markets. In order to integrate jobseekers as rapidly as possible, a result-oriented system of incentives has been developed. This paper describes the institutional setting and ex-amines its appropriateness for efficient job placement services.Contracting-out, personnel service agency, quasi-markets, temporary agency work

Challenges and opportunities in a global economy: perspectives on outsourcing, exchange rates, and free trade: a summary of the 2004 Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum

Globalization ; Foreign exchange rates ; Free trade ; Contracting out

Contracting welfare-to-work services: use and usefulness

This paper contributes to the broad literature on public services contracting in two ways: We provide an empirical analysis of contracting decisions in the provision of welfare-to-work (WTW) services, and we explicitly model two forms of external provision of WTW services by municipalities. We estimate both the WTW-contracting decisions of Dutch municipalities and their impact on the performance, measured as the fraction of Social Assistance recipients. The two forms of external provision are (1) Contracting with other municipalities and/or (2) Contracting-out services to private providers. Our findings suggest that contracting decisions are predominantly driven by cost considerations, both for the decision to contract with other municipalities and the share of contracting out to private providers. Municipalities with low WTW budgets or facing budget constraints are more likely to contract with external parties – presumably this reduces their costs and the risk of future budget deficits. We do not find contracting decisions to affect the performance of municipalities, measured as the use, inflow or outflow out of the SA scheme. From this alone, however, we cannot conclude that both the three provision modes are equally cost-effective too, as external provision may be less costly.

Contracting out public service provision to not-for-profit firms

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Oxford Economic Papers following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version in Oxford Economic Papers volume 62, issue 4 is available online at the link below.In an incomplete-contract setting, we analyse the contracting out of public service provision, comparing the performance of for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit (NP) firms. Two institutional arrangements are considered, control rights lying either with the firm (PPP) or the government (traditional procurement). We show that provision by an NP may be associated with overinvestment in quality improvement, but that under conditions that restrain this overinvestment, the NP may yield greater welfare than obtains with FP-provision. Although none of the four possible arrangements is preferable under all conditions, the introduction of PPP has enhanced the scope for advantageous provision by an NP.Economic and Social Research Counci

BUREAUCRATS AS PURCHASERS OF HEALTH SERVICES: LIMITATIONS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR FOR CONTRACTING

Contracting out of health services increasingly involves a new role for governments as purchasers of services. To date, emphasis has been on contractual outcomes and the contracting process, which may benefit from improvements in developing countries, has been understudied. This article uses evidence from wide scale NGO contracting in Pakistan and examines the performance of government purchasers in managing the contracting process; draws comparisons with NGO managed contracting; and identifies purchaser skills needed for contracting NGOs. We found that the contracting process is complex and government purchasers struggled to manage the contracting process despite the provision of well-designed contracts and guidelines. Weaknesses were seen in three areas: (i) poor capacity for managing tendering; (ii) weak public sector governance resulting in slow processes, low interest and rent seeking pressures; and (iii) mistrust between government and the NGO sector. In comparison parallel contracting ventures managed by large NGOs generally resulted in faster implementation, closer contractual relationships, drew wider participation of NGOs and often provided technical support. Our findings do not dilute the importance of government in contracting but front the case for an independent purchasing agency, for example an experienced NGO, to manage public sector contracts for community based services with the government role instead being one f larger oversight. © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.