Rapacious Resource Depletion, Excessive Investment and Insecure Property Rights

For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. The theory suggests that adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving.exhaustible resources, Hotelling rule, Hartwick rule, capital, sustainable consumption, fractionalization, seepage, insecure property rights, differential game, genuine saving, adjusted net saving

Pricing Factors in Real Estate Markets: A Simple Preference Based Approach

Conventional wisdom tells us that the price level of properties should be supported by the rent they receive. This paper examines the pricing factors of properties by analyzing how individuals allocate their income to housing consumption and other goods, which in turn become the rent (or implicit rent) to support property values. Our model’s results can explain several puzzling observations in property markets, including why the variance of property appreciation rates is much higher than that of income growth rates in the same area.Preference-based model, pricing factors, property appreciation, property markets

Law and the Demand for Property-Casualty Insurance Consumption

This paper examines the importance of legal rights and enforcement in influencing property-casualty insurance consumption. We extend the existing literature by examining the role of legal factors in determining insurance density across countries. Also, measures of risk aversion, loss probability and price, which overcome limitations of proxies used in the existing literature on insurance demand are analysed. Using a panel data set we apply a Generalized Methods of Moments dynamic system estimator, which relaxes the assumption of strict exogeneity of the regressors and produces unbiased and efficient estimates. The results show a strong positive relationship between the protection of property rights and insurance consumption, which is robust to various model specifications and estimation techniques. Moreover, the results show the purchase of property-casualty insurance is significantly and positively related to loss probability and income, as well as providing weaker evidence of a negative relationship with price.

Intellectual Property & External Consumption Effects: Generalizations from Pharmaceutical Markets

There is a long-standing literature that recognizes that an efficient solution in correcting a consumption externality is through applying subsidies and taxes that line up private incentives with social ones. An equally long-standing literature tackles the appropriate methods of generating the efficient amount of R&D into goods that only have private consumption effects, e.g. the analysis of the welfare effects of patent regulations. This paper analyzes the joint problem of the optimal provision of R&D and consumption incentives for goods that at the same time undergo technological change and have external consumption effects. For good with external effects, just as is the case for goods with only private effects, ex-post static efficiency may have to be sacrificed for dynamic efficiency. For goods with only private consumption effects, it is well-understood that efficient competition ex-post leads to insufficient R&D incentives ex-ante, which is of course the common rationale for patents. For external effects, this analogy has the important and unrecognized implication that classic interventions to solve externality problems, such as Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, may often be inefficient under technological change. In many cases, arguing for Pigouvian solutions in presence of technological change is analogous to arguing for competitive markets for new inventions (!), as both argue for ex-post efficiency rather than dynamic efficiency. The results are discussed in the context of the pharmaceutical industry which simultaneously is one of the most R&D-intensive industries and one for which consumption of its output often seems to involve external effects, e.g. through human rights-based access issues.

Consumption

Macroeconomic research on consumption has been influenced profoundly by rational expectations. First, rational expectations together with the hypothesis of constant expected real interest rates implies that consumption should evolve as a random walk. Much of the research of the past decade has been devoted to testing the random walk hypothesis and to explaining its failure. Three branches of the literature have developed. The first relies on the durability of consumption to explain deviations from the random walk property. The second invokes liquidity constraints which block consumers from the credit market transactions needed to make consumption follow a random walk when income fluctuates up and down. The third branch dispenses with the assumption that expected real interest rates are constant. It attempts to explain deviations from the random walk in terms of intertemporal substitution.

The New View of the Property Tax: A Reformulation

The"new view" of the property tax is reformulated within the context of a model with interjurisdictional competition, endogenous local public services, individuals who are segregated into homogeneous communities according to tastes for local public services, a simple form of land use zoning, and a political or constitutional constraint on the use of head taxes by local governments. Expressions for the "profits tax" and"excise tax" effects of the property tax are derived. The effects of a "consumption distortion" away from government services due to local reluctance to tax mobile capital are also examined.

Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government

In this paper, we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax, federal transfers, and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit gamestructure s among multipleprivateage nts, multiplelocal governments, and the federal government. In general, the optimal local property tax is zero if the local property tax is constrained to be nonnegative, whereas the optimal local consumption tax is always positive. When the local consumption tax is chosen optimally, the federal income tax can be either positive or negative. For most reasonable parameter values, our numerical calculations have shown that with a positive local consumption tax there exists a reverse transfer from local governments to the federal government.Income tax, Property tax, Consumption tax, Intergovernmental transfers, Capital accumulation, Fiscal federalism

Resource abundance and regional development in China:

"Over the past several decades, China has made tremendous progress in market integration and infrastructure development. Demand for natural resources has increased from the booming coastal economies, causing the terms of trade to favor the resource sector, which is predominantly based in the interior regions of the country. However, the gap in economic development level between the coastal and inland regions has widened significantly. In this paper, using a panel data set at the provincial level, we show that Chinese provinces with abundant resources perform worse than their resource-poor counterparts in terms of per capita consumption growth. This trend that resource-poor areas are better off than resource-rich areas is particularly prominent in rural areas. Because of the institutional arrangements regarding property rights of natural resources, most gains from the resource boom have been captured either by the government or state owned enterprises. Thus, the windfall of natural resources has more to do with government consumption than household consumption. Moreover, in resource-rich areas, greater revenues accrued from natural resources bid up the price of non-tradable goods and hurt the competitiveness of the local economy." from Authors' AbstractRegional inequality, Resource curse, Dutch disease, Property rights, Rural-urban linkages,

What drives urban consumption in mainland China? The role of property price dynamics

This paper adds to the literature on wealth effects on consumption by disentangling house price effects on consumption for mainland China. In a stochastic modelling framework, the riskiness, rate of increase and persistence of house price movements have different implications for the consumption/housing ratio. We exploit the geographical variation in property prices by using a quarterly city-level panel dataset for the period 1998Q1 – 2009Q4 and rely on a panel error correction model. Overall, the results suggest a significant long run impact of property prices on consumption. They also broadly confirm the predictions from the theoretical model.consumption; house prices; China; panel data

Utilitarianism and unequal longevities: A remedy?

Classical utilitarianism, if coupled with standard assumptions such as the expected utility hypothesis and additive lifetime welfare, has the undesirable corollary to recommend a redistribution of resources from short-lived to long-lived agents, against any intuition of compensation. This paper proposes a remedy to that undesirable property of utilitarianism. This remedy consists in imputing, when solving the social planner's problem, the consumption equivalent of a long life to the consumption of long-lived agents. Provided the consumption equivalent is positive, the modified first-best problem exhibits a compensation of short-lived agents, under the form of a higher consumption. Then, in a general framework where agents differ in survival prospects, we compare the ex ante remedy (compensating agents with a lower life expectancy) and the ex post remedy (compensating short-lived agents), and show their incompatibility.utilitarianism ; differential longevity ; compensation ; redistribution ; consumption equivalent