Concessions Rejected

[Excerpt] On November 19, steelworkers came within 90 votes of making giveaways worth as much as $6 billion dollars to the basic steel industry. By a vote of 231-141 the Presidents who make up the Basic Steel Industry Conference rejected a unanimous recommendation from the International Executive Board to grant the biggest package of concessions in the history of the American labor movement

Concessions Bargaining in Auto

[Excerpt] David Bensman\u27s Concessions at South Works in the Winter issue of Labor Research Review was an excellent recounting and analysis of the concessions process at United Steel workers Local 65. However, it misrepresents the nature of both the concessions and the concessions process in the United Auto Workers. Not only did the UAW\u27s contracts with Ford and General Motors fail to provide job security as advertised, they were also arrived at by a process fully as manipulative as that in the USWA

Pensioners' travel concessions - a misallocation of resources

Everyone has a soft spot for pensioners. This probably explains most peoples’ unquestioning approval of pensioners’ travel concessions. However, it is argued here that concessions do not make sense because pensioners would be better off with the cash equivalent of their concessions. Concessions involve inefficiencies of which the following are the main ones. First, there are good arguments for some subsidies (e.g. health and education). These arguments do not apply well to pensioner travel. For example in the case of health, many people in the absence of the National Health Service would face sudden large bills for medical treatment. In contrast, the bill for essential travel, like going to the shops, is a predictable and modest weekly expense of the same order as the weekly cost of food ( for which pensioners are not given concessions ). Second, about three quarters of the money spent on concessions is wasted in that it goes on transporting those who could afford the full fare or who are on non-essential journeys. In contrast, under a no concession scenario only about a quarter of the expenditure is wasted. Also, concessions are a poor means of supplying transport facilities to pensioners since about a third are not well served by public transport. In contrast, under a no concessions scenario, virtually all less well off pensioners get “transport subsidy money” since this money is contained in an increased state pension. Under a no concessions scenario, pensioners can spend their “subsidy money” on for example home delivery of groceries, taxi trips or subsidising relatives’ car running costs where the latter do the shopping. Fourth, social exclusion is often used to justify concessions. It is shown that abolishing concessions, far from increasing social exclusion, might even reduce it.pensioners; travel; fares; concessions; concessionary; inefficient; waste; bureaucracy

Determinants of the influence of voters and interest groups on the political decision making process

This paper provides a comprehensive theoretical model of the political decision making process. Therein two ideologically different political parties compete for power. Their primary instrument in this competition are programmatic concessions in favor of voters and interest groups. As any concession causes losses in utility for the party members, the parties try to win the election with as little concessions as possible. The efficient amount of concessions and their distribution on different groups of voters and interest groups is derived. These concessions are taken as an indicator for the influence of these two groups of political agents on the political decision making process. Hence the political model developed in this paper helps to determine the political influence of voters and interest groups. The illustrations show that the efficient amount of concessions depends on the closeness of the election race. The closer the initial distribution of votes, the more concessions can voters and interest groups wring from the political parties. The characteristics of the political landscape, e.g. the share of informed voters and the degree of ideological polarization, are found to determine the efficient amount of concessions and thus the influence of voters and interest groups on the political decision making process. --Public Choice,theory,voters,interest groups,election

Concessions to PPC?

Public private cooperation (further PPC) is frequently presented as the solution for budgetary shortages for governments at national and regional level. A PPC invests in infrastructure whereby efficient cooperation enables advantages for both public and private parties is claimed. It proves to be difficult to really interest private businesses for investments in infrastructure. Therefore, the central question, which we answer in this paper, is: 'From a theoretical perspective, is PPC an option for investments in infrastructure?' In this paper, a literature review is presented on the subject of public private cooperation for the development of infrastructure projects. The main findings are that firstly, there is a large diversity in projects that might qualify for PPC. More specific, each infrastructure project is unique, making it even more difficult to implement cooperation. Secondly, the role of the national and regional governments in financing infrastructure is changing. This changing role means that the governments withdraw themselves on core functions and that they strive for private party risk-bearing in infrastructure investments. Thirdly, the theoretical definition of PPC and the more practical definition differ. In Europe, most PPCs are worked out as a concession (and therefore not a real PPC). Fourthly, from a cost point of view it is possible that the government is more efficient in cost terms and the private party is more efficient in terms of turnover. Fifthly, there are several reasons for the government to interfere in economic living. Reasons concerning infrastructure might be the public goods characterise and the external impacts. Sixthly, the public characteristics of infrastructure are decreasing. Seventhly, in general it is unattractively for private parties to invest in infrastructure. In order to make it more attractive, profits can be offered to the private parties. However, this will increase the total costs of the project. Eighthly, process management shows that it is no simple task to turn a PPC into a success. When the participating parties are persuaded of the advantages that the cooperation between public and private parties can offer, have chosen consciously for the PPC, and are prepared to invest in cooperation for the long-term, then PPC can offer means to pursue the defined objectives. If true cooperation is aimed for, costs, risks, and profits must be shared instead of divided. The joint venture can provide insights into the process of sharing. Ninthly, the construction businesses are production ventures, whereas banking services and the government operate in the service industry. Finally, the market of the most important private parties that are involved in PPC is an oligopoly. This suggests quite some market power for the private businesses involved.

IAM District 100 Vs. Eastern and the Banks

The story that follows is a story of how IAM District 100, step by step, escalated a struggle over almost every major issue facing the labor movement today: concessions, control of corporate investment decisions, the power of the financial industry, management- initiated employee involvement schemes, workers\u27 education, joint control over large corporate pension funds, and union leadership style. The Machinists at Eastern would begin this struggle on the shop floor and eventually take it to Eastern\u27s stockholders meetings and to the boardrooms of the world\u27s largest financial institutions. In this bleak period for labor, where unions are battling daily against corporate demands for concessions, IAM District 100 had the harder task of ending concessions that had already been granted