Extending the Bounded Rationality Model: The Distributed Cognition Approach

The way Simon, and the major part of the scholars, presented and used bounded rationality directly refers to human computational capabilities (or “brute-force”). Despite its broad powers of explanation, some problems arise when taking into account the way the human cognitive system really works. In order to avoid these problems, we present an alternative model of rationality, where computation plays only a part, together with the implemented role of external resources, emotional and other non-strictly-rational variables.bounded rationality, distributed cognition, external resources, decision-making, problem solving, emotions

Proof-theoretic Analysis of Rationality for Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets

In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Rationality here means playing only strategies one believes to be best responses. This involves looking at two formal languages. One is first-order, and is used to formalise optimality conditions, like avoiding strictly dominated strategies, or playing a best response. The other is a modal fixpoint language with expressions for optimality, rationality and belief. Fixpoints are used to form expressions for common belief and for iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies.Comment: 16 pages, Proc. 11th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XI). To appea

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.bounded rationality; genetic algorithms; individual heterogeneitybounded rationality; genetic algorithms; individual heterogeneity

Risk Management – Managing Risks, not Calculating Them

The expected utility approach to decision making advocates a probability vision of the world and labels any deviation from it ‘irrational’. This paper reconsiders the rationality argument and argues that calculating risks is not a viable strategy in an uncertain world. Alternative strategies not only can save considerable cognitive and computational resources, but are more ‘rational’ with view to the restricted definition of rationality applied by expected utility theorists. The alternative decision making model of risk management is presented and explained.

Computational rationality and voluntary provision of public goods: an agent-based simulation model

The issue of the cooperation among private agents in realising collective goods has always raised problems concerning the basic nature of individual behaviour as well as the more traditional economic problems. The Computational Economics literature on public goods provision can be useful to study the possibility of cooperation under alternative sets of assumptions concerning the nature of individual rationality and the kind of interactions between individuals. In this work I will use an agent-based simulation model to study the evolution of cooperation among private agents taking part in a collective project: a high number of agents, characterised by computational rationality, defined as the capacity to calculate and evaluate their own immediate payoffs perfectly and without errors, interact to producing a public good. The results show that when the agents’ behaviour is not influenced either by expectations of others’ behaviour or by social and relational characteristics, they opt to contribute to the public good to an almost socially optimal extent, even where there is no big difference between the rates of return on the private and the public investment.Computational Economics; Agent-based models; Social Dilemmas; Collective Action; Public Goods

Aggregation Operators for Fuzzy Rationality Measures.

Fuzzy rationality measures represent a particular class of aggregation operators. Following the axiomatic approach developed in [1,3,4,5] rationality of fuzzy preferences may be seen as a fuzzy property of fuzzy preferences. Moreover, several rationality measures can be aggregated into a global rationality measure. We will see when and how this can be done. We will also comment upon the feasibility of their use in real life applications. Indeed, some of the rationality measures proposed, though intuitively (and axiomatically) sound, appear to be quite complex from a computational point of view

Testing Consumer Rationality using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs

Given a consumer data-set, the axioms of revealed preference proffer a binary test for rational behaviour. A natural (non-binary) measure of the degree of rationality exhibited by the consumer is the minimum number of data points whose removal induces a rationalisable data-set.We study the computational complexity of the resultant consumer rationality problem in this paper. This problem is, in the worst case, equivalent (in terms of approximation) to the directed feedback vertex set problem. Our main result is to obtain an exact threshold on the number of commodities that separates easy cases and hard cases. Specifically, for two-commodity markets the consumer rationality problem is polynomial time solvable; we prove this via a reduction to the vertex cover problem on perfect graphs. For three-commodity markets, however, the problem is NP-complete; we prove thisusing a reduction from planar 3-SAT that is based upon oriented-disc drawings