Perceptual Abstraction for Robotic Cognitive Development

We are concerned with the design of a developmental robot that learns from scratch simple models about itself and its surroundings. A particular attention is given to perceptual abstraction from high-dimensional sensors

Development in the early years : Its importance for school performance and adult outcomes [Wider Benefits of Learning Research Report No. 20]

Early development of children’s intellectual, social and physical abilities has the potential to affect their long term achievement, beyond the initial introduction to the classroom, through their school lives and into adulthood. A greater understanding of the processes at work in these early years and their role in later success is therefore important to ensure that resources are appropriately targeted. Past research has shown that early cognitive attainment is strongly related to later academic success. But we are also interested in the benefit that children gain from arriving at school with particular personal characteristics and the relationship which these may have to cognitive development. We also seek to explore the role of development (as opposed to innate capability) in the pre-school years. Data from the 1970 British Cohort Study is used to examine the importance of early measures of children’s cognitive ability and behavioural development for their subsequent school and labour market achievement. Our results suggest that, of the various measures used in this study, the most powerful predictor of later academic and labour market success is the ability of children to copy basic designs. However, we do not ignore the influence of behavioural factors and highlight the particular importance of skills related to attention with respect to these outcomes. The results clearly show that early development of both cognitive and behavioural skills have a role in subsequent achievement. In this respect, we believe that the findings in this report add to the debate on the appropriate balance between cognitive and non-cognitive skills at different ages and for different groups of children. In particular, failure to place sufficient emphasis on cognitive development may run counter to the interests of children from low SES groups. We believe that pedagogy should continue to address ways in which cognitive and non-cognitive abilities can support one another and how the interactions between these different groups of skills can best be harnessed for different groups of children

The role of falsification in the development of cognitive architectures: insights from a Lakatosian analysis

It has been suggested that the enterprise of developing mechanistic theories of the human cognitive architecture is flawed because the theories produced are not directly falsifiable. Newell attempted to sidestep this criticism by arguing for a Lakatosian model of scientific progress in which cognitive architectures should be understood as theories that develop over time. However, Newell’s own candidate cognitive architecture adhered only loosely to Lakatosian principles. This paper reconsiders the role of falsification and the potential utility of Lakatosian principles in the development of cognitive architectures. It is argued that a lack of direct falsifiability need not undermine the scientific development of a cognitive architecture if broadly Lakatosian principles are adopted. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the Lakatosian concepts of positive and negative heuristics for theory development and of general heuristic power offer methods for guiding the development of an architecture and for evaluating the contribution and potential of an architecture’s research program

An analysis of MRI derived cortical complexity in premature-born adults : regional patterns, risk factors, and potential significance

Premature birth bears an increased risk for aberrant brain development concerning its structure and function. Cortical complexity (CC) expresses the fractal dimension of the brain surface and changes during neurodevelopment. We hypothesized that CC is altered after premature birth and associated with long-term cognitive development. One-hundred-and-one very premature-born adults (gestational age <32 weeks and/or birth weight <1500 ​g) and 111 term-born adults were assessed by structural MRI and cognitive testing at 26 years of age. CC was measured based on MRI by vertex-wise estimation of fractal dimension. Cognitive performance was measured based on Griffiths-Mental-Development-Scale (at 20 months) and Wechsler-Adult-Intelligence-Scales (at 26 years). In premature-born adults, CC was decreased bilaterally in large lateral temporal and medial parietal clusters. Decreased CC was associated with lower gestational age and birth weight. Furthermore, decreased CC in the medial parietal cortices was linked with reduced full-scale IQ of premature-born adults and mediated the association between cognitive development at 20 months and IQ in adulthood. Results demonstrate that CC is reduced in very premature-born adults in temporoparietal cortices, mediating the impact of prematurity on impaired cognitive development. These data indicate functionally relevant long-term alterations in the brain’s basic geometry of cortical organization in prematurity

What can developmental disorders tell us about the neurocomputational constraints that shape development? the case of Williams syndrome

The uneven cognitive phenotype in the adult outcome of Williams syndrome has led some researchers to make strong claims about the modularity of the brain and the purported genetically determined, innate specification of cognitive modules. Such arguments have particularly been marshaled with respect to language. We challenge this direct generalization from adult phenotypic outcomes to genetic specification and consider instead how genetic disorders provide clues to the constraints on plasticity that shape the outcome of development. We specifically examine behavioral studies, brain imaging, and computational modeling of language in Williams syndrome but contend that our theoretical arguments apply equally to other cognitive domains and other developmental disorders. While acknowledging that selective deficits in normal adult patients might justify claims about cognitive modularity, we question whether similar, seemingly selective deficits found in genetic disorders can be used to argue that such cognitive modules are prespecified in infant brains. Cognitive modules are, in our view, the outcome of development, not its starting point. We note that most work on genetic disorders ignores one vital factor, the actual process of ontogenetic development, and argue that it is vital to view genetic disorders as proceeding under different neurocomputational constraints, not as demonstrations of static modularity

Poverty, Maternal Depression, Family Status and Children's Cognitive and Behavioural Development in Early Childhood: A Longitudinal Study

Improving children's lives is high on the UK policy agenda. In this study for a recent birth cohort of UK children we examine how three aspects of parental resources - income, mother's mental well-being and family status - in early childhood enhance or compromise their children's cognitive and behavioural development. As well as examining how these three aspects of parental resources separately and jointly affect children's well-being, we also enquire whether persistent poverty or persistent maternal depression are more deleterious for children's current well-being than periodic episodes of poverty and depression. We find strong associations between poverty and young children's intellectual and behavioural development, and persistent poverty was found to be particularly important in relation to children's cognitive development. Maternal depression (net of other factors) was more weakly related to cognitive development but strongly related to whether children were exhibiting behaviour problems, and persistent depression amplified the situation. Family status, net of other factors (most noticeably poverty), was only weakly associated with children's development

Cognitive function in childhood and lifetime cognitive change in relation to mental wellbeing in four cohorts of older people

Background: poorer cognitive ability in youth is a risk factor for later mental health problems but it is largely unknown whether cognitive ability, in youth or in later life, is predictive of mental wellbeing. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether cognitive ability at age 11 years, cognitive ability in later life, or lifetime cognitive change are associated with mental wellbeing in older people.Methods: we used data on 8191 men and women aged 50 to 87 years from four cohorts in the HALCyon collaborative research programme into healthy ageing: the Aberdeen Birth Cohort 1936, the Lothian Birth Cohort 1921, the National Child Development Survey, and the MRC National Survey for Health and Development. We used linear regression to examine associations between cognitive ability at age 11, cognitive ability in later life, and lifetime change in cognitive ability and mean score on the Warwick Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale and meta-analysis to obtain an overall estimate of the effect of each.Results: people whose cognitive ability at age 11 was a standard deviation above the mean scored 0.53 points higher on the mental wellbeing scale (95% confidence interval 0.36, 0.71). The equivalent value for cognitive ability in later life was 0.89 points (0.72, 1.07). A standard deviation improvement in cognitive ability in later life relative to childhood ability was associated with 0.66 points (0.39, 0.93) advantage in wellbeing score. These effect sizes equate to around 0.1 of a standard deviation in mental wellbeing score. Adjustment for potential confounding and mediating variables, primarily the personality trait neuroticism, substantially attenuated these associations.Conclusion: associations between cognitive ability in childhood or lifetime cognitive change and mental wellbeing in older people are slight and may be confounded by personality trait difference

Modelling the Developing Mind: From Structure to Change

This paper presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of mind. Thus, the architecture of mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. The paper then specifies the types of change that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the paper and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience is discussed throughout the paper

Modelling individual variability in cognitive development

Investigating variability in reasoning tasks can provide insights into key issues in the study of cognitive development. These include the mechanisms that underlie developmental transitions, and the distinction between individual differences and developmental disorders. We explored the mechanistic basis of variability in two connectionist models of cognitive development, a model of the Piagetian balance scale task (McClelland, 1989) and a model of the Piagetian conservation task (Shultz, 1998). For the balance scale task, we began with a simple feed-forward connectionist model and training patterns based on McClelland (1989). We investigated computational parameters, problem encodings, and training environments that contributed to variability in development, both across groups and within individuals. We report on the parameters that affect the complexity of reasoning and the nature of ‘rule’ transitions exhibited by networks learning to reason about balance scale problems. For the conservation task, we took the task structure and problem encoding of Shultz (1998) as our base model. We examined the computational parameters, problem encodings, and training environments that contributed to variability in development, in particular examining the parameters that affected the emergence of abstraction. We relate the findings to existing cognitive theories on the causes of individual differences in development