Boycotting a dictatorship: who does it really hurt?

Consumer boycotts and international economic sanctions represent a frequent tool to protest against countries for their violation of human rights. This paper questions if such a kind of action hurts more the populations it is supposed to defend than governing classes it is targeting. Overall, boycotts of more rapacious regimes may decrease more the well-being of the population than the one of the governing class.consumer boycott, dictatorial regimes.

Shepherd's Dilemma

Recent outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever in sheep have led to boycotts of African livestock by Middle Eastern importers. To normalize trade, attempts have been made to apply new livestock forecasting and monitoring technologies. In this process, producers have exhibited a resistance in revealing livestock health information, a resistance that could jeopardize the information system and lead to further boycotts. We investigate the incentives governing this problem and model the most fundamental contract issues, those concerning reputation and credibility. Equilibrium contracts require that the buyer compensate the producer for private information to address the shepherd's dilemma of concealing livestock information (and facing continued boycotts) or revealing the information and being blacklisted.Livestock Production/Industries,

Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling

This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some consumers care not only about the products they buy but also about whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumers do not care about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impression of being ethical consumers. Consequently, to affect a firm’s ethical behavior, moral consumers refuse to buy from an unethical firm. Consumers who do not care about ethical behavior may join the boycott to (falsely) signal that they do care. In the firm’s choice between ethical and unethical behavior, the optimality of mixed and pure strategies depends on the cost of behaving ethically. In particular, when the cost is (relatively) low, ethical behavior arises from a prisoners’ dilemma as the firm’s optimal strategy.firm’s ethical code, consumer morality, boycotts

Should we boycott child labour ?

In high income countries, there is nearly universal popular support for boycotts against products using child labor or punitive sanctions against countries with high levels of child labor. This essay assumes that the reason for this popular support is a concern for the well- being of these child laborers. Consumer boycotts or sanctions should then be viewed by advocates as successful if they make children in low-income countries better off. This essay argues that much of the popular debate on boycotts and sanctions suffers from a failure to consider what children will do if they are not working. To answer this question, the responsible activist or policymaker must understand why children work. While some circumstances of child laborers are so insidious that policies even more aggressive than boycotts may be justified, most of the work performed by children in low income countries reflects the desperateness of their family's poverty. For these cases, if consumer boycotts diminish the earnings power of children, then the incidence of the boycott can be on the poorest of the poor. In this sense, a consumer boycott of products made with child labor can be equivalent to a consumer boycott of poverty relief for both child laborers and their families

Consumer boycotts and consumer sovereignty

Cranfield School of Managemen

Oh, Ya Got Trouble! Right Here in New York City! or Gotta Find a Way to Keep the Young Ones Moral After School: The Boycott of Hollywood, March-July 1934

This article discusses the movie boycotts of 1934. These were started because religious groups, especially the Catholic Church, were concerned about the sexual and violent content of movies and how it was affecting children. The article states that it is unsure whether or not these boycotts and protests were agreed upon by the majority of Americans at the time, or if there was an amount of bias in reports from the time

The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal

An agreement among competitors to refuse to deal with another party is traditionally per se illegal under the antitrust laws. But coordinated refusals to deal are often necessary to punish wrongdoers, and thus to deter undesirable behavior that state-sponsored courts cannot reach. When viewed as a mechanism to govern transactions and induce socially desirable cooperative behavior, coordinated refusals to deal can sustain valuable reputation mechanisms. This paper employs institutional economics to understand the role of coordinated refusals to deal in merchant circles and to evaluate the economic desirability of permitting such coordinated actions among competitors. It concludes that if the objective of antitrust law is to promote economic efficiency, then per se treatment-or any heightened presumption of illegality-of reputation mechanisms with coordinated punishments is misplaced

Boycott of the Los Angeles 1984 Olympic Games as an Example of Political Play-Acting of the Cold War Superpowers

Sports boycott is one of the most important dimension of sport colliding with politics. The subject of the article is the boycott of the Los Angeles Olympic Games in 1984, one of the most spectacular boycotts, which was conducted by communist countries. It is widely recognized, that Los Angeles Olympics were boycotted as a result of a similar action by Western countries towards Moscow Olympics in 1980. However, evidence proves that there was no decision concerning communist boycott of Los Angeles Olympics until a few months before the Games. Preparations to the Olympics were on their way, but unexpected change of Soviet leader resulted in the boycott. Safety reasons were the declared reason for the boycott of the Soviet Union and 13 other communist countries. Nevertheless, it is evident that the real reasons were connected with the political game of USSR. The probable actual aims were the desire to hit the first ever privately financed Olympic Games and to make it harder for American president Ronald Raegan to be reelected. Naturally, at least partly it was also a matter of revenge for boycotting the Moscow Games