Bounded Rationality

The observation of the actual behavior by economic decision makers in the lab and in the field justifies that bounded rationality has been a generally accepted assumption in many socio-economic models. The goal of this paper is to illustrate the difficulties involved in providing a correct definition of what a rational (or irrational) agent is. In this paper we describe two frameworks that employ different approaches for analyzing bounded rationality. The first is a spatial segregation set-up that encompasses two optimization methodologies: backward induction and forward induction. The main result is that, even under the same state of knowledge, rational and non-rational agents may match their actions. The second framework elaborates on the relationship between irrationality and informational restrictions. We use the beauty contest (Nagel, 1995) as a device to explain this relationship.Behavioral economics, bounded rationality, partial information

Structural stability and robustness to bounded rationality

The introduction of a small amount of bounded rationality into a model sometimes has little effect, and sometimes has a dramatic impact on predicted behavior. We call a model robust to bounded rationality if small deviations from rationality result only in small changes in the equilibrium set. We also say that a model is structurally stable if the equilibrium set (given fully rational agents) varies continuously with the parameter values of the model. Our notions of a model and of rationality are quite broad, allowing us to cover cases in which bounded rationality refers to imperfect optimization, non-rational expectations, or arbitrary behavior by a subset of agents. We show that a model is robust to bounded rationality if and only if it is structurally stable. Thus, we can characterize which models will be robust to bounded rationality and which ones will not, independently of the exact form that bounded rationality takes. In addition, from our characterization it follows that introducing a small amount of bounded rationality will have large effects on predicted outcomes if and only if parameters are near a critical point where the equilibrium set changes in a discontinuous way JEL classification: C69, C79, D51, E19

Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization Present Use and (Some) Future Possibilities

The way in which bounded rationality enters contemporary organizational economics theorizing is examined. It is argued that, as it is being used, bounded rationality is neither necessary nor sufficient for producing the results of organizational economics. It is at best a rhetorical device, used for the purpose of loosely explaining incomplete contracts. However, it is possible to incorporate much richer notions of bounded rationality, founded on research in cognitive psychology, and to illuminate the study of economic organization by means of such notions. A number of examples are provided.Varieties of bounded rationality, incomplete contracts, economic organization, cognitive psychology

Simon's Bounded Rationality. Origins and use in economic theory

The paper aims to show how Simon's notion of bounded rationality should be interpreted in the light of its connection with artificial intelligence. This connection points out that bounded rationality is a highly structured concept, and sheds light on several implications of Simon's general views on rationality. Finally, offering three paradigmatic examples, the artic1e presents the view that recent approaches, which refer to Simon's heterodox theory, only partially accept the teachings of their inspirer, splitting bounded rationality from the context of artificl al intelligence.

(WP 2014-03) Bounded Rationality and Bounded Individuality

This paper argues that since the utility function conception of the individual is derived from standard rationality theory, the view that rationality is bounded suggests that individuality should also be seen as bounded. The meaning of this idea is developed in terms of two ways in which individuality can be said to be bounded, with one bound associated with Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory and the ‘new’ behavioral economics and a second bound associated with Simon’s evolutionary thinking and the ‘old’ behavioral economics. The paper then shows how different bounded individuality conceptions operate in nudge economics, agent-based modeling, and social identity theory, explaining these conceptions in terms of how they relate to these two behavioral economics views of bounded rationality. How both the ‘new’ and ‘old’ individuality bounds might then be combined in a single account is briefly explored in connection with Kirman’s Marseille fish market analysis

Law for the Common Man: An Individual-Level Theory of Values, Expanded Rationality, and the Law

This article makes an admittedly bold attempt at outlining an analytical framework for addressing this question. Instead of looking at the legal implications of bounded rationality -- an exercise highly worthy in its own right -- this article advances a theory of expanded rationality. This theory retains the element of rationality in that people respond to incentives in an attempt to attain utility, and it does not question the observation that decision-making is often bounded due to various factors

Maps of Bounded Rationality

The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos Tversky (1937-1996) during a long and unusually close collaboration. Together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their bounded rationality. This essay presents a current perspective on the three major topics of our joint work: heuristics of judgment, risky choice, and framing effects. In all three domains we studied intuitions - thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without much reflection. I review the older research and some recent developments in light of two ideas that have become central to social-cognitive psychology in the intervening decades: the notion that thoughts differ in a dimension of accessibility - some come to mind much more easily than others - and the distinction between intuitive and deliberate thought processes.behavioral economics; experimental economics

review of BOUNDED RATIONALITY

A short critical note on a recent book, containing several different approaches to bounded rationality, and the adaptive toolbox.rationality choices heuristics

Bounded rationality, value systems and time-inconsistency of preferences as rational foundations for the concept of trust

This paper intends to contribute to the (bounded rationality) foundations of trust. After reviewing the extant definitions, I establish the formal structure of situations involving trust. In that context, I examine the paradoxical situation of (calculative) trust in simple settings. Then I show how bounded rationality provides a rationale for a concept of trust that goes beyond that calculative notion. Value systems and possible inconsistency of time preferences are shown to be crucial elements.Trust; Bounded rationality; Value systems; Behavioral decision-making;