Thrifty Wives and Lavish Husbands? – Bargaining Power and Financial Dicisions in Germany

Numerous contributions in the literature show that household outcomes are influenced by the distribution of intra-household decision power expressed by bargaining indicators such as relative income of the spouses. Since women can expect a longer retirement period, increased female bargaining power could lead to higher savings and wealth accumulation. In contrast, a household could consume more in the current period (e.g., to the benefit of the children) if gender differences in saving preferences had other rationales. Using two German datasets and different measures of bargaining power, my analysis gives evidence that female bargaining power has no or a negative influence on saving and wealth even when controlling for expectations of future support by public pension schemes of the spouses. In some specifications, I also find positive associations between the wife‘s bargaining power and attitudes towards current consumption proxied by repayments of consumer loans. Different results for subsamples of couples with and without dependent children support the validity of the “kids-do-better hypothesis” which indicates that mothers use their bargaining power to enforce higher current consumption in favor of the children.Intra-household allocation; bargaining power; saving; debt; SOEP; SAVE

Bargaining Power and Equilibrium Consumption

We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.household behavior, bargaining power, local and global changes, price effects, general equilibrium

Quality of Available Mates, Education and Intra-Household Bargaining Power

This paper further explores the role of sex ratios on spouses’ bargaining power, by focusing on educational attainment in order to capture the qualitative aspect of mate availability. Using Census and Current Population Survey data for U.S. metropolitan areas in year 2000, a quality sex ratio is constructed by education brackets to test the effect on the intra-household bargaining power of couples in the corresponding education bracket. We argue that a relative shortage of suitably educated women in the spouse’s potential marriage market increases wives’ bargaining power in the household while it lowers their husbands’. Additionally, we test the prediction that this bargaining power effect is greater as the assortative mating order by education increases. We consider a collective labor supply household model, in which each spouse’s labor supply is negatively related to their level of bargaining power. We find that higher relative shortage of comparably educated women in the couple’s metropolitan area reduces wives’ labor supply and increases their husbands’. Also, the labor supply impact is stronger for couples in higher education groups. No such effects are found for unmarried individuals, which is consistent with bargaining theory.Education, Intra-Household Bargaining Power, Labor Supply

In Search of Gender Bias in Household Resource Allocation in Rural China

This paper tests three hypotheses concerning intra-household resource allocation in rural China. First, whether increasing the women's bargaining power alters household expenditure patterns. Second, whether households allocate fewer resources to daughters than to sons. Third, whether increasing the bargaining power of women reduces pro-boy discrimination. We find that expenditure patterns do vary with proxies for women's bargaining power. Pro-boy discrimination is suggested by: lower female outlay equivalent ratios for adult goods; greater sensitivity of household health spending to young boys than to young girls; and high male sex ratios. No evidence is found to support the third hypothesis.intrahousehold allocation, women, bargaining power, China

German collective bargaining in a European perspective: Continuous erosion or re-stabilisation of multi-employer agreements?

Since the mid-1990s the German system of collective bargaining with its traditional dominance of sector-level agreements has been faced by a process of creeping erosion. While the bargaining coverage has shown a steady decline, a far-reaching decentralisation has increasingly undermined the system of multi-employer bargaining. Compared with other European countries, the development in Germany seems to be rather ex-ceptional, as many countries were able to continue with a rather stable collective bargaining system and a relatively high bargaining coverage. This holds true also for countries where - as in Germany - the unions were faced by a significant decline of organisational power. The latter indicates that there are other political factors which seem to compensate for the decline of unions' organisational power and keep their institutional power basis relatively stable. In discussing German collective bargaining in a European perspective it is the aim of this paper to identify the factors which support a stable and encompassing collective bargaining system. Our arguments are developed in three steps: First, we describe the recent developments in German collective bargaining and the accompanying changes in the organisational and structural power of German trade unions. Secondly, we compare the German situation with the development in other European countries and analyses the factors which are conducive for a stable bargaining sys-tem. Considering the different experiences in Europe, we thirdly discuss the possibilities for a restabilisation of German collective bargaining. --

Ordered Bargaining

When buyers choose the order in which they bargain with suppliers of known characteristics, prices are determined jointly by bargaining power and competitive intensity (the outside option to bargain with rival suppliers). Bargaining power becomes less important to the outcome as competition intensifies; prices fall to marginal cost in the limit. With positive visit costs and weak competition, some buyer power is necessary for trade. Incomplete buyer power may lead to inefficient choice of bargaining order. The robustness of ordered bargaining to the possibility of price posting and auctions, and welfare properties of these alternative pricing institutions are also explored.

Bargaining and the Provision of Health Services

We model and compare the bargaining process between a purchaser of health services, such as a health authority, and a provider (the hospital) in three plausible scenarios: a) the purchaser sets the price, and activity is bargained between the purchaser and the provider: activity bargaining; b) the price is bargained between the purchaser and the provider, but activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider: price bargaining; c) price and activity are simultaneously bargained between the purchaser and the provider: efficient bargaining. We show that: 1) if the bargaining power of the purchaser is high (low), efficient bargaining leads to higher (lower) activity and purchaser's utility, and lower (higher) prices and provider's utility compared to price bargaining. 2) In activity bargaining, prices are lowest, the purchaser's utility is highest and the provider's utility is lowest; activity is generally lowest, but higher than in price bargaining for high bargaining power of the purchaser. 3) If the purchaser has higher bargaining power, this reduces prices and activity in price bargaining, it reduces prices but increases activity in activity bargaining, and it reduces prices but has no effect on activity in efficient bargaining.bargaining. negotiation. purchasing.

In Search of Gender Bias in Household Resource Allocation in Rural China

This paper tests three hypotheses concerning intra-household resource allocation in rural China. First, whether increasing the women's bargaining power alters household expenditure patterns. Second, whether households allocate fewer resources to daughters than to sons. Third, whether increasing the bargaining power of women reduces pro-boy discrimination. We find that expenditure patterns do vary with proxies for women's bargaining power. Pro-boy discrimination is suggested by: lower female outlay equivalent ratios for adult goods; greater sensitivity of household health spending to young boys than to young girls; and high male sex ratios. No evidence is found to support the third hypothesis.intrahousehold allocation, women, bargaining power, China

Client-contractor bargaining on net present value in project scheduling with limited resources

The client-contractor bargaining problem addressed here is in the context of a multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows, which is formulated as a progress payments model. In this model, the contractor receives payments from the client at predetermined regular time intervals. The last payment is paid at the first predetermined payment point right after project completion. The second payment model considered in this paper is the one with payments at activity completions. The project is represented on an Activity-on-Node (AON) project network. Activity durations are assumed to be deterministic. The project duration is bounded from above by a deadline imposed by the client, which constitutes a hard constraint. The bargaining objective is to maximize the bargaining objective function comprised of the objectives of both the client and the contractor. The bargaining objective function is expected to reflect the two-party nature of the problem environment and seeks a compromise between the client and the contractor. The bargaining power concept is introduced into the problem by the bargaining power weights used in the bargaining objective function. Simulated annealing algorithm and genetic algorithm approaches are proposed as solution procedures. The proposed solution methods are tested with respect to solution quality and solution times. Sensitivity analyses are conducted among different parameters used in the model, namely the profit margin, the discount rate, and the bargaining power weights

Power Processes in Bargaining

This is a theoretical article that integrates and extends a particular program of work on power in bargaining relationships. Power is conceptualized as a structurally based capability, and power use as tactical action falling within either conciliatory or hostile categories. The core propositions are (1) the greater the total amount of power in a relationship, the greater the use of conciliatory tactics and the lower the use of hostile tactics; and (2) an unequal power relationship fosters more use of hostile tactics and less use of conciliatory tactics than an equal power relationship. Distinct research on power dependence and bilateral deterrence provides support for both propositions. Implications are discussed for power struggle in ongoing relationships