Seeing more than we can know: Visual attention and category activation

Extending existing work on the conditional automaticity of category activation, the present research investigated the extent to which category activation is moderated by the resolution of visual attention. As visual attention gates access to material in semantic memory, so too should it regulate the activation of social categories when triggering verbal labels are encountered. Accordingly, only when triggering stimuli fall within the spotlight of attention did we expect category activation to occur. The results of two studies supported this prediction. We consider the implications of our findings for recent treatments of category automaticity

On certain recurrent and automatic sequences in finite fields

In this work we extend our study on a link between automaticity and certain algebraic power series over finite fields. Our starting point is a family of sequences in a finite field of characteristic $2$, recently introduced by the first author in connection with algebraic continued fractions. By including it in a large family of recurrent sequences in an arbitrary finite field, we prove its automaticity. Then we give a criterion on automatic sequences, generalizing a previous result and this allows us to present new families of automatic sequences in an arbitrary finite field.Comment: 10 page

The perils of automaticity

Classical theories of skill acquisition propose that automatization (i.e., performance requires progressively less attention as experience is acquired) is a defining characteristic of expertise in a variety of domains (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967). Automaticity is believed to enhance smooth and efficient skill execution by allowing performers to focus on strategic elements of performance rather than on the mechanical details that govern task implementation (Williams & Ford, 2008). By contrast, conscious processing (i.e., paying conscious attention to one’s action during motor execution) has been found to disrupt skilled movement and performance proficiency (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001). On the basis of this evidence, researchers have tended to extol the virtues of automaticity. However, few researchers have considered the wide range of empirical evidence which indicates that highly automated behaviors can, on occasion, lead to a series of errors that may prove deleterious to skilled performance. Therefore, the purpose of the current paper is to highlight the perils, rather than the virtues, of automaticity. We draw on Reason’s (1990) classification scheme of everyday errors to show how an overreliance on automated procedures may lead to 3 specific performance errors (i.e., mistakes, slips, and lapses) in a variety of skill domains (e.g., sport, dance, music). We conclude by arguing that skilled performance requires the dynamic interplay of automatic processing and conscious processing in order to avoid performance errors and to meet the contextually contingent demands that characterize competitive environments in a range of skill domains

On the Automaticity and Ethics of Belief

Recently, philosophers have appealed to empirical studies to argue that whenever we think that p, we automatically believe that p (Millikan 2004; Mandelbaum 2014; Levy and Mandelbaum 2014). Levy and Mandelbaum (2014) have gone further and claimed that the automaticity of believing has implications for the ethics of belief in that it creates epistemic obligations for those who know about their automatic belief acquisition. I use theoretical considerations and psychological findings to raise doubts about the empirical case for the view that we automatically believe what we think. Furthermore, I contend that even if we set these doubts aside, Levy and Mandelbaum’s argument to the effect that the automaticity of believing creates epistemic obligations is not fully convincing

Confirmatory factor analysis of the Test of Performance Strategies (TOPS) among adolescent athletes

The aim of the present study was to examine the factorial validity of the Test of Performance Strategies (TOPS; Thomas et al., 1999) among adolescent athletes using confirmatory factor analysis. The TOPS was designed to assess eight psychological strategies used in competition (i.e. activation, automaticity, emotional control, goal-setting, imagery, negative thinking, relaxation and self-talk,) and eight used in practice (the same strategies except negative thinking is replaced by attentional control). National-level athletes (n = 584) completed the 64-item TOPS during training camps. Fit indices provided partial support for the overall measurement model for the competition items (robust comparative fit index = 0.92, Tucker-Lewis index = 0.88, root mean square error of approximation = 0.05) but minimal support for the training items (robust comparative fit index = 0.86, Tucker-Lewis index = 0.81, root mean square error of approximation = 0.06). For the competition items, the automaticity, goal-setting, relaxation and self-talk scales showed good fit, whereas the activation, emotional control, imagery and negative thinking scales did not. For the practice items, the attentional control, emotional control, goal-setting, imagery and self-talk scales showed good fit, whereas the activation, automaticity and relaxation scales did not. Overall, it appears that the factorial validity of the TOPS for use with adolescents is questionable at present and further development is required

On the automaticity of language processing

People speak and listen to language all the time. Given this high frequency of use, it is often suggested that at least some aspects of language processing are highly overlearned and therefore occur “automatically”. Here we critically examine this suggestion. We first sketch a framework that views automaticity as a set of interrelated features of mental processes and a matter of degree rather than a single feature that is all-or-none. We then apply this framework to language processing. To do so, we carve up the processes involved in language use according to (a) whether language processing takes place in monologue or dialogue, (b) whether the individual is comprehending or producing language, (c) whether the spoken or written modality is used, and (d) the linguistic processing level at which they occur, that is, phonology, the lexicon, syntax, or conceptual processes. This exercise suggests that while conceptual processes are relatively non-automatic (as is usually assumed), there is also considerable evidence that syntactic and lexical lower-level processes are not fully automatic. We close by discussing entrenchment as a set of mechanisms underlying automatization

The relationship between motor control and phonology in dyslexic children

Background: The goal of this study was to investigate the automaticity/cerebellar theory of dyslexia. We tested phonological skills and cerebellar function in a group of dyslexic 8-12 year old children and their matched controls. Tests administered included the Phonological Assessment Battery, postural stability, bead threading, finger to thumb and time estimation. Results: Dyslexic children were found to be significantly poorer than the controls at all tasks but time estimation. About 75% of dyslexics were more than one standard deviation below controls in phonological ability, and 50% were similarly impaired in motor skills. However, at least part of the discrepancy in motor skills was due to dyslexic individuals who had additional disorders (ADHD and/or DCD). The absence of evidence for a time estimation deficit also casts doubt on the cerebellar origin of the motor deficiency. About half the dyslexic children didn't have any motor problem, and there was no evidence for a causal relationship between motor skills on the one hand and phonological and reading skills on the other. Conclusion: This study provides partial support for the presence of motor problems in dyslexic children, but does not support the hypothesis that a cerebellar dysfunction is the cause of their phonological and reading impairment