What a fair relationship between ‘euro ins’ and ‘euro outs’ could look like

The relationship between Eurozone members and non-euro states has been cited by David Cameron as one of the key issues in his attempted renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership. Nicolai von Ondarza writes that while some actors have proposed stronger blocking powers for non-euro states, a far better arrangement would be to simply give these countries the power to delay decisions. He argues this would generate increased public scrutiny over outcomes, encouraging Eurozone members to find a suitable compromise that takes the views of non-euro states into account

The Brexit revolution: new political conditions change the dynamics of the next phase of EU-UK negotiations

Following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU), the Brexit negotiations are entering the decisive next phase: In a transition period of now only 10 months, the future relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom with regard to economic, internal security, and foreign policy as well as an overall institu­tional framework must be negotiated. But the signs point to confrontation. The main aim of the domestically strengthened British government is absolute dissociation from the EU; the list with potential points of conflict with the Union’s negotiation objectives is long. Together, the negotiators must find a new model of cooperation between partnership and competition. (author's abstract

The crisis governance of the European Union: more responsibility requires more democratic legitimacy

Since 2010, amid a series of overlapping crises, the EU has introduced far-reaching instruments both within and beyond the EU treaties that have expanded its responsibilities. These instruments often have a structure-defining character and/or have served as precedents in subsequent crises. An analysis of the decision-making processes on three key crisis instruments during the Covid-19 pandemic - vaccine procurement, the SURE programme to support national short-time working schemes and the recovery fund NGEU - reveals deficits in the democratic legitimacy of the EU's crisis governance. The "emergency Article" 122 TFEU, which was used for all three crisis instruments, largely excludes the involvement of the European Parliament. As NGEU was linked to the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework, the EP was involved but politically marginalised by the member states in the Council. Because standard EU procedures were used, the German Bundestag was informed in all three cases and was even able to secure more extensive information rights than the EP. However, this cannot replace European-level parliamentary control. As far as the capacity to act in decision-making processes is concerned, Article 122 TFEU with majority voting allowed for very quick decisions to be made regarding vaccine procurement and SURE, but not NGEU. The model of NGEU - with a link to the Multiannual Financial Framework and lengthy national approval procedures - is therefore not suitable as a model for crisis instruments. There are clear deficiencies in the transparency of decision-making processes and implementation as well the allocation of political responsibility. In the short term, the EU should increase the transparency of crisis instruments; in the long term, it should introduce a clear definition of a "state of emergency", with appropriate limits, into the EU Treaty, while strengthening the role of the EP. (author's abstract

Blocked for good by the threat of treaty change? Perspectives for reform in the European Union

The European Union faces a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, pressure to reform its structures is growing. The hard negotiations with Greece in summer 2015 have revived the debate on deepening the Eurozone, while at the same time London is pushing to roll back integration, at least for itself. On the other hand, national governments reject any moves that would require a treaty change (such as transfer of powers) as politically impossible. Legal options for evading the dilemma and developing the Union by "covert integration" do exist, but these require unanimous political agreement among all the national governments - and would in the medium term require treaty changes to restore transparency and democratic legitimacy. (author's abstract

The European Parliament's involvement in the EU response to the corona pandemic: a spectator in times of crisis

Since the beginning of 2020, European Union (EU) institutions have adopted a number of measures in response to the corona pandemic to coordinate Member States' con­tain­ment efforts and provide European resources for joint reconstruction. The EU re­covery fund will set the course that will shape European integration. Nevertheless, despite its budgetary rights, the European Parliament (EP) has remained an onlooker for most of these decisions, as it did during the euro and refugee crises. In order to strengthen democratic legitimacy and the European perspective, the EP should be more closely involved in the EU recovery fund in the short term, and in the long term be given a co-decision role in the EU's crisis policy instruments. (author's abstract

The trouble with transition: no off-the-shelf arrangement for the UK after Brexit

The transition will be the most important medium-term issue in the second phase of the Brexit negotiations. The United Kingdom is due to leave the European Union officially in March 2019, too soon to negotiate a detailed agreement on future relations. With neither side standing to gain from a cliff-edge, the British request for a transitional arrangement falls on open ears. But finding agreement will be no easy matter. From the EU's perspective the only acceptable option is full and complete replication of the status quo, with the UK accepting and implementing EU rules for two years without having any say over them. This will include Prime Minister Theresa May needing to secure a parliamentary majority accepting "rule-taker" status for the UK - and breaking all the promises of the advocates of Brexit for at least two years. (Autorenreferat

Core Europe and the United Kingdom: risks, opportunities and side-effects of the British reform proposals

The EU is in the midst of completing one of its most delicate negotiations to date – the talks on the “EU Reform” with which British Prime Minister David Cameron hopes to persuade the British to vote to stay in the Union. The heart of his vision for the EU is flexibility. Britain should be given the opportunity to cut loose from further EU integration and concentrate its membership on a deepened internal market. As such, Cameron is proposing to consolidate his nation’s existing special position within an increasingly differentiating Union. Concrete political considerations aside, the EU states must therefore find answers to two central questions in the negotiations: How much differentiation, how many opt-outs, can the European Union withstand? And how can a single market of 28, a Eurozone of 19 and more permanent differentiation be better managed? (author's abstract

Euro-sceptics in power: integration-critical parties in the European Parliament and national governments

Following a string of crises that have eroded trust in the European Union, Euro-sceptic parties achieved major gains in the 2014 European elections, and have expanded their share of the vote in almost all regional and national elections held since. Seven national governments now either include or are tolerated by Euro-sceptic parties. In practice, however, their impact on the legislative process in the European Parliament and the Council has been minimal. But the crumbling of the European consensus limits the room for national governments to find compromises at the EU level, above all in relation to the Union's major challenges. The EU therefore needs to secure its future on the basis of its existing level of integration. (Autorenreferat

Dancing on the Brexit cliff edge: the key to the exit negotiations lies in British domestic policy

The negotiations on the Brexit withdrawal agreement are heading for the endgame: An agreement is to be reached in October – at the latest in November 2018 – if the United Kingdom is to leave the EU in an orderly manner in March 2019, as planned. But the EU-27 and the British government are still a long way from reaching this agreement. Above all, British domestic policy is unpredictable: There is neither a majority for any form of Brexit, nor a substantial change of opinion against Brexit, as such. Any outcome of the Brexit negotiations threatens to trigger a political crisis in the UK, further increasing the risk of a disruptive exit. (Autorenreferat

A redefinition of "Spitzenkandidaten": the next EU Commission needs a common political mandate

The European Union’s (EU) citizens have voted, and now the EU institutions are due to be reorganised for the next political cycle. Most attention is focussed on personnel issues, but the reorganisation of policy priorities and the structure of the EU Commis­sion are equally important. At the end of Jean-Claude Juncker's term as President of the European Commission, the results are mixed: The Commission has become more focussed and internally coherent, but even at the end of the legislative period, many of its legislative proposals were not able to obtain a majority in the European Par­liament and/or the Council of the EU. The mission statement of the political Commission has increasingly proven to be incompatible with the control tasks of the EU's highest executive body. The new Commission will operate in an even more difficult political environment and will itself become more party-politically heterogeneous. Its realignment should therefore also be used as an opportunity to interpret the "Spitzen­kandidaten" principle differently and negotiate a joint political programme for the EU between the Parliament, the Council, and the new Commission. (author's abstract