Transnational organized environmental crime

Based on three case studies of transnational organized environmental crime, this chapter, on the one hand, aims to illustrate some direct and indirect harm caused by environmental black markets. On the other hand, it aims to critically assess the often artificial distinction between organized and corporate crime in environmental crimes. Since the 1990s, so-called green criminologists have critically studied the environment in the broadest sense of the word, focusing on various forms of environmental harm, crime and regulation, often drawing parallels between ecological and socioeconomic or political inequalities. Waste crime is the trade, treatment or disposal of waste in ways that breach international or domestic environmental legislation and cause harm or risk to the environment and human health. Wildlife crime is one of the areas that have long been recognized as a key environmental crisis. Many species, both big and small, are on the brink of extinction or have gone extinct because of trade and poaching

Measuring Compliance in the Age of Governance:How the Governance Turn Has Impacted Compliance Measurement by the State

Since the 1980s, the governance of business behavior in Western societies has been characterized by a move away from state-centered hierarchical forms of governance to networks of governance which include a wide variety of public and private actors. This chapter illustrates how this so-called governance turn has impacted compliance measurement by the state. The chapter begins by outlining the characteristics of the turn to governance and the questions this raises for the measurement of compliance by the state. The chapter is subsequently organized around two key issues: 1) What is it that we measure when we measure compliance? and 2) The reliability, magnitude, and ownership of the data used. Drawing on examples of certification and the global anti-money laundering regime, each section discusses how the governance turn has made compliance measurement by regulatory authorities more challenging

Toekijken of toezichthouden?

Hoe heeft het zover kunnen komen? Wat kunnen we van deze ervaring leren? Twee regelmatig terugkerende vragen in reactie op misstanden, rampen en langdurige overtredingen. Zo begon ook het artikel in dit vakblad over de Barneveldse insecticidenproducent Denka medio vorig jaar. Als de VROM-Inspectie in december 2005 constateert dat de veiligheidssituatie bij Denka ernstig tekortschiet, duurt het nog ruim drie jaar voordat de situatie bij het bedrijf in januari 2009 enigszins verbetert. Terugblikkend in HandHaving, blijkt Denka echter niet het enige voorbeeld te zijn waarin de overtredingen langdurig aanhouden. Tijd om de zaken waarover Handhaving publiceerde eens aan een nadere analyse te onder- werpen. Wat zijn de belangrijkste factoren die eraan hebben bijgedragen dat de overtredingen zo lang voortduurden