Voters on the extreme left and right are far more likely to believe in conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories are a feature of political discourse across the United States and Europe, but are some types of voters more likely to believe in conspiracy theories than others? Jan-Willem van Prooijen presents findings from a study of belief in conspiracy theories among individuals in the Netherlands and the U.S. He writes that those on the extreme left and right of the political spectrum, together with those who are more likely to have faith in there being simple solutions to complex political problems, are substantially more likely to also believe in conspiracy theories

Punishment Reactions to Powerful Suspects:Comparing a “Corrupt” Versus a “Leniency” Approach of Power

Although the justice system punishes transgressions predominantly when an articulated rationale is provided, there are situations where people judge actors whose guilt is uncertain. In this research, we investigate how observers assign punishments to suspects depending on the suspects’ power (i.e., one’s capacity to control valuable resources and produce intended outcomes). Power, on the one hand, indicates one’s potential to inflict harm and thus increases observer’s perception of a powerful suspect as guilty (the “power corrupts” approach). On the other hand, people see powerholders in more positive terms (cf., Basking in reflected glory) and disregard negative information about them (the “power leniency” approach). If the “power corrupts” approach holds, observers should perceive powerful, as opposed to powerless suspects or suspects whose power is undefined, as more guilty. Moreover they should display punishment motives that are based on utilitarianism with the aim of incapacitating the highly threatening powerful harm-doers and prevent them from future harm. If the “power leniency” approach is true, observers should perceive powerless suspects and suspects whose power is undefined (as opposed to powerful suspects) as more guilty and should display stronger punishment motives (utilitarian, retributive, or restorative) towards those suspects. Further, in line with both approaches, we predict that observers should follow the intuitive retributivism hypothesis and assign more retributive punishments towards suspects with low or undefined power, as compared with high power suspects, with the aim to make them pay for what they did. Besides, we investigate the mediating role of recidivism and guilt likelihood in the relationship between a suspect’s power and an observer’s punishment motives. Finally, we expect that retribution will be generally assigned to a higher extent than utilitarian or restorative motives for sanctioning. Research question: Do people assign suspects retributive, utilitarian or restorative punishments depending on the suspects' power? Study methods: We will conduct a simple experimental design where we will manipulate the power possession of suspects accused of money embezzlement. Guilt likelihood and recidivism of the suspect, and motives for punishment (retributive, utilitarian, restorative) of the observer will be assessed

Motives for punishing powerful vs. powerless offenders:The mediating role of demonization

In the present research, we examine how power and group membership of an offender influence observers’ motives for punishment. As compared to powerless offenders, powerful offenders should elicit a stronger motivation of an observer to incapacitate them and protect society (i.e., utilitarian punishment motivation). Moreover, demonization of the offender (e.g., perceiving the offender as evil) should mediate the effect of power on punishing motives. Finally, we investigated whether group membership of an offender would moderate the effects of power on punishing motives. In three studies, wemanipulated an offender’s power (high, low) and group membership (ingroup, outgroup, and – in Study 1 – ambiguous). Supporting our hypotheses, all three studies revealed that powerful offenders triggered stronger utilitarian punishment motivation as opposed to powerless offenders, while demonization of the offender mediated this effect. Moreover, Studies 1 and 2 showed that powerless offenders triggered stronger restorative punishment motivation as opposed to powerful offenders while low demonization of the offender mediatedthis effect. Contrary to our expectations, however, group membershipdid not moderate the effect of power on observer’s punishing motives.Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed

Instrumental Goals Shape EU Citizens’ Attitudes to the Russia-Ukraine War Over Time

The European Union (EU) legislation suggests that EU member states progressively adopt and implement policies that are primarily in line with the broader European interests, and secondarily with specific national interests. Yet, citizens from various EU member-states often oppose these EU directives and adopt attitudes that favor national or individual interests. The current study investigates whether EU citizens progressively comply with – or digress from – EU directives during the Russia-Ukraine war. In a two-wave study we investigated the role of instrumental reasons (i.e., maximization of material gain) to cooperate with Russia in Greeks’ (an EU member state) compliance with the EU directives over time during the Russia-Ukraine war. We hypothesized and found that instrumental reasons to cooperate with Russia a) encourage EU citizens to support digressing from EU directives and b) predict decreased identification with the superordinate identity of EU and NATO over time. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed

Motives for Punishing Powerful vs. Prestigious Offenders:The Moderating Role of Group Identity

Status can be seen as power over valued resources or as prestige that lies in the eyes of the beholder. In the present research, we examine how power versus prestige influence observers’ punishing motives. Possession of power implies the capacity to harm and elicits threat and therefore should trigger stronger incapacitative motives for punishing an offender. In contrast, prestige signals the observer's admiration of the target and therefore should elicit a strong motivation to help an offender reintegrate into society. Studies 1 and 2 manipulated an offender's status (power vs. prestige vs. control) and group identity (ingroup vs. outgroup). Supporting our hypotheses, both studies revealed that observers had stronger incapacitative motivations towards powerful as opposed to prestigious offenders, particularly when the offender came from the ingroup. Study 2 also showed that observers had stronger restorative motives towards a prestigious as opposed to powerful offender. Contrary to expectations, group identity did not moderate the effect of status on observer's restorative motives. Study 3 manipulated power and prestige separately and showed that power elicits stronger incapacitative motives through ingroup threat and perceived capacity to harm. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings

Instrumental Goals Shape EU Citizens’ Attitudes to the Russia-Ukraine War Over Time

The European Union (EU) legislation suggests that EU member states progressively adopt and implement policies that are primarily in line with the broader European interests, and secondarily with specific national interests. Yet, citizens from various EU member-states often oppose these EU directives and adopt attitudes that favor national or individual interests. The current study investigates whether EU citizens progressively comply with – or digress from – EU directives during the Russia-Ukraine war. In a two-wave study we investigated the role of instrumental reasons (i.e., maximization of material gain) to cooperate with Russia in Greeks’ (an EU member state) compliance with the EU directives over time during the Russia-Ukraine war. We hypothesized and found that instrumental reasons to cooperate with Russia a) encourage EU citizens to support digressing from EU directives and b) predict decreased identification with the superordinate identity of EU and NATO over time. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed