Human Capital Formation during the First Industrial Revolution: Evidence from the use of Steam Engines

We examine the effect of technical change on human capital formation during England's Industrial Revolution. Using the number of steam engines installed by 1800 as a synthetic indicator of technological change and occupational statistics to measure working skills (using HISCLASS), we establish a positive correlation between the use of steam engines and the share of skilled workers at the county level. We use exogenous variation in carboniferous rock strata (containing coal to fuel the engines) to show that the effect was causal. While technological change stimulated the formation of working skills, it had an overall negative effect on the formation of primary education, captured by literacy and school enrolment rates. It also led to higher gender inequality in literacy

Gender gaps in education

This chapter reviews the growing body of research in economics which concentrates on the education gender gap and its evolution, over time and across countries. The survey first focuses on gender differentials in the historical period that roughly goes from 1850 to the 1940s and documents the deep determinants of the early phase of female education expansion, including preindustrial conditions, religion, and family and kinship patterns. Next, the survey describes the stylized facts of contemporaneous gender gaps in education, from the 1950s to the present day, accounting for several alternative measures of attainment and achievement and for geographic and temporal differentiations. The determinants of the gaps are then summarized, while keeping a strong emphasis on an historical perspective and disentangling factors related to the labor market, family formation, psychological elements, and societal cultural norms. A discussion follows of the implications of the education gender gap for multiple realms, from economic growth to family life, taking into account the potential for reverse causation. Special attention is devoted to the persistency of gender gaps in the STEM and economics fields

Gender Gaps in Education

This chapter reviews the growing body of research in economics which concentrates on the education gender gap and its evolution, over time and across countries. The survey first focuses on gender differentials in the historical period that roughly goes from 1850 to the 1940s and documents the deep determinants of the early phase of female education expansion, including preindustrial conditions, religion, and family and kinship patterns. Next, the survey describes the stylized facts of contemporaneous gender gaps in education, from the 1950s to the present day, accounting for several alternative measures of attainment and achievement and for geographic and temporal differentiations. The determinants of the gaps are then summarized, while keeping a strong emphasis on an historical perspective and disentangling factors related to the labor market, family formation, psychological elements, and societal cultural norms. A discussion follows of the implications of the education gender gap for multiple realms, from economic growth to family life, taking into account the potential for reverse causation. Special attention is devoted to the persistency of gender gaps in the STEM and economics fields

The role of human capital formation in the transition to modern economic growth, 1300-1900

Economic models of the Industrial Revolution increasingly emphasize the key role of human capital in promoting economic growth, and empirical studies have shown that education is a strong predictor of per capita GDP. Contrary to the theory, however, economic historians have described the role of human capital in the English Industrial Revolution as minor: there was not much improvement in male literacy between 1750 and 1850, and primary school enrolment rates were rather modest by international standards. The conclusion that human capital did not play an important role in the British Industrial Revolution draws upon records of school enrolment and literacy. Literacy rates are likely to underestimate the level of human capital as they only proxy primary schooling (reading and writing abilities) and enrolment rates do not take into account the age structure of the population. What is more, by largely focussing on the period after 1750, these measures are expected to understate the growth of literacy, and that of schooling in general, which occurred in the centuries leading up to the Industrial Revolution. In my thesis I have introduced new data capturing the evolution of human capital formation in Europe and England over the very long run to reconsider previous conclusions on the human capital to economic growth relationship. To address this issue systematically, I have first of all measured the contribution of human capital to early modern growth, for which it was required to focus on trends of growth in pre-industrial Europe. It is argued that the economies of the Low Countries and England showed a lot of progress between 1300 and 1800, whilst the economies of countries on the Continent stagnated after ca. 1500. As a second step, I have focussed on the human capital to growth relationship in England during the period of its industrialisation. England was the first country that made the transition from agriculture to industry, which made it a highly relevant case. In doing so I introduced three proxies for human capital formation: formal schooling (average years of schooling), working skills (the share of unskilled workers used for production), and‘highly-skilled workmen’ (the share of engineers, mechanics, wrights, instrument makers, chemists). The main findings are that human capital formation was an important driver of the ‘Little Divergence’. Increases in human capital formation did contribute to economic growth in Holland and England between 1300 and 1900. During the period of the Industrial Revolution itself, the relationship was clearly negative. There was a decrease in average years of schooling after ca. 1740 and there was an increase in the share of unskilled workers. At the same time, there was an increase in the share of ‘highly-skilled workmen’.These well-educated workers, comprising up to ca. 3-5 per cent of the work force, supported innovation and provided a major contribution to the spread and consolidation of the Industrial Revolution. It is therefore likely that the technological inventions of the Industrial Revolution were skills saving and skill using at the same time

Capital and economic growth in Britain, 1270-1870: Preliminary findings

Estimates of capital formation and the stock of capital in Britain are provided for the period 1270-1870 and used to analyse economic growth. (1) We chart the growing importance of fixed relative to working capital, the declining importance of land and the growth of net overseas assets. (2) Kaldor’s stylised facts of a rising capital-labour ratio and a stationary capital-output ratio are broadly confirmed, but only if attention is confined to fixed capital. (3) Extensive form growth accounts suggest that output growth was driven largely by factor input growth, while intensive form growth accounts suggest that TFP growth was more important than capital deepening in explaining the growth of output per head. (4) The investment share of GDP increased substantially during the transition from pre-industrial to modern economic growth

Human capital formation from occupations: the ‘deskilling hypothesis’ revisited

We use HISCLASS to code the occupational titles of over 30,000 English male workers according to the skill content of their work. We then track the evolution of the sampled working skills across three centuries of English history, from 1550 to 1850. We observe a modest rise in the share of ‘high-quality workmen’ deemed necessary by Mokyr and others to facilitate the Industrial Revolution, including machine erectors and operators. But we also find remarkable growth in the share of unskilled workers, rising from 20 % in the late sixteenth century to nearly 40 % in the early nineteenth century, caused mainly by falling shares of semi-skilled, blue-collar workers. Close inspection of the occupational structures within the main sectors of production suggests that deskilling occurred in agriculture and industry alike, prompted by land concentration in agriculture and workshop-to-factory changes in industry

The Role of Human Capital in the Process of Economic Development: The Case of England, 1307-1900

Macroeconomic growth models underline the importance of human capital in the process of economic development. This analysis introduces a new proxy for human capital, which is educational attainment, and examines cohesion between education levels and growth for England between 1307 and 1900. The empirical evidence suggests no significant result between basic skills, such as reading and writing abilities, and growth of per capita GDP. More progressive human capital levels, as measured by average years of higher education, seem to have contributed to the process of development until the mid-eighteenth century.Economic development, human capital, history of education, England

Female autonomy generated successful long-term human capital development : Evidence from 16th to 19th century Europe

Does higher female autonomy increase human capital formation? To find out, we employ novel data on numeracy as a proxy for human capital and the demographic indicator female age at marriage as a measure for female autonomy for 27 countries and 153 regions in Europe between 1500 and 1900. Our empirical analysis shows that countries and regions with a relatively high level of female autonomy became success cases and pioneers in long-term human capital development. Because women had an advantage in dairy-farming, we approach endogeneity issues by exploiting variation in gender-biased agricultural specialization

Gender Relations and Economic Development: Hypotheses about the Reversal of Fortune in EurAsia

This paper develops an interrelated set of hypotheses about the links between gender relations, family systems and economic development in EurAsia. Firstly, we briefly discuss a number of ideas from the recent literature about the links between gender relations and economic development. Secondly, we suggest a measure of historic gender relations via the classification and measurement of historical family systems, and offer a set of maps of the institutions concerning marriage, inheritance and family formation that determine the degree of agency that women enjoyed at the micro level. Thirdly, we discuss the possible explanation of the genesis of the EurAsian pattern in family systems and gender relations as a by-product of the spread of agriculture and the process of ancient state formation that followed the Neolithic Revolution 10,000 years ago. Finally, we link these patterns in family systems and female agency to economic growth after 1500. We empirically demonstrate that high female agency was related to per capita GDP between 1800 and 2000. The ‘reversal of fortune’ that happened within EurAsia between 1000 and 2000, whereby the ancient centers of state formation and urbanization in the Middle East, India and China were overtaken by regions at the margin of the continent (Western Europe, Japan, Korea), can in our view be linked to this spatial pattern in gender relations and family systems found there (and reconstructed here)