V2V-PoseNet: Voxel-to-Voxel Prediction Network for Accurate 3D Hand and Human Pose Estimation from a Single Depth Map

Most of the existing deep learning-based methods for 3D hand and human pose estimation from a single depth map are based on a common framework that takes a 2D depth map and directly regresses the 3D coordinates of keypoints, such as hand or human body joints, via 2D convolutional neural networks (CNNs). The first weakness of this approach is the presence of perspective distortion in the 2D depth map. While the depth map is intrinsically 3D data, many previous methods treat depth maps as 2D images that can distort the shape of the actual object through projection from 3D to 2D space. This compels the network to perform perspective distortion-invariant estimation. The second weakness of the conventional approach is that directly regressing 3D coordinates from a 2D image is a highly non-linear mapping, which causes difficulty in the learning procedure. To overcome these weaknesses, we firstly cast the 3D hand and human pose estimation problem from a single depth map into a voxel-to-voxel prediction that uses a 3D voxelized grid and estimates the per-voxel likelihood for each keypoint. We design our model as a 3D CNN that provides accurate estimates while running in real-time. Our system outperforms previous methods in almost all publicly available 3D hand and human pose estimation datasets and placed first in the HANDS 2017 frame-based 3D hand pose estimation challenge. The code is available in https://github.com/mks0601/V2V-PoseNet_RELEASE.Comment: HANDS 2017 Challenge Frame-based 3D Hand Pose Estimation Winner (ICCV 2017), Published at CVPR 201

Endowment structures, industrial dynamics, and economic growth

Economic Theory&Research,Political Economy,Economic Growth,Debt Markets,Emerging Markets

Marshallian externality, industrial upgrading, and industrial policies

A growth model with multiple industries is developed to study how industries evolve as capital accumulates endogenously when each industry exhibits Marshallian externality (increasing returns to scale) and to explain why industrial policies sometimes succeed but sometimes fail. The authors show that, in the long run, the laissez-faire market equilibrium is Pareto optimal when the time discount rate is sufficiently small or sufficiently large. When the time discount rate is moderate, there exist multiple dynamic market equilibria with diverse patterns of industrial development. To achieve Pareto efficiency, it would require the government to identify the industry target consistent with the comparative advantage and to coordinate in a timely manner, possibly for multiple times. However, industrial policies may make people worse off than in the market equilibrium if the government picks an industry that deviates from the comparative advantage of the economy.Water and Industry,Economic Theory&Research,Industrial Management,Industrial Economics,Common Property Resource Development

Social Norms, Information and Trust among Strangers: Theory and Evidence

Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary ―trust‖ game. Players are randomly and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.Social Norms, Trust Game, Random Matching, Trust and Reciprocity, Information, Reputational Mechanisms, Experimental Economics.