Why do markets freeze?

In normal times, investors buy and sell financial assets because there are gains from trade. However, markets do not always function properly — they sometimes “freeze.” An example is the collapse of trading in mortgage-backed securities during the recent financial crisis. Why does trade break down despite the potential gains from trade? Can the government intervene to restore the normal functioning of markets? In “Why Do Markets Freeze?,” Yaron Leitner explains what a market freeze is and some of the theories as to why these freezes occur.Financial markets

A lifeline for the weakest link? Financial contagion and network design

In "A Lifeline for the Weakest Link? Financial Contagion and Network Design," Yaron Leitner describes how contagion can occur, explains why the threat of contagion is not necessarily a bad thing, and shows why some firms may choose to bail out other firms that are facing financial problems.Contracts ; Financial crises

Using collateral to secure loans

In “Using Collateral to Secure Loans,” Yaron Leitner asks: Why is collateral used to secure some loans, but not others? And why does collateral potentially involve more risk? He considers these questions, looking at some of the explanations for using collateral, focusing on its benefits and drawbacks.Loans

Liquidity and exchanges, or contracting with the producers

Yaron Leitner discusses liquidity, a desirable feature of a well-functioning market. In "Liquidity and Exchanges, or Contracting with the Producers," Leitner explains how exchanges can provide liquidity. He also discusses his recent research, which explains some contractual problems that may arise in very liquid markets, as well as the potential role of an exchange in overcoming these problems.Liquidity (Economics)

Non-exclusive contracts, collateralized trade, and a theory of an exchange

Liquid markets where agents have limited capacity to sign exclusive contracts may permit agents to promise the same asset to multiple counterparties and subsequently default. I show that in such markets an exchange can arise as an intermediary whose only role is to set limits on the number of contracts that agents can report voluntarily. In some cases, these limits must be non-binding in equilibrium, and reported trades must not be made public. A (costly) alternative to an exchange is collateralized trade, and the gains from an exchange increase when agents have more intangible capital (e.g., reputation) or when markets are more liquid. ; Superseded by Working Paper 10-28R: Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary.Contracts ; Trade

Legal uncertainty and contractual innovation

Although innovative contracts are important for economic growth, when firms face uncertainty as to whether contracts will be enforced, they may choose not to innovate. Legal uncertainty can arise if a judge interprets the terms of a contract in a way that is antithetical to the intentions of the parties to the contract. Or sometimes a judge may understand the contract but overrule it for other reasons. How does legal uncertainty affect firms’ decisions to innovate? In “Legal Uncertainty and Contractual Innovation,” Yaron Leitner explores issues related to legal uncertainty, particularly the amount of discretion judges have and the types of evidence they consider.Contracts

Stock prices and business investment

Is there a link between the stock market and business investment? Empirical evidence indicates that there is. A firm tends to invest more when its stock price increases, and it tends to invest less when the price falls. In “Stock Prices and Business Investment,” Yaron Leitner discusses existing research that explains this relationship. One question under consideration is whether the stock market actually improves investment decisions.Stock - Prices ; Investments

Convertible securities and venture capital finance

Venture capital financing relies heavily on convertible securities; the most common type is convertible preferred stock. Venture capital contracts also specify control rights that describe who gets to make the firm's decisions. The recent literature has provided some theoretical explanations for the use of these two features. Underlying these explanations is the idea that individuals can take actions that affect the firm's performance but that these actions cannot be specified in a contract. In this article, Yaron Leitner focuses on venture capital contracts, but the ideas presented can be applied to other contracting problems in which individuals must be given incentives to take appropriate actions.Venture capital ; Securities ; Contracts

Market run-ups, market freezes, and leverage

The authors study trade between a buyer and a seller when both may have existing inventories of assets similar to those being traded. They analyze how these inventories affect trade, information dissemination, and price formation. The authors show that when the buyer's and seller's initial leverage is moderate, inventories increase price and trade volume, but when leverage is high, trade may become impossible (a "market freeze"). Their analysis predicts a pattern of trade in which prices and trade volume first increase, and then markets break down. The authors use their model to discuss implications for regulatory intervention in illiquid markets. ; Superseded by Working Paper 12-8Inventories ; Trade ; Markets

Why do markets freeze?

Consider the sale of mortgages by a loan originator to a buyer. As widely noted, such a transaction is subject to a severe adverse selection problem: the originator has a natural information advantage and will attempt to sell only the worst mortgages. However, a second important feature of this transaction has received much less attention: both the seller and the buyer may have existing inventories of mortgages similar to those being sold. The authors analyze how the presence of such inventories affects trade. They use their model to discuss implications for regulatory intervention in illiquid markets.Mortgage loans