Partisan impacts on the economy: evidence from prediction markets and close elections

Analyses of the effects of election outcomes on the economy have been hampered by the problem that economic outcomes also influence elections. We sidestep these problems by analyzing movements in economic indicators caused by clearly exogenous changes in expectations about the likely winner during election day. Analyzing high frequency financial fluctuations following the release of flawed exit poll data on election day 2004, and then during the vote count we find that markets anticipated higher equity prices, interest rates and oil prices, and a stronger dollar under a George W. Bush presidency than under John Kerry. A similar Republican–Democrat differential was also observed for the 2000 Bush–Gore contest. Prediction market based analyses of all presidential elections since 1880 also reveal a similar pattern of partisan impacts, suggesting that electing a Republican president raises equity valuations by 2–3 percent, and that since Ronald Reagan, Republican presidents have tended to raise bond yields

Magnetic structure of CeRhIn5_{5} under magnetic field

The magnetically ordered ground state of CeRhIn$_{5}$ at ambient pressure and zero magnetic field is an incomensurate helicoidal phase with the propagation vector $\bf{k}$=(1/2, 1/2, 0.298) and the magnetic moment in the basal plane of the tetragonal structure. We determined by neutron diffraction the two different magnetically ordered phases of CeRhIn$_{5}$ evidenced by bulk measurements under applied magnetic field in its basal plane. The low temperature high magnetic phase corresponds to a sine-wave structure of the magnetization being commensurate with $\bf{k}$=(1/2, 1/2, 1/4). At high temperature, the phase is incommensurate with $\bf{k}$=(1/2, 1/2, 0.298) and a possible small ellipticity. The propagation vector of this phase is the same as the one of the zero-field structure.Comment: 4 Figure

The Promise of Prediction Markets

Prediction markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. Using these markets as forecasting tools could substantially improve decision making in the private and public sectors. We argue that U.S. regulators should lower barriers to the creation and design of prediction markets by creating a safe harbor for certain types of small stakes markets. We believe our proposed change has the potential to stimulate innovation in the design and use of prediction markets throughout the economy, and in the process to provide information that will benefit the private sector and government alike.Technology and Industry

Foreign Policy and the Ideology of Post-ideology: The Case of Matteo Renzi’s Partito Democratico

The post-communist Italian Left has experienced a long phase of ideational misalignment between ideas placed at different levels, as a qualified discursive institutionalist approach demonstrates. Background public philosophies have often clashed with post-communist political ideology, while foreign policy programmes have often contradicted specific policies. Under the leadership of Matteo Renzi, however, the PD is now experiencing a moment of remarkable ideational consistency. Rather than being founded on entirely new premises, this new consensus folds old elements into new ones and shows all the defining traits of post-ideology. Yet, by espousing post-ideology, Renzi is making an ultimately ideological move whose limitations may soon start to show

The political economy of the disability insurance: theory and evidence of gubernatorial learning

Abstract The dramatic rise in the disability insurance (DI) rolls in the last 20 years has been the subject of much controversy. While the relationship between DI and labor force participation has been the subject of a growing literature, the mechanism of this transition from employment to DI remains unclear. We hypothesize that one mechanism is the state-level administration of the program which creates a classic principal-agent problem. We analyze the conflict of interests for Disability Determination Services agencies between Social Security Administration (SSA) standards and state gubernatorial political interests interacted with the increased demand for disability insurance as an alternative for low-skilled employment during the period of 1982 to 2013. We find evidence that multi-term governors allow a greater fraction of applicants than do first-term governors, but only up to year 2000, when allowance rates started to decrease over time. We develop a model that illustrates how these differences can be due to the type of monitoring conducted by the SSA. We provide additional evidence supporting this hypothesis analyzing how the effects interact with economic and political constraints. JEL codes H55, I18, I38, G22</jats:p