The industrial organization of competition in local bus services

This article is aimed at deepening our understanding of the functioning of competition in the local bus transportation industry and to evaluate its effectiveness. It provides an overview of the competitive constraints that are at work in the industry as discussed in the economic literature, and sketches empirical tests to check whether the intuitions provided by the economists are in line with the reality of the industry.Cet article vise à approfondir notre compréhension du fonctionnement de la concurrence dans l'industrie du transport urbain. Il donne un aperçu des contraintes concurrentielles qui sont à l'œuvre dans l'industrie tel que discuté dans la littérature économique, et esquisse des tests empiriques afin de vérifier si les intuitions fournies par les économistes sont en phase avec la réalité de l'industrie

Cost of the mission of transport and delivery of printed press: theory and evidence

In the first part, we examine from a theoretical perspective how the cost of the mission of postal transport and delivery of newspapers should be defined and by which factors it is determined. In particular we show that a crucial ingredient in the determination of this cost is the variation in aggregate demand induced by an increase in the uniform transportation and delivery rate. In the second part, we empirically analyze the French print media market by modeling the existence of a reciprocal effect between the size of the readership and the amount of advertising. For this two-sided platform, we model the impact of the readership on the level of advertising demand and the intensity of advertising on the number of periodicals sold

Competition for versus in the market of long-distance passenger rail services

This paper is aimed at evaluating the net gains and trade-offs at stake in implementing the competition of the rail mode in the long distance passenger market either by means of franchise or by an open access mechanism. We simulate the outcomes of competition in and for the market using a differentiated-products oligopoly model allowing for inter- and intra-modal competition in a long distance passenger market. Specifically we first calibrate the model using data describing high speed lines in France and show that the incumbent railway operator’s strategy does not simply boil down to a short-term profit maximization (e.g., because of existing regulation or limit-pricing strategy). This yields two important results when simulating competition. First, whether it is for or in the market, the opening to competition does not guarantee a decrease in prices in favor of passengers. Second, the effects of opening up to competition for the market are relatively predictable and potentially positive, while those of opening up to competition in the market remain very uncertain

Competition for versus in the market of long-distance passenger rail services

This paper is aimed at evaluating the net gains and trade-offs at stake in implementing the competition of the rail mode in the long distance passenger market either by means of franchise or by an open access mechanism. We simulate the outcomes of competition in and for the market using a differentiated-products oligopoly model allowing for inter- and intra-modal competition in a long distance passenger market. Specifically we first calibrate the model using data describing high speed lines in France and show that the incumbent railway operator’s strategy does not simply boil down to a short-term profit maximization (e.g., because of existing regulation or limit-pricing strategy). This yields two important results when simulating competition. First, whether it is for or in the market, the opening to competition does not guarantee a decrease in prices in favor of passengers. Second, the effects of opening up to competition for the market are relatively predictable and potentially positive, while those of opening up to competition in the market remain very uncertain

Intermodal and Intramodal Competition in Passenger Rail Transport

Abstract: The objective of the paper is to elaborate a simulation model to analyze inter-and intra-modal competition in the transport industry, based on game theory models. In our setting, consumers choose a transport mode and an operator to travel on a given city-pair; operators strategically decide on prices for the types of service they provide. We derive the market equilibrium and simulate potential scenarios. In particular we measure the impact of entry by a low cost train operator and the effect of a kerosene tax. Hence our framework could serve as a tool to measure the effectiveness of competition on a relevant market or to design marketing strategies. More generally it can be applied in cases of oligopolistic competition when detailed data are not available