Corporate governance and control in Russian banks

The Working Paper examines peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life.banks; Russia; corporate governance

Russia's banking sector transition: Where to?

This paper applies an analytical paradigm of institutional economics to the transition of the Russian banking sector, focusing on the interplay between ownership change and institutional change. We find that the state’s withdrawal from commercial banking has been inconsistent and limited in scope. To this day, core banks have yet to be privatized and the state has made a comeback as owner of the dominant market participants. We also look at the new institutions imported into Russia to regulate banking and finance, including rule of law, competition, deposit insurance, bankruptcy, and corporate governance. The unfortunate combination of this new institutional overlay and traditional local norms of behavior have brought Russia to an impasse – the banking sector’s ownership structure hinders further advancement of market institutions. Indeed, we may now be witnessing is a retreat from the original market.banking sector reform; privatization; Russia; economic transition; institutional economics

Russian banking: The state makes a comeback?

The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by ‘state corporations’. We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.Russian banks; transition; banking; state; government; public sector; state-owned banks; state-controlled banks; state-influenced banks

Government Banking in Russia: Magnitude and New Features

State-controlled banks are currently at the core of financial intermediation in Russia. This paper aims to assess the magnitude of government banking, and to reveal some of its special features and arrangements. We distinguish between directly and indirectly state-controlled banks and construct a set of bank-level statistical data covering the period between 2000 and 2011. By January 2011 the market share of state-controlled banks reached almost 54 percent of all bank assets, putting Russia in the same league with China and India and widening the gap from typical European emerging markets. We show that direct state ownership is gradually substituted by indirect ownership and control. It tends to be organized in corporate pyramids that dilute public property, take control away from government bodies, and underpin managerial opportunism. Statecontrolled banks blur the borderline between commercial banking and development banking. Dominance of public banks has a bearing on empirical studies whose results might suggest state-owned banks’ greater (or lesser) efficiency or competitiveness compared to other forms of ownership. We tend to interpret such results as influenced by the choice of indicator, period of observations, sample selection, etc., in the absence of an equal playing field for all groups of players. We suggest that the government’s planned retreat from the banking sector will involve non-core assets mainly, whereas control over core institutions will just become more subtle.Russia, banks, government, state-owned banks, public sector

Quality of governance and bank valuation in Russia: An empirical study

This paper aims at explaining the differences in valuation of banking firms in Russia from a quality of governance point of view. A sample of acquisition deals and public offerings over the last 5 years is collected with the view of discovering factors that investors deem significant in making a decision whether to invest in a given banking firm and, if so, at what price. We use price-to-book-value of equity (P/BV) multiple as standard measurement of valuation and the dependent variable. As for explanatory variables, we put together a set of proxies for quality of bank governance and management, such as degree of concentration of control, managerial experience, degree of compliance with corporate governance best practices (e.g. degree of Board independence, qualification of external auditors), stability of bank’s governing bodies (Management Board and Board of Directors), and availability of external credit ratings. We find out which factors are statistically significant and relevant. A least squares multiple linear regression model is devised to check how individual variables explain the differences in valuation. We discover that external investors attach value to high concentration of ownership, sheer size of the bank, stability of the governing bodies, involvement of well-established external auditors and also that strategic investors tend to pay higher acquisition premiums. The features of the Board of Directors such as its independence, maturity and stability appear to create less value if any.Bank; corporate governance; valuation; Russia

Banking sector liberalization and the impact of foreign banks: The case of Russia

The paper aims to make the first assessment of the impact that presence of foreigncontrolled banks have produced on the Russian economy and banking system. So far foreign banks have gained a modest market share in Russia with 7% of the combined assets of the banking system. They have made some contribution to the improvement of financial intermediation, especially in terms of reallocation of savings towards Russian corporate borrowers. The presence of foreign banks has rendered some additional resilience to the Russian banking system during and after the financial crisis of 1998. Evidence from Russia, however, supports only some of the presumed benefits from foreign bank participation in transition economies. Insufficient proof was found to confirm assumptions that foreign banks: lend more actively, cheaper or for longer tenors than local peers; sufficiently support the local banking system during liquidity crises; enhance positive structural changes in the host economy; catalyze foreign direct investment; or disseminate product knowledge and new banking technologies

Market share of state-influenced banks in Russia

In this paper we rely on empirical data to develop a classification of state-influenced banks. An estimate of such banks’ combined market share by July 1, 2009 is suggested. We identify 53 state-controlled banks in Russia, including state-owned banks and state-governed banks. Public sector in the banking industry is not limited to the property of federal-level executive authorities or the Central Bank of Russia. It also comprises banks effectively controlled by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks and by “state corporations”. Altogether these banks account for 56% to 57% of all banking assets. Banks owned by public capital indirectly are the fastest-growing group among state-influenced institutions. Concentration grows within public sector of the banking industry, with top-5 state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of national bank assets. We also contemplate a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital whose market share shrinks from year to year. Effectively a return to a state-run credit system has been accomplished. Several largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate third tier of the banking system. Russia’s transition path goes in a quite different direction from that of CEE countries.Russia; banks; state control; public sector; state-owned banks; state-controlled banks; state-influenced banks; transition

«Национальные чемпионы» в структуре российского рынка банковских услуг

We assess the effects from the industrial policy of growing state-controlled national champions on the Russian banking system, its concentration and competitiveness. Some light is shed on comparative financial performance of state-controlled banks versus other market participants. We also show that direct stare ownership is being replaced by indirect ownership and control. The period of observations spreads from 2000 through 1Q 2012. We modify the method of calculating the indicators of market concentration to reflect public ownership of the core market players. As a result of this modification, most market segments cross the threshold of high concentration (HHI ≥ 0.25), whereas household deposits market becomes close to monopoly. Supremacy of public banks enhances their market power and enables collecting rent that boosts profitability. In terms of institutional dynamics, we find a growing similarity between the Russian case and the evolution of the Chinese banking industry

Corporate governance and control in Russian banks

The Working Paper examines peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life

Corporate governance and control in Russian banks

The Working Paper examines peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life