Political budget cycles at the municipal level in Croatia

This paper examines the existence of the political budget cycle (PBC) at the local unit level in Croatia. The research was focused on a sample of 19 county centres, the City of Zagreb and Pula in the period from 2002 to 2011. During that time three parliamentary (in 2003, 2007 and in 2011) and two local elections (in 2005 and in 2009) were held and all the results are calculated at the level of the selected cities. The results do not confirm the existence of opportunistic PBCs, either when the analysis takes in all five elections or when it considers only the parliamentary polls. They do however indicate the restructuring of total expenditures based on second-best strategies and institutional constraints. Analysis of local elections alone indicates the existence of Rogoff’s model of information asymmetry. The paper also presents various theoretical models of the PBC together with a survey of empirical research regarding the existence of PBCs in the developed, transitional and developing countries

Proračunska transparentnost lokalnih vlasti: politička ekonomija proračuna gradova i općina u Hrvatskoj

This paper investigates the budget transparency of Croatian local governments, i.e., the relationship between the open local budget index (OLBI) and a set of economic, political and socio- -cultural variables. It uses a unique panel database of all 128 cities and 428 municipalities in 2015 and 2016. To examine the differences among the samples and years and to determine whether the different samples have different driving forces, a regression analysis based on a Poisson distribution is used. In the total (cities and municipalities) and city samples, average income per capita (p.c.) is the most important determinant of the OLBI, which confirms Ferejohn\u27s principal-agent model. At the municipality level, the findings indicate that political variables (ideology and political competition) are the factors that play the most important role, which is in line with the principal-agent and legitimacy theories. Findings point out to the necessity of reconsidering the number of local governments, particularly smaller ones lacking the capacity for maintaining basic budget transparency standards and to motivate citizens to demand and local governments to offer more budget transparency.Rad istražuje transparentnost proračuna hrvatskih lokalnih jedinica, odnosno odnos između indeksa otvorenosti lokalnih proračuna (OLBI) te ekonomskih, političkih i sociokulturnih varijabli. Primjenom regresijske analize utemeljene na Poissonovoj distribuciji, na jedinstvenoj bazi podataka svih 128 gradova i 428 općina za 2015. i 2016. istražuju se razlike među uzorcima i godinama te utvrđuje značenje različitih varijabli za različite uzorke. U ukupnom uzorku (općine i gradovi) i na razini gradova najvažnija je odrednica OLBI-ja prosječni dohodak po stanovniku, čime se potvrđuje Ferejohnov model principala i agenta. Na razini općina najvažnije su političke varijable (ideologija i politička konkurencija), što je u skladu s teorijom principala i agenta te teorijom legitimnosti. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da je nužno preispitivanje broja lokalnih jedinica, posebice onih manjih, koje ne mogu održavati minimalne standarde proračunske transparentnosti, uz istodobno motiviranje građana da zahtijevaju i lokalnih jedinica da nude više proračunske transparentnosti

Competitiveness, consumer confidence and election outcomes

The literature on the political business cycle (PBC) suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic conditions in order to increase their chances of re-election. The list of variables that have been found to have a significant effect on the probability of re-election includes macroeconomic (inflation rate, unemployment rate, output growth rate) and fiscal (budget balance, level of expenditures and tax revenues) outcomes. This paper focuses on the question whether price and non-price competitiveness indicators together with consumer confidence index have a statistically significant effect. Thus, this paper addresses two empirical questions. First, in light of the globalisation process and on-going comparisons among national economies, could price and non-price indicators serve as a proxy for voters when deciding on whether to penalise or reward the incumbent? And second, based on the economic theory of voting, is consumer confidence index a better indicator of re-election probability compared to unemployment and output growth rates? Using a dataset of EU member states over the 2000-2015 period and by applying probit/logit analysis we test both questions

Political Stubbornness and Online Local Budget Transparency in Croatia

Online proračunska transparentnost lokalnih jedinica (OLBT) prepoznata je kao važna značajka dobrog upravljanja. U skladu s tim, OLBT se u ovom radu mjeri u svih 128 gradova i na uzorku od 100 općina u Hrvatskoj koristeći nekoliko ključnih lokalnih proračunskih dokumenata objavljenih na web stranicama lokalnih jedinica. Koristeći Poissonov panel model s fiksnim učinkom u razdoblju 2013. – 2017., pokazalo se da osim dohotka stanovnika i fiskalnog kapaciteta lokalnih jedinica, razinu OLBT-a određuju politička ideologija i politička konkurencija. Ovaj rad pridonosi rastućoj literaturi o proračunskoj transparentnosti utvrđivanjem važnosti političkih faktora kao odrednica OLBT-a u bivšoj socijalističkoj, fiskalno centraliziranoj, članici EU-a i otkriva zanimljivu tvrdoglavost građana koji dosljedno glasaju za netransparentne političare. Glavni nalaz je da su politički faktori (politička ideologija i politička konkurencija) važni kao odrednice OLBT-a, što u lokalnim jedinicama rezultira suboptimalnom ravnotežom s niskim razinama OLBT-a. Lokalni političar na vlasti zaključuje da OLBT nije od posebne važnost da bi mu izborna jedinica zamjerila netransparentnost. U takvom je okruženju navedeni zaključak valjan, jer ovaj rad dokazuje da birači, koji su tvrdoglavi u svojim glasačkim obrascima, odbijaju promijeniti lokalnog političara na vlasti iako je netransparentan.Online local budget transparency (OLBT) has been recognized as an important feature of good governance. Accordingly, in this paper, OLBT is measured in all 128 cities and a sample of 100 municipalities in Croatia using several key local budget documents published on local government websites. Using a fixed effect Poisson panel model covering the 2013-2017 period, it is shown that along with residents’ income and fiscal capacity of local governments, political ideology and political competition determine the level of OLBT. This paper contributes to the growing body of budget transparency literature by establishing the importance of political factors as determinants of OLBT in this former socialist, fiscally centralized EU member state and reveals the curious stubbornness of the citizens who consistently vote for non-transparent politicians. The main finding is that political factors (political ideology and political competition) matters in determining OLBT, resulting in suboptimal equilibrium of local governments with low levels of OLBT. The local incumbent concludes that OLBT is not a high priority and that his/her constituency will not hold it against him/her. In this environment such a conclusion stands owing to the fact that voters who are stubborn in their voting patterns refuse to change the incumbent who created nontransparency

Politika štednje i izborni ciklus: panel analiza jedanaest novih zemalja članica Europske unije

Provođenje ekonomske politike često je ograničeno društvenim okolnostima, stoga se ona teško može provoditi onako kako je teorijski bila zamišljena. Istodobno, u životu političara izbori – najvažnije ograničenje – rezultiraju pokušajima podređivanja ekonomske politike cilju reizbora umjesto ostvarenja postavljenih ekonomskih ciljeva u izbornim godinama. Ovaj rad istražuje navedenu dihotomiju na primjeru provođenja politike štednje unutar izbornog ciklusa 11 novih zemalja članica Europske unije od 2004. do 2019. Rezultati dinamičke panel-analize potvrđuju oportunističko ponašanje političara na vlasti u izbornim godinama, ali samo u razdobljima kada zemlje nisu obuhvaćene procedurom prekomjernog deficita. Jednom kad im je nametnuto egzogeno ograničenje, političkoproračunski ciklus nestaje

No country for old men? Microsimulation effects of activating pensioners on the labour market

Being a pensioner in Croatia carries certain risks of poverty and inequality compared to the rest of the population. Low level of average pension compared to the minimal wage is just one case in point. On the other hand, the labour market shortage is not negligible and there is also a poor track record when it comes to pension system reforms in the last two decades. This paper investigates a possible path of the future pension system reform aimed at increasing household income levels -- focused on the labour market participation of people aged 65+ who are willing and able to solve labour shortages present in the market. The general aim of the paper is to analyze the effects that the establishment of the Pensioners Service Center might have on market income, mean household income by decile groups, poverty and inequality indices. It fills the research gap by conducting the first microsimulation of the pension system reform in Croatia focusing on market income. The hypothetical reform is simulated using the tax--benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD based on EU--SILC 2019 data for Croatia. Results confirm market income as the main cause of income inequality as well as that the second decile is the target group of the proposed intervention. Pensioners have a clear monetary incentive to increase their labour supply, which in return decreases all poverty and inequality indices

ODREDNICE DOBROVOLJNE TRANSPARENTNOSTI PRORAČUNA LOKALNIH JEDINICA: PRIMJER HRVATSKE

This article analyses the determinants of the voluntary online local budget transparency (OLBT) of Croatian local governments. Budget transparency is one of preconditions for enabling citizens’ participation and improving public sector outcomes; however, the previous empirical results are ambiguous and inconclusive, with particular gaps for ex-socialist, fiscally centralized countries. To contribute to the existing literature, this article uses the principal-agent and legitimacy theories and non-linear panel data models for the 2015-2017 period to analyse 128 cities and 428 municipalities in Croatia. The findings show that local governments with higher residents’ per capita income, population, Internet access, and administrative and fi scal capacity voluntarily publish more budget documents online. Policy recommendations point to the urge for the reform of the country’s territorial and fi scal organisation, the promotion of budget transparency in less developed cities/ municipalities and for education of citizens about budgets. The main study limitation is the absence of a qualitative analysis of observed documents.Rad analizira odrednice dobrovoljne transparentnosti proračuna lokalnih jedinica (OLBT) u Hrvatskoj. Premda proračunska transparentnost predstavlja preduvjet participaciji građana i poboljšavanja ishoda u javnom sektoru, rezultati istraživanja su nejasni i neuvjerljivi, gotovo nepostojeći za post-socijalističke, fiskalno centralizirane države. Doprinos rada je primjena modela agenta i principala te teorije legitimnosti na primjeru jedne takve zemlje. Primjenom nelinearne panel analize na uzorku od 128 gradova i 428 općina u razdoblju od 2015. do 2017. godine utvrđeno je da lokalne jedinice s većim dohotkom po stanovniku, brojem stanovnika, boljim pristupom internetu, većim administrativnim i fi skalnim kapacitetom dobrovoljno objavljuju više proračunskih dokumenata. Preporuke ukazuju na potrebu reforme teritorijalnog i fiskalnog ustroja države, promicanja dobrih praksi proračunske transparentnosti u manje razvijenim gradovima i općinama te educiranja građana o proračunu. Glavno o graničenje istraživanja jest odsustvo kvalitativne analize dokumenata

What determines the fiscal success at a local level? The case of Croatian local government units

The paper investigates the relationship between Croatian local government budget outturns (i.e., fiscal success) and a chosen set of economic and non-economic determinants. The determinants are divided into four groups: (i) economic, (ii) political, (iii) transparency and (iv) socio-historical. Three main goals are set in the paper. The first is to determine whether there are differences in fiscal success at the different levels of administrative governance (counties, cities and municipalities) in Croatia. Subsequently, the second goal is determining whether such differences are of an economic or non-economic origin and third, whether such differences are robust, meaning do they persist at all three administrative levels. If the differences are not persistent, the question remains as towards what determinants (economic or non-economic) do they diverge. The analysis is conducted on the entire population, i.e. 428 municipalities, 128 cities and 20 counties for the period 2012–2014. Panel data and regression analysis are applied to study the differences and signs of independent variables. The obtained results indicate that differences between local government units in Croatia stem are of an economic and political origin