Wirtschaftswachstum in den MOEL zunehmend durch heimische Nachfrage getragen

GERMAN: Die Konjunkturbelebung in der EU 15 trug 2006 zu einer Beschleunigung des Wirtschaftswachstums in den MOEL bei. Während in den neuen EU-Ländern in Mitteleuropa der Außenhandel kräftig wuchs und eine weitere Aufwertung bewirkte, geht die Dynamik in den meisten anderen MOEL vor allem auf die hohe Verschuldungsbereitschaft der privaten Haushalte zurück. Die Lage auf dem Arbeitsmarkt entspannte sich in den neuen EU-Ländern weiter, der Strukturwandel ist dort weitgehend abgeschlossen. In den Westbalkanländern verschlechterte sich die Situation jedoch zum Teil sogar. Die Performance der russischen Wirtschaft hat sich von der Entwicklung der Weltmarktpreise für Energie weitgehend entkoppelt; in der Ukraine schwankt das Wachstum dagegen erheblich und nicht zuletzt durch politische Faktoren bedingt. ---- ENGLISH: The economic recovery in the EU 15 in 2006 resulted in an acceleration of growth in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), particularly in the new EU member states of Central Europe. Helped by the recent massive inflows of FDI, these countries have become serious competitors on the European markets, particularly those of manufactured goods. The continuous nominal currency appreciations in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia reflect their gains in international competitiveness and will not affect their economic growth. In contrast, the contribution of foreign trade to growth was decidedly negative in most other CEECs, including the Baltics and the new EU members in Southeast Europe. Their growth rates - quite high in some instances - were first of all due to a boom in private consumption, largely financed by external borrowing facilitated by the dominance of foreign-owned banks. In some cases, the credit boom is about to overheat and produce ¿bubbles¿, especially in real estate. However, the available policy options are limited: while monetary policy is constrained by fixed exchange rate regimes, fiscal policy is already quite restrictive in general. In the new EU member states, the labour market situation is continuing to improve given that their industrial restructuring is nearing completion, and not least due to the sizeable outward migration flows. In the West Balkan countries, on the other hand, unemployment rates are generally high and rising. Their recent progress towards EU integration has been generally modest, even though greater political stability and growing foreign trade both support their economic recovery. With the exception of Hungary (where large-scale efforts at fiscal consolidation have induced a noticeable economic slowdown), short- and medium-term economic prospects for the CEECs are positive, whereas growth in Serbia and Ukraine remains relatively vulnerable to political risks.transitional economies, comparative study, macroeconomic forecast, macroeconomic analysis, Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasts; Labour and Migration; International Trade and Competitiveness; Foreign Direct Investment; EU Integration; Fiscal and Monetary Policy

MOEL: Wachstumsvorsprung gegenüber Westeuropa bleibt erhalten

GERMAN: Die MOEL verzeichneten 2007 erneut ein kräftiges Wirtschaftswachstum. In den neuen EU-Ländern in Mitteleuropa, deren Expansion primär durch die Re-Industrialisierung geprägt ist, war ein Anstieg der Beschäftigung zu beobachten. In den anderen MOEL wurde die Entwicklung jedoch vor allem vom Dienstleistungssektor getragen und basierte nach wie vor teilweise auf der Ausweitung der Kreditvergabe der Banken, die allerdings in mehreren Ländern etwas gebremst wurde. Die Folgen der weltweiten Finanzmarktturbulenzen und eine Wachstumsverlangsamung in Westeuropa dürften die Konjunkturaussichten der MOEL nur unwesentlich dämpfen; der latente Arbeitskräftemangel und anhaltender Inflationsdruck aufgrund der Verteuerung von Energie und Agrarprodukten auf dem Weltmarkt könnten sich jedoch mittelfristig als Wachstumshemmnis erweisen. ---- ENGLISH: CEEC Growth Still Overtakes Western Europe - Summary Economic growth in Central and East European countries (CEECs) in 2007 was driven primarily by strong domestic demand, especially for consumer goods. The latter resulted from both higher incomes (particularly in Central Europe's new EU countries) and expanding household credit (elsewhere), although the pace of credit expansion has slowed down somewhat, not least due to government efforts to avoid excessive 'overheating'. Another distinction between these two country groups has been in the sectoral patterns of growth: the main growth engine was industry in the Central European new EU countries and the services sector elsewhere. The higher world prices for food and energy and further tightening of domestic labour markets led to mounting inflationary pressures. The latter proved to be particularly strong in the poorer CEECs, but was mitigated by an ongoing currency appreciation in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The recent surge in inflation is unwelcome news for the new EU countries aiming to join the European Monetary Union soon (especially the Baltic states, but in the longer term also Bulgaria and Romania); only Slovakia has a realistic chance to join the euro zone already at the beginning of 2009 as aspired to by the country's government. At the same time, higher inflation and further budget consolidation have improved the fiscal performance of several new EU countries; the latter is no longer a formal obstacle to adopting the euro (with the exception of Hungary). In contrast, fiscal policy in Russia and Ukraine has been somewhat loosened. Russia's sovereign oil fund, which has been booming recently thanks to soaring world crude prices, is being increasingly spent on industrial policy, aimed at diversifying the country's economic structure away from energy. The current turbulence in the global financial markets and a slowdown in Western Europe should dampen the CEECs' growth prospects in 2008 only marginally. The speed of their real convergence to the EU 15 will most probably stay at around 3.5 percentage points on average. Hungary's economic growth should even pick up slightly, as consumer demand will gradually recover from the adverse effects of last year's budget consolidation. At the same time, in Latvia and Estonia, 'hard landing' following a protracted period of demand overheating appears inevitable. The prospects of EU accession for a number of Southeast European countries have recently improved and should contribute to the region's overall stability and economic development. However, Serbia might suffer from the recent 'Kosovo crisis' and the potentially destabilizing consequences of the recent fiscal loosening ahead of the parliamentary elections in May 2008, whereas Turkey remains vulnerable to fluctuations in the world financial markets.transitional economies, comparative study, economic growth, fiscal and monetary policy, macroeconomic forecast, macroeconomic analysis

MOEL im Sog der Krise (CEECs Falling Prey to the International Crisis)

GERMAN: Die mittel- und osteuropäischen Länder (MOEL) sind spätestens seit September 2008 von der Krise der Weltwirtschaft ebenfalls betroffen. Vor allem die Industrieproduktion und der Außenhandel leiden unter den Folgen des Nachfrageeinbruchs. Das reale BIP-Wachstum verlangsamte sich zunächst deutlich und dürfte mittlerweile in fast allen Ländern von einem Rückgang abgelöst worden sein. Die Verschlechterung der Wirtschaftslage bewirkte eine deutliche Erhöhung der Arbeitslosigkeit. Die öffentlichen und die privaten Haushalte sowie die Unternehmen und Banken stehen unter Druck, der zunehmen wird, sollte die Weltwirtschaftskrise von längerer Dauer sein. Die Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Ländern sind jedoch substantiell, da in jedem Land spezielle krisenabschwächende oder -verstärkende Faktoren eine Rolle spielen. Gravierend dürfte die Rezession in jenen Ländern ausfallen, die durch hohe makroökonomische Ungleichgewichte gekennzeichnet sind (Ungarn, baltische Länder) oder eine rückständige Exportstruktur aufweisen (Ukraine). ---- ENGLISH: The current global financial and economic crisis has been spilling over to the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). After several years of economic prosperity in most of these countries, activities of the real economy have slowed down. The crisis has reached the region on two tracks. More difficult and costly access to borrowing (first track) exerts a negative impact on private consumption, especially with regard to demand for durable consumer goods, such as cars, on private investment (both in construction and equipment), and, finally, on foreign trade. At the same time, CEE exports are suffering from the recession in the EU 15 (second track), above all in Germany, the main trading partner for most of the CEECs. Industrial output and export data both reflect the depth of the economic downturn. Inflation had been on the rise up to mid-2008, but decelerated afterwards, with cases of zero month-on-month inflation frequently seen in CEECs. At least, this is true for euro countries and countries with a fixed currency peg. In others, the currency depreciated after September 2008, which also led to significant real depreciation. CEECs with notoriously large current-account deficits are in a dilemma, as sources of external financing have become scarce. The same is true for countries where a wide gap between interest rates for domestic and foreign borrowing had seduced the private sector to accumulate large volumes of debt denominated in foreign currency. Governments were bound by fiscal discipline in recent years, but deficits will increase in 2009 and 2010 in an environment of low revenues, high expenditures and high unemployment. Apart from Russia, these countries have only limited means to implement economic stimulus packages. As internal sources will not be able to generate a great deal of additional demand, the CEECs will have to wait for spillovers from an improving business climate in the rest of the world.transitional economies, comparative study, economic growth, fiscal and monetary policy, macroeconomic forecast, macroeconomic analysis

Erholungstendenzen in den MOEL

GERMAN: Das Wirtschaftswachstum belebt sich in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern (MOEL) langsam, bleibt jedoch schwächer als vor der Wirtschaftskrise. Einige der kleinen, offenen Volkswirtschaften der Region wahrten durch Abwertung oder auch Produktivitätssteigerung ihre preisliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Der überwiegend starke Exportaufschwung trug zur Erholung der Industrieproduktion bei. Aufgrund der dynamischen Ausfuhrentwicklung und der Schwäche der Inlandsnachfrage verringerten sich die Leistungsbilanzdefizite 2010 weiter; in den kommenden Jahren ist allerdings wieder mit einem leichten Anstieg zu rechnen. Mit der Verbesserung der Kapazitätsauslastung werden die Anlageninvestitionen 2011 in allen MOEL ausgeweitet. Auch die Nachfrage der privaten Haushalte wächst, allerdings eher verhalten. Die weltweite Verteuerung von Nahrungsmitteln und Rohstoffen bewirkt auch in den MOEL eine Inflationsbeschleunigung. Der Kreditmarkt leidet in den MOEL nach wie vor unter einer Kreditklemme und einem relativ großen Anteil uneinbringlicher Kredite. In den meisten MOEL schwenkte die Budgetpolitik 2010 auf einen ausgabenseitigen Konsolidierungspfad. Aufgrund des mäßigen Wirtschaftswachstums wird die Beschäftigung erst ab 2012 so stark zunehmen, dass die Arbeitslosigkeit merklich sinkt. ---- ENGLISH: Stabilization of a Weak Recovery in the CESEE Countries The outlook for the world economy improved in the course of 2010 and the recovery has now gained strength in the EU as well. The Central, East and Southeast European (CESEE) countries have also recovered from the crisis; most of them recorded positive GDP growth rates. On average, their exports have been growing at an even stronger pace than before the crisis. On the other hand, industrial output has so far not surpassed pre-crisis levels. The persistent unfavourable development in construction and fixed investments – both rates echoing the still hesitant credit markets – represents one of the key internal risks that could negatively affect the rather optimistic regional economic forecast. The general outlook for the CESEE region in the baseline scenario expects a gradual strengthening of economic growth over the period of 2011-2013, usually not exceeding 4 per cent p.a. GDP growth will become more broadly based. The formerly predominant role of external demand will weaken somewhat, while both household consumption and gross fixed investments will ultimately contribute positively to GDP growth. With exports, industrial output levels and eventually also GDP growth already recovered or on the road to recovery, the economy is seen as having largely returned ‘back to normal’ – yet with at least two important differences: (i) post-crisis growth will be slower; that slower growth, however, also implies that (ii) the labour market situation will be ‘very far from normal’ as unemployment will remain high, with young and low-skilled workers being especially adversely affected, and any improvement only gradual and delayed. Inflation rose throughout 2010 as food and commodity prices soared; in general, however, it will pose no (or little immediate) threat. The moderate economic upturn and a revival of capital inflows have resulted in renewed pressure to appreciate the currency. The forecasts point to a gradual deterioration of current account positions in all CESEE countries. The financing constraint with respect to both domestic and external loans will constitute one of the key brakes on future economic growth. Given the sorry state of public finances and the ensuing budget consolidation efforts, we cannot expect any further growth-stimulating measures from the public sector – on the contrary, owing to the limited fiscal manoeuvring space government deficits and public debts will have to be scaled back.transitional economies, comparative study, economic growth, fiscal and monetary policy, macroeconomic forecast, macroeconomic analysis

Ukraine: Current Economic Situation and Future Prospects

Ukraine's recent political developments have been rather turbulent and their effects on the economy controversial. The economy was rapidly growing between 2000 and 2004, albeit starting from a very low base. Among the growth factors were the devaluation of the hryvnia in 1999, the rising demand in Russia, other CIS markets and Asia, high world market prices of steel and a dramatic upswing in domestic demand for capital goods. Yet in 2005 economic growth slowed down dramatically, as the investment climate suffered from a re-privatization campaign, the world steel prices plunged, while imports were fostered by increased social spending and the currency revaluation undertaken. Newly available data show that the economic slowdown has reversed recently. Private consumption gained momentum once again, backed by an impressive growth of money incomes of households and expanding bank lending. The new Yanukovych government appears to be returning to the more liberal course pursued prior to the Orange Revolution cutting the corporate profit tax, re-instating the Special Economic Zones and shifting the social insurance burden from employers to employees. The consolidated deficit envisaged by the 2007 budget draft (2.6% of GDP) is to be covered largely by privatization receipts. Foreign trade developments during the past one and a half decades have been generally characterized by a re-orientation of trade flows away from Russia and the CIS. However, Ukraine's trade and integration relations with the EU have not advanced very much. The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement envisages the formation of a free trade area with the EU only after the Ukraine has joined the WTO; the latter seems now likely to be delayed and synchronized with that of Russia. The project of a Common Economic Space (CES) between Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan - agreed upon in September 2003 - remains largely on paper as well. Ukraine has scarce reserves of fossil fuels but an extremely energy-intensive economy. In order to reduce the energy dependence on Russia, the 'Energy Strategy of Ukraine until 2030' aims at using more nuclear power and domestically produced coal. An even better recipe in solving the country's energy problems would be a large-scale implementation of energy-saving technologies, including those brought by foreign investors. However, until now the FDI flows into Ukraine have been rather disappointing. The EU-15 share in Ukraine's FDI stock stood at 58% by the end of 2005. The relative political stability following the formation of the new government in the summer of 2006 is likely to bring benefits in the form of increasing investments and higher economic growth. The relations with Russia will almost certainly improve. Further price hikes for imported natural gas are likely to be gradual so that their impact on Ukraine's economy will probably be smoothed. The expected economic growth is 6.5% in 2006 and 7% next year, with annual consumer price inflation hovering around 10%. The recent upturn in exports implies that the trade and the current account deficits will be relatively small. In the longer run, a diversification of the economic structure away from metals and chemicals, and towards goods with a higher value-added, accompanied by an implementation of energy-saving measures, will be essential for ensuring the sustainability of economic growth.macroeconomic analysis and forecasts, international trade and competitiveness, foreign direct investment, fiscal and monetary policy

A Range of Factors Driving Growth Acceleration in Central and Eastern Europe

In 2004, nearly all countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) recorded an acceleration of economic growth and once again outperformed in this respect the EU 15. However, the reasons for this have been different across individual countries. In the new EU member states domestic demand has picked up, Romania and Bulgaria have improved their competitiveness due to the surge in foreign direct investment, the Western Balkans have benefited from greater political stability, whereas Russia and Ukraine have taken advantage of the high world prices for their major export commodities: energy and metals.MOEL CEEC Ost-Mitteleuropa 2004

The Russian Oil and Gas Sector: Facing the New Challenges

Russian oil and gas are playing a vital role in the world markets, but they also represent an important and (still) the most successful part of the national economy. However, whether the oil and gas sector will become an engine for the country's development in the medium and long run depends to a large extent on the performance of the sector itself, and particularly on whether it will be able to overcome the looming supply bottlenecks. Part of the problem is to be solved via the large-scale energy-saving measures envisaged by the federal 'Energy Strategy' and implying, among other things, a tariff reform aimed at bringing domestic prices for natural gas and electricity closer to the world level. In addition, the country's gas industry is to be reorganized on a competitive basis, with only transportation and distribution remaining in state hands. In the oil sector, transportation constraints are becoming much of a concern, as they may hamper the country's ambitious projects of simultaneous penetration into several important energy markets, such as those of the United States and East Asia. As of now, there are reasons to believe that Russia will continue its strategy of free-riding on OPEC supply cuts in the years to come, not least because of the recent warming of the Russian-American relations. Another issue is whether the oil sector will be able cope with production bottlenecks, as the bulk of currently operating deposits are largely exhausted and the most promising oilfields are situated in remote areas of Northern Russia, East Siberia and the Far East. Finally, a lot will depend on whether Russian exporters will be able to export more refined oil products and less crude oil.Russian oil and gas are playing a vital role in the world markets, but they also represent an important and (still) the most successful part of the national economy. However, whether the oil and gas sector will become an engine for the country's development in the medium and long run depends to a large extent on the performance of the sector itself, and particularly on whether it will be able to overcome the looming supply bottlenecks. Part of the problem is to be solved via the large-scale energy-saving measures envisaged by the federal 'Energy Strategy' and implying, among other things, a tariff reform aimed at bringing domestic prices for natural gas and electricity closer to the world level. In addition, the country's gas industry is to be reorganized on a competitive basis, with only transportation and distribution remaining in state hands. In the oil sector, transportation constraints are becoming much of a concern, as they may hamper the country's ambitious projects of simultaneous penetration into several important energy markets, such as those of the United States and East Asia. As of now, there are reasons to believe that Russia will continue its strategy of free-riding on OPEC supply cuts in the years to come, not least because of the recent warming of the Russian-American relations. Another issue is whether the oil sector will be able cope with production bottlenecks, as the bulk of currently operating deposits are largely exhausted and the most promising oilfields are situated in remote areas of Northern Russia, East Siberia and the Far East. Finally, a lot will depend on whether Russian exporters will be able to export more refined oil products and less crude oil.

Sectoral Productivity, Demand, and Terms of Trade: What Drives the Real Appreciation of the East European Currencies?

Since the start of transition, the currencies of most East European countries have experienced an abrupt real depreciation, followed by a trend real appreciation over the subsequent years. Within the framework of a panel-data study for eight Central European transition countries - Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia - over a period of up to 12 years, we attempt to explain their real exchange rate movements against the ECU/euro. Theory suggests that in the medium and long run, real exchange rate movements can only be explained by real shocks, such as the shifts in tastes and technology. We construct a model decomposing real exchange rate movements into two components the changing relative price of tradables (the shifts in terms of trade, reflecting the quality upgrading of the countries' exports) and the changing relative price of non-tradables, relating the latter variable to cross-sectoral productivity differentials (capturing presumably the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect). Our findings suggest that not only the tradable sector productivity and the share of government in GDP, but also the terms of trade are significant determinants of the real exchange rate. However, controlling for sectoral productivities, we found no positive correlation between real exchange rate and per capita GDP, suggesting the relative unimportance of demand effects associated with rising income. The latter finding implies that the trend real appreciation in the countries involved (i.e. higher domestic inflation under a fixed exchange rate arrangement within the framework of monetary integration with the EU) may prove more pronounced than usually assumed due to the possible demand-driven component, as living standards and consumption patterns in transition economies are expected to converge to those currently observed in West European countries.foreign exchange, productivity, transitional economies, real exchange rates, relative prices