The not so smart, smart grid - potential security risks associated with the deployment of smart grid technologies

The electricity grid has been up until now a relatively stable artifice of modern industrialized nations. The power grids are the most widespread wired networks in the world. They are heavily regulated and standardized to protect the integrity, stability and reliability of supply. The grids have been essentially closed systems, this is now rapidly changing with the introduction of the network enabled smart meter. These meters are “web” accessible, connect and interact directly with electrical appliances in domiciles and businesses. This move now brings a range of extreme risks and complexities into these stable networks. This paper explores the security issues and potential problems associated with current moves to provide these smart meters to existing grid connections

Oops they did it again: The 2007 Australian study of remnant data contained on 2nd hand hard disks

The 2007 study used a biased selection process where the primary focus was the purchase of high-speed SCSI drives and drive packs, in addition 2.5 inch laptop drives were targeted. Conventional IDE based hard drives were also examined in the study. A total of 84 drives were examined this year, 23 yielded data that represented significant and in some cases profound exposure if data. Encouragingly more hard disks were erased in this study than in previous studies. However, there is still a significant gap in erasure procedures in organisations, which is particularly concerning given that the drives were from large corporations

Issues common to Australian critical infrastructure providers scada networks discovered through computer and network vulnerability analysis

This paper reports on generic issues discovered as a result of conducting computer and network vulnerability assessments (CNVA) on Australian critical infrastructure providers. Generic issues discovered included policy, governance, IT specific such as segregation, patching and updating. Physical security was also lacking in some cases. Another issue was that previous security audits had failed to identify any of these issues. Of major concern is that despite education and awareness programs, and a body of knowledge referring to these issues, they are still occurring. It may be necessary for the federal government to force organisations to undergo computer and network vulnerability assessment from recognised experts on a regular basis

An overview of ADSL homed nepenthes honeypots in Western Australia

This paper outlines initial analysis from research in progress into ADSL homed Nepenthes honeypots. One of the Nepenthes honeypots prime objective in this research was the collection of malware for analysis and dissection. A further objective is the analysis of risks that are circulating within ISP networks in Western Australian. What differentiates Nepenthes from many traditional honeypot designs it that is has been engineered from a distributed network philosophy. The program allows distribution of results across a network of sensors and subsequent aggregation of malware statistics readily within a large network environment

The Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge (MABOK)

The ability to forensically analyse malicious software (malware) is becoming an increasingly important discipline in the field of Digital Forensics. This is because malware is becoming stealthier, targeted, profit driven, managed by criminal organizations, harder to detect and much harder to analyse. Malware analysis requires a considerable skill set to delve deep into malware internals when it is designed specifically to detect and hinder such attempts. This paper presents a foundation for a Malware Analysis Body of Knowledge (MABOK) that is required to successfully forensically analyse malware. This body of knowledge has been the result of several years of research into malware dissection

Finding evidence of wordlists being deployed against SSH Honeypots - implications and impacts

This paper is an investigation focusing on activities detected by three SSH honeypots that utilise Kippo honeypot software. The honeypots were located on the same /24 IPv4 network and configured as identically as possible. The honeypots used the same base software and hardware configurations. The data from the honeypots were collected during the period 17th July 2012 and 26th November 2013, a total of 497 active day periods. The analysis in this paper focuses on the techniques used to attempt to gain access to these systems by attacking entities. Although all three honeypots are have the same configuration settings and are located on the same IPv4 /24 subnet work space, there is a variation between the numbers of activities recorded on each honeypots. Automated password guessing using wordlists is one technique employed by cyber criminals in attempts to gain access to devices on the Internet. The research suggests there is wide use of automated password tools and wordlists in attempts to gain access to the SSH honeypots, there are also a wide range of account types being probed

The 2009 analysis of information remaining on USB storage devices offered for sale on the second hand market

The use of the USB storage device, also known as the USB drive, a thumb drive, a keychain drive and a flash drive has, for the most part, replaced the floppy disk and to some extent the Compact Disk (CD), the DVD (Digital Video Disk or Digital Versatile Disk) and the external hard disk. Their robustness, size and weight make them easy to transport, but also to lose or misplace. They are inexpensive and are often given away as promotional items by organisations. Over the last few years there has been a dramatic increase in the storage capacity of these devices, going from a few tens of megabytes to a current capacity of around 64 gigabytes (equal to around 13 DVDs). The larger capacity and continued low cost has vastly increased the potential uses of the devices and also the volumes and types of data that they may contain

A Threat to Cyber Resilience : A Malware Rebirthing Botnet

This paper presents a threat to cyber resilience in the form of a conceptual model of a malware rebirthing botnet which can be used in a variety of scenarios. It can be used to collect existing malware and rebirth it with new functionality and signatures that will avoid detection by AV software and hinder analysis. The botnet can then use the customized malware to target an organization with an orchestrated attack from the member machines in the botnet for a variety of malicious purposes, including information warfare applications. Alternatively, it can also be used to inject known malware signatures into otherwise non malicious code and traffic to overloading the sensors and processing systems employed by intrusion detection and prevention systems to create a denial of confidence of the sensors and detection systems. This could be used as a force multiplier in asymmetric warfare applications to create confusion and distraction whilst attacks are made on other defensive fronts

The Proceedings of 14th Australian Digital Forensics Conference, 5-6 December 2016, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Australia

Conference Foreword This is the fifth year that the Australian Digital Forensics Conference has been held under the banner of the Security Research Institute, which is in part due to the success of the security conference program at ECU. As with previous years, the conference continues to see a quality papers with a number from local and international authors. 11 papers were submitted and following a double blind peer review process, 8 were accepted for final presentation and publication. Conferences such as these are simply not possible without willing volunteers who follow through with the commitment they have initially made, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the conference committee for their tireless efforts in this regard. These efforts have included but not been limited to the reviewing and editing of the conference papers, and helping with the planning, organisation and execution of the conference. Particular thanks go to those international reviewers who took the time to review papers for the conference, irrespective of the fact that they are unable to attend this year. To our sponsors and supporters a vote of thanks for both the financial and moral support provided to the conference. Finally, to the student volunteers and staff of the ECU Security Research Institute, your efforts as always are appreciated and invaluable. Yours sincerely, Conference Chair Professor Craig Valli Director, Security Research Institut