From a currency board to the euro: Public attitudes toward unilateral euroization in Bulgaria

Bulgaria has operated a currency board since 1997. It is expected to join the EU in 2007 and the EMU thereafter. This paper uses survey data to analyze public attitudes toward adoption of the euro in advance of EMU membership. Bulgarians are equally split in support for and opposition to euroization. The reasons to support euroization include the eliminated risk of currency devaluation and the perception that the euro is already widely used in the economy. The opposition derives from people’s attachment to the national currency and from concerns about the conversion costs involved in a switch to the euro.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40122/3/wp736.pd

Credit Expansions and Financial Crises: The Roles of Household and Firm Credit

The literature has identified credit expansions to the private sector as an important predictor of financial crises in developing countries. We extend the literature by decomposing credit into credit extended to households and credit extended to firms. We compile a unique disaggregated data set and find evidence that household credit growth and firm credit growth have positive, distinct, and statistically significant effects on the likelihood of banking and currency crises. Furthermore, household credit growth is a particularly important predictor of banking crises in countries with a high propensity to consume. Working Paper 06-5

Once Bitten, Twice Shy: Experiences of a Banking Crisis and Expectations of Future Crises

Survey data from Bulgaria show that people who had experienced a loss during a banking crisis are significantly more likely to expect a new crisis. This result holds despite 12 years between the earlier crisis and the survey, and the dramatically improved performance of the financial sector and the economy in the meantime. However, we find that earlier experiences affect expectations only for less informed individuals. Individuals who are more informed about the economy are unaffected by their prior experiences.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64382/1/wp969.pd

Monetary Union and Central Bank Independence

We study the consequences of forming a monetary union among a group of countries where the central banks lack independence and are pressured frequently to accommodate government objectives. This is a common situation in the developing countries. As it is common in the literature, we show that forming a monetary union yields net benefits if output shocks are similar across the member countries and if one or more countries in the union can serve as anchors. Our framework highlights an additional gain from monetary union. We show that the opportunistic objectives of one country's policymakers are kept in check at the union level by other members with disparate objectives. Hence, monetary union can improve the monetary policy for its members if the pressures on the individual central banks are dissimilar. We calibrate the model to evaluate the proposed monetary union in the East African Community. Working Paper 06-5

The Maturity Structure of Bank Credit: Determinants and Effects on Economic Growth

We investigate a new data set on the maturity of bank credit to the private sector in 74 countries. We show that credit maturity is longer in countries with strong institutions, low inflation, large financial markets, and where banks share information about borrowers. Furthermore, we extend the finance and growth literature by showing that credit maturity matters for economic growth. Economic growth is enhanced in countries where agents have access to long-term financing. Therefore, weak institutions, high inflation and other variables that reduce credit maturity have an impact on economic growth via their influence on credit maturity. The estimated effects are substantial in size. Working Paper 08-1

Fixed Exchange Rate Credibility with Heterogeneous Expectations

After disinflation has been achieved, agents who form more sophisticated forecasts have lower confidence in the sustainability of a peg compared to less sophisticated agents. Furthermore, sustained financial stability leads to a declining proportion of sophisticated agents. Thus, the credibility of a fixed exchange rate regime grows over time partly because fewer people pay attention to the workings of the monetary regime. These results are derived in a rules-versus-discretion model of a fixed exchange rate regime with heterogeneous agents. We provide unique supporting evidence using data on expectations and information about the monetary regime from Bulgaria's currency board. Working Paper 06-2

Tenuous Financial Stability

Many countries fix their exchange rate in order to bring financial stability. Usually, inflation declines and output expands but contractual agreements retain their short time frame, investment is sluggish, and economic growth slows down a few years later. This outcome is often attributed to persistent doubts on the part of agents in the commitment and ability of the government to maintain the peg. Yet direct evidence for credibility is difficult to obtain. Unique survey data from Bulgaria reveal that expectations of devaluation were indeed very much present three, four, and five years after that country achieved financial stability under a currency board regime.Credibility, Currency boards, Stabilization programs