The UK should embrace the European model of public financing for political parties

Valentino Larcinese argues that, as is the case in Europe, the UK should adopt public financing for political parties to help avoid elite capture by wealthy private individuals or corporations, and allow politicians to devote their time to activities other than just fundraising

Rational ignorance and the public choice of redistribution

This paper studies the role of citizensÂ’ demand for political information in elections and provides a possible explanation for the poor empirical support encountered by political economy models of income redistribution. It shows that incentives to gather political information may derive from its relevance to private choices. Under quite mild assumptions, the demand for political information is increasing in income. Information affects citizensÂ’ responsiveness to electoral platforms, and vote-seeking political parties should take this into account: as a consequence, redistribution will generally be less than predicted by the median voter theorem. Moreover, in contrast with what most literature seems to take for granted, an increase in inequality will not unambigously increase redistribution. Finally, introducing endogenous information may lead some policy restrictions to have effects quite different from those intended.redistribution, median voter, information, inequality

PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME TAXATION IN A PROGRESSIVE TAX SYSTEM: EVIDENCE FROM ITALY

I compare personal and household income taxation and study the effects of tax progression under the two systems. Potential reforms of the Italian tax system are simulated, endogenizing labor supply reactions. Results show that, with respect to a number of indicators, the choice of the tax unit is more relevant than the degree of progression of the tax schedule. A personal and progressive tax system provides incentives to female labor supply and turns out to be the most effective in redistributing income and raising revenue, with little productive costs compared with a flat tax rate. Household taxation has instead a number of drawbacks when coupled with a progressive tax schedule.

Enfranchisement and Representation: Italy 1909-1913

This paper presents evidence on the consequences of the 1912 introduction of "quasiuniversal" male suffrage in Italy. The reform increased the electorate from slightly less than three million to 8,650,000 and left the electoral rules and the district boundaries unchanged. This allows us to exploit the heterogeneity in enfranchisement rates across electoral districts to identify the causal effects of franchise extension on a number of political outcomes. The reform caused an increase in the vote share of social reformers (Socialists, Republicans and Radicals), together referred to as the Estrema. One standard deviation in the share of newly enfranchised voters over the total number of registered 1913 voters caused an increase of around 2% in votes for Estrema candidates but had no impact on their parliamentary net seat gains. Enfranchisement had also no impact on the parliamentary representation of aristocracy and traditional elites. Other outcomes (the chances of having candidates from the Estrema and the Herfindel-Hirshman index of electoral competition) were also unaffected, with the exception of turnout, which decreased. These findings show that de jure political equalization did not cause major changes to political representation, although the voting choices of the formerly and newly enfranchised citizens differed on average. This apparent puzzle is the consequence of the heterogeneity of the effect across a number of both social and political dimensions. The paper documents elite's effort to minimize the political impact of the reform.democratization, voting, electoral competition, inequality, swingdistricts, political violence, Vatican, socialism.

Personal and household income taxation in a progressive tax system: evidence from Italy.

I compare personal and household income taxation and study the effects of tax progression under the two systems. Potential reforms of the Italian tax system are simulated, endogenizing labor supply reactions. Results show that, with respect to a number of indicators, the choice of the tax unit is more relevant than the degree of progression of the tax schedule. A personal and progressive tax system provides incentives to female labor supply and turns out to be the most effective in redistributing income and raising revenue, with little productive costs compared with a flat tax rate. Household taxation has instead a number of drawbacks when coupled with a progressive tax schedule.

Crime and punishment the British way: how the expenses scandal affected the 2010 general election

A study by Valentino Larcinese examines the channels through which voters keep politicians accountable. Using the expenses scandal as a source of data, he finds that it was scandal-related press coverage which affected negatively the 2010 performance of standing MPs. Punishment in the ballot box, however, was relatively small and generally not sufficient to remove MPs involved in the scandal from their seat. One of the reasons why in general elections the punishment of corrupt politicians can be modest is because ideology matters and many voters may still prefer a corrupt politician to an ideologically more distant alternative

The real problem in Italian democracy is not the electoral law, but Silvio Berlusconi’s continued grip over the country’s media

Italy’s new prime minister Matteo Renzi has made electoral reform one of his key priorities, with a new electoral law currently under consideration in the Italian Senate, having been passed in the lower house of the Italian parliament last week. Valentino Larcinese writes that while Renzi may succeed in his attempts at electoral reform, the fact that he has relied on the support of Silvio Berlusconi carries its own cost. By offering Berlusconi a route back into frontline politics, Renzi has effectively contributed to the former Italian PM’s political rehabilitation following his expulsion from parliament. Moreover, the preoccupation with electoral reform has obscured the fact that the foremost problem with Italian democracy still remains: Berlusconi’s grip over the country’s media

Political information, elections and public policy

This thesis contributes to the study of the role of information in elections and public policy formation. Its main focus is on information acquisition and voting behaviour. Chapter 1 discusses the motivation of this research and presents a survey of related literature. Chapter 2 focuses on electoral turnout, Chapter 3 on public policy, and Chapter 4 on mass media. Chapter 2 studies the impact of information on electoral turnout. Since incentives to be informed are correlated with other incentives to participate in public life, a model of information acquisition and turnout is introduced to isolate potential instrumental variables and try to establish a causal relation. Results are tested on the 1997 General Election in Britain. It is shown that information, as well as ideology, matters for turnout. It also contributes to explain the systematic correlation of turnout with variables like education and income. Voters' knowledge of candidates and of other political issues is also substantially influenced by mass media. Chapter 3 presents a model that links the distribution of political knowledge with redistributive policies. It argues that voters can have private incentives to be informed about politics and that such incentives are correlated with income. Therefore redistribution will be systematically lower than what the median voter theorem predicts. Moreover, more inequality does not necessarily lead to an increase in redistribution and constitutional restrictions might have unintended consequences. In Chapter 4 it is argued that instrumentally motivated voters should increase their demand for information when elections are close. In supplying news, mass media should take into account information demand, as well as the value of customers to advertisers and the cost of reaching marginal readers. Information supply should therefore be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, the population is on average more valuable for advertisers, and the population density is higher. These conclusions are then tested with good results on data from the 1997 General Election in Britain

Why Italians should reject Renzi’s constitutional reform

We are now in the final month of campaigning ahead of Italy’s constitutional referendum on 4 December. Presenting a case for a No vote, Valentino Larcinese argues that the proposed reform would remove much needed checks and balances on executive power in Italy, while the method used by the government to try and enact the reform is also worthy of rejection in its own right

There is no such thing as the ‘will of the people’ – Brexit needs the involvement of parliament

Theresa May has rejected calls for the UK parliament to have a vote on the terms of Brexit, however on 12 October she accepted that there will be an opportunity for parliament to debate the country’s strategy before Article 50 is triggered. Valentino Larcinese states that the argument against parliament having a strong role in the process rests on a decidedly misguided notion of the ‘will of the people’ and that UK citizens deserve adequate deliberation and decision-making procedures to determine the way forward following the referendum result