Sharedness as an innate basis for communication in the infant

From a cognitive perspective, intentional communication may be viewed as an agent's activity overtly aimed at modifying a partner's mental states. According to standard Gricean definitions, this requires each party to be able to ascribe mental states to the other, i.e., to entertain a so-called theory of mind. According to the relevant experimental literature, however, such capability does not appear before the third or fourth birthday; it would follow that children under that age should not be viewed as communicating agents. In order to solve the resulting dilemma, we propose that certain specific components of an agent's cognitive architecture (namely, a peculiar version of sharedness and communicative intention), are necessary and sufficient to explain infant communication in a mentalist framework. We also argue that these components are innate in the human species

On the nature and role of intersubjectivity in communication

We outline a theory of human agency and communication and discuss the role that the capability to share (that is, intersubjectivity) plays in it. All the notions discussed are cast in a mentalistic and radically constructivist framework. We also introduce and discuss the relevant literature

Editorial: Beyond embodied cognition: Intentionality, affordance, and environmental adaptation

The paper describes the contents of the contributions contained in the special topi

Sharedness and privateness in human early social life

This research is concerned with the innate predispositions underlying human intentional communication. Human communication is currently defined as a circular and overt attempt to modify a partner's mental states. This requires each party involved to posse ss the ability to represent and understand the other's mental states, a capability which is commonly referred to as mindreading, or theory of mind (ToM). The relevant experimental literature agrees that no such capability is to be found in the human speci es at least during the first year of life, and possibly later. This paper aims at advancing a solution to this theoretical problem. We propose to consider sharedness as the basis for intentional communication in the infant and to view it as a primitive, i nnate component of her cognitive architecture. Communication can then build upon the mental grounds that the infant takes as shared with her caregivers. We view this capability as a theory of mind in a weak sense.

Rethinking the ontogeny of mindreading

We propose a mentalistic and nativist view of human early mental and social life and of the ontogeny of mindreading. We define the mental state of sharedness as the primitive, one-sided capability to take one's own mental states as mutually known to an i nteractant. We argue that this capability is an innate feature of the human mind, which the child uses to make a subjective sense of the world and of her actions. We argue that the child takes all of her mental states as shared with her caregivers. This a llows her to interact with her caregivers in a mentalistic way from the very beginning and provides the grounds on which the later maturation of mindreading will build. As the latter process occurs, the child begins to understand the mental world in terms of differences between the mental states of different agents; subjectively, this also corresponds to the birth of privateness.

Th.o.m.a.s.: An exploratory assessment of Theory of Mind in schizophrenic subjects

A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects (first vs. second order, first vs. third person, egocentric vs. allocentric, beliefs vs. desires vs. positive emotions vs. negative emotions and how each of these mental state types may be dealt with), to determine whether some components are more impaired than others. We developed a Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) and administered it to 22 persons with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and a matching control group. Th.o.m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview which allows a multi-component measurement of ToM. Both groups were also administered a few existing ToM tasks and the schizophrenic subjects were administered the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale and the WAIS-R. The schizophrenic persons performed worse than control at all the ToM measurements; however, these deficits appeared to be differently distributed among different components of ToM. Our conclusion is that ToM deficits are not unitary in schizophrenia, which also testifies to the importance of a complete and articulated investigation of ToM

Evaluation of the effectiveness of BNT162b2 primary vaccination and booster dose to SARS-CoV-2 in eliciting stable mucosal immunity

The waning effectiveness of the primary vaccination for SARS-CoV-2 led to administration of an additional booster dose (BD). The efficacy of the BD in stimulating humoral systemic immune response is well established, but its effectiveness on inducing mucosal immune reaction has not yet been reported. To address this issue, we evaluated SARS-CoV-2-specific antibody responses in the serum, saliva, and tears after BNT162b2 (Pfizer/BioNTech, New York, NY, USA) vaccination and BD, as well as after SARS-CoV-2 infection. After two doses of BNT162b2 vaccine, we observed specific serum IgG in 100% and IgA in 97.2% of subjects, associated with mucosal response in both salivary samples (sIgA in 97.2% and IgG(S) in 58.8%) and in tears (sIgA in 77.8% and IgG(S) in 67.7%). BD induced a recovery of the systemic humoral response and of tear sIgA when compared to 6 months of follow-up titers (p < 0.001; p = 0.012). However, sIgA levels in both tears and saliva were significantly lower following BD when compared to patients with prior SARS-CoV-2 infection (p = 0.001 and p = 0.005, respectively). Our results demonstrated that administration of BD restored high serum levels of both IgG and IgA but had a poor effect in stimulating mucosal immunity when compared to prior SARS-CoV-2 infection