Implicit vs. Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study

We derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent’s rent increases with bonus pay, the principal implements the maximum credible salary promise. Thus, the bonus increases while the salary promise and the agent’s effort decrease with a higher probability of premature contract termination. We subject this mechanism to econometric testing using personnel data of an insurance company. The empirical results strongly support our theoretical predictions.implicit contract, explicit bonus pay, premature contract termination, compensation and productivity estimates

Investments in the human capital of the socially disadvantaged children: Effects on redistribution

Recently, early investments in the human capital of children from socially disadvantaged environments have attracted a great deal of attention. Programs of such early intervention, aiming at children's health and well-being, are spreading considerably in the U.S. and are currently tested in several European countries. In a discrete version of the Mirrlees model with a parents' and a children's generation we show the intra-generational and the inter-generational redistributional consequences of such intervention programs. It turns out that the parents' generation always loses when such intervention programs are implemented. Among the children's generation it is the rich who always benefit. Despite the expectation that early intervention puts the poor descendants in a better position, our analysis reveals that the poor among the children's generation may even be worse off if the effect of early intervention on their productivity is not large enough. --Early Intervention,welfare,redistribution,taxation

Implicit vs. explicit incentives : theory and a case study

We derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent's rent increases with bonus pay, the principal implements the maximum credible salary promise. Thus, the bonus increases while the salary promise and the agent's effort decrease with a higher probability of premature contract termination. We subject this mechanism to econometric testing using personnel data of an insurance company. The empirical results strongly support our theoretical predictions

Corporate Management of Highly Dynamic Risks: The Case of Terrorism Insurance in Germany

This article extends the theory of corporate risk management to encompass highly dynamic risks. Taking Viscusi'�s (1989) prospective reference from the context of individual decision making and applying it to a corporate context we propose a theory of how corporations process new information. Using unique data on all terrorism insurance policies sold in Germany we find support for this concept of risk-updating by showing that the demand for terrorism insurance is strongly determined by the recent occurrence of terrorist attacks.Corporate Insurance, Risk Management, Terrorism Insurance, Expected Utility, Prospect Theory

Supply and Demand for Terrorism Insurance: Lessons from Germany

In our article we consider insurance as a means of allocating terrorism risk. Terrorism poses a significant challenge for insurers worldwide. In terms of possible losses it fits into the same category as earthquakes and hurricanes. Yet as a result of the uncertainty surrounding these risks private markets face significant difficulties in providing insurance for it. In the insurance industry costly risk bearing can explain the supply of capacity risks. Corporate risk management theory provides reasons why transaction costs can motivate firms to purchase insurance. In the context of these tightly connected theories we derive models for both the supply of terrorism reinsurance and the demand for terrorism insurance. Using two datasets from the German terrorism insurer we estimate models on how corporations in Germany employ government sponsored insurance to manage their terrorism risk and on the factors that determine the supply for private market terrorism reinsurance

What if Firms Could Borrow More? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

We study the effects of a unique lending program initiated by the Swedish government at the height of the financial crisis that allowed firms to suspend payment of all labor-related taxes and fees. Comprehensive administrative data on all Swedish firms show that firms borrowing from the program have higher rates of debt growth, investment spending, and employment growth compared to otherwise similar firms whose labor taxes were sufficiently low they could not benefit from the program. These results connect the availability of external credit with real activity in entrepreneurial firms in a way that has proved difficult in other settings

Same legal status but unequal treatment: bureaucratic discrimination against mobile EU citizens

EU Citizenship guarantees the same rights to all mobile EU citizens who move to another member state. And yet, as a recent study by Christian Adam, Xavier Fernández-i-Marín, Oliver James, Anita Manatschal, Carolin Rapp and Eva Thomann indicates, some EU citizens are more likely than others to face discrimination when interacting with their host country’s public administration. Remarkably, they find that patterns of discrimination displayed by public administrators are very similar to patterns of discriminatory behaviour displayed by the general public