Duterte's resurgent nationalism in the Philippines: a discursive institutionalist analysis

Early in his administration, Rodrigo Duterte, the controversial sixteenth president of the Philippines, did what no other Filipino president has done before - announce a separation from the geopolitical interests of its former colonial master, the United States of America. Beyond the personal slights caused by the US criticism of his anti-drug campaign lies a deeper sense of historical grievance that has been ingrained in Duterte's generation and his identity as a Mindanaoan. Not only does he represent Mindanao's resentment towards "imperial Manila", but also a historical blowback against "US imperialism". Duterte's nationalist exhortations can be traced to the cycle of regime narratives in the Philippines, which serves as a medium for institutional continuity and change through the mobilisation of ideas at a discursive level. By reviving the anti-US nationalism of his youth, Duterte is repudiating the liberal reformist, albeit elitist, narrative of the Aquino-to-Aquino regimes. Duterte's so-called "pivot to China" is also a dramatic reversal of his predecessors' strong anti-China and rabidly pro-American foreign policy position. This paper blends Vivien A. Schmidt's discursive institutional analytical framework with Stephen Skowronek's concept of presidential leadership in political time to analyse how crafted narratives are transformed into governance scripts that bind together a coalition of interests within a particular institutional setting

Beyond nostalgia: the Marcos political comeback in the Philippines

On 25 May 2022, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., son, and namesake of the late dictator, was proclaimed by Congress as the 17th president of the Republic of the Philippines. His landslide victory in the presidential election was astounding, coming 36 years after his family was ousted from the presidential palace in a military-backed people power uprising. He has also emerged as the first majority president in the post-Marcos period garnering a historic 31,629,783 (59%) votes, with a margin of almost 31% ahead of his closest rivals. His successful presidential campaign was built around the myth, propagated on social media, and actively embraced by a large segment of the public (both young and old) that the Marcos dictatorship was a “golden age” of peace and prosperity, as opposed to the long-held and well-documented accounts of a violent and corrupt rule that left the country poor. While it is possible to say that the rise of Rodrigo Duterte’s strongman populism in 2016 cleared the stage for the Marcos restoration in 2022, authoritarian nostalgia has been simmering in the public’s political preference since the mid-2000s. The inability to adequately address the legacies of authoritarianism has impacted the overall consolidation of democratic gains. This paper would like to address the following questions: First, what factors contributed to the erosion of the post-Marcos liberal reformist political order? Second, how did the Marcos dynasty succeed in staging a political comeback? Third, what are the prospects for Philippine democracy under a restored Marcos presidency

The study of politics in Southeast Asia: The Philippines in Southeast Asian political studies

The study of politics in Southeast Asia emerged out of significant junctures in historical state-making and nation-building in the region. Given the neglect of Southeast Asia in mainstream Western political science, efforts have been made by scholars within and outside Southeast Asia to form epistemic communities like the Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA) to promote studies about Asia. The Philippines is an interesting case in this regard because it mirrored significant periods in its political history - from colonialism to nationalism, modernization, authoritarianism, and democratization. Notwithstanding the strong influence of American political scientists in the early teaching and writing on Filipino politics, the discipline has generally avoided the quantitative methodologies privileged by its American counterpart. Moreover, a vibrant and pluralist approach has been evident in the scholarly output of the Philippine Political Science Journal (PPSJ). Despite initial setbacks in its organization, the Philippine Political Science Association (PPSA) has been successful in fostering a national epistemic community of academics, scholars, and practitioners. © 2014 Philippine Political Science Association (PPSA)

Duterte’s resurgent nationalism in the philippines: A discursive institutionalist analysis

© 2016, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. All rights reserved. Early in his administration, Rodrigo Duterte, the controversial sixteenth president of the Philippines, did what no other Filipino president has done before – announce a separation from the geopolitical interests of its former colonial master, the United States of America. Beyond the personal slights caused by the US criticism of his anti-drug campaign lies a deeper sense of historical grievance that has been ingrained in Duterte’s generation and his identity as a Mindanaoan. Not only does he represent Mindanao’s resentment towards “imperial Manila,” but also a historical blowback against “US imperialism.” Duterte’s nationalist exhortations can be traced to the cycle of regime narratives in the Philippines, which serves as a medium for institutional continuity and change through the mobilisation of ideas at a discursive level. By reviving the anti-US nationalism of his youth, Duterte is repudiating the liberal reformist, albeit elitist, narrative of the Aquino-to-Aquino regimes. Duterte’s so-called “pivot to China” is also a dramatic reversal of his predecessors’ strong anti-China and rabidly proAmerican foreign policy position. This paper blends Vivien A. Schmidt’s discursive institutional analytical framework with Stephen Skowronek’s concept of presidential leadership in political time to analyse how crafted narratives are transformed into governance scripts that bind together a coalition of interests within a particular institutional setting

House of clans: Political dynasties in the legislature

A combination of adaptive strategies has enabled political dynasties to maintain their dominance in Philippine congressional politics. Consequently, a variety of political dynasties have emerged in successive political regimes utilizing these strategies. This study investigates the adaptability and resilience of political clans. It is an exposition of the methods undertaken by traditional, new, and emerging political dynasties to maintain their dominance in congressional politics. The national legislature, in its various historical incarnations, has long served as a nexus for national and local power dynamics. Thus, the mechanism by which political clans acquire, sustain, and reproduce power through the House of Representatives is elaborated. © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Mark R. Thompson and Eric Vincent C. Batalla; individual chapters, the contributors

Regional dimensions of the 2016 general elections in the Philippines: Emerging contours of federalism

This election report will focus on the regional dimensions of the 2016 national and local elections in the Philippines. In doing so, the report aims to draw regional implications for the proposed shift to federalism. The following shall discuss the results of provincial elections for governor clustered along regional administrative lines; elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); elections for congressional districts clustered in regions; and the breakdown of regional support for the presidential candidates based on their respective bailiwicks. © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

Synthesis and distillation of policy issues: What should governments do? The global financial crisis as a market and government failure

Some of the current financial issues and problems besetting the world economies may be traced to the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s which centered on free markets and free trade with the consequent less government regulation. Liberalization led to global prosperity and innovation after two decades but extreme market fundamentalism also contributed to the present financial crisis. Is the problem one of governance, of market failure or of people? It is all of these. Markets failed to allocate resources into an efficient manner; governments failed to curb the excesses of the markets. Policy analyses and the presentation of the speakers in the conference reveal that the possible solution is not limited to economics but should also include political adjustments in terms of policy pronouncements. There is a need to look into the equity issues, especially the safety nets of people who will be displaced by the ill effects of the financial crisis. A balance between politics, the experts, the players, the markets and everyone else is emphasized. © 2009 De La Salle University, Philippines

Power bequeathed: Generational shift and elite reproduction in the eleventh House of Representatives

This study is an exposition of the methods undertaken by the traditional, new and emerging socio-economic elites at maintaining their dominance in congressional politics, giving stress to the internal structure of the oligarchy and the mechanisms or strategies of their resilience in achieving, exercising and keeping power .This research utilized the case study method to illustrate how the House of Representatives serves as a nexus between local and national politics. The legislators who inherited their congressional posts from their parents are the main subjects of these case studies. The number of cases is seventeen. The sample is derived from the total number of representative who replaced his or her three-term parent. The study made use of primary and secondary materials. Key informant interviews were conducted to provide a first-hand assessment of the tactics and strategies that have assured political dominance in the congressional districts.A combination of adaptive strategies enabled political clans to maintain their dominance in congressional politics. Consequently, a variety of political clans have emerged in successive political regimes utilizing most of these strategies. The introduction of term limits in the 1987 Constitution was an attempt to widen the avenue for legislative recruitment. However, in the Philippines, limiting the term of elected officials is not enough to curb the dynastic ambitions of most political clans. Political clans continue to perpetuate themselves in power either by fielding relatives as proxy candidates to warm their seats in Congress, or by totally bequeathing power to their next of kin. The election of children of political clan members indicates a generation shift in the country\u27s power holders. Usually, a shift in generations is accompanied by changes in political outlook and the functions, roles and skills performed by the next generation of political elites. There is a significant transformation involving the shift from traditional elites to the rise of strategic elites composed of third generation traditional clans, new and emerging clans. This may provide a narrow window for change and reform in the political system. However, while the next generation of political elites demonstrate new political outlook, most continue to succumb to their parent\u27s traditional mode of political contestation.Term limits have been proven simply as a minor obstacle for entrenched political dynasties. The rotation of political candidacy among political clans and proxy candidates are means utilized to get around term limits. Term limits alone is not enough to curb the dynastic ambitions of political clans. Therefore, efforts must be made to enact the anti-dynasty provision of the Constitution, and the process of electoral reforms and modernization must be completed

Duterte's pandemic populism: Strongman leadership, weak state capacity, and the politics of deployment in the Philippines

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic undermined the populist legacy of Philippine president Rodrigo R. Duterte. Despite implementing one of the longest and strictest lockdowns globally, the country has struggled with controlling the pandemic. While Duterte looks to have triumphed in his attack on human rights and press freedom, his government's record in combating the virus has been spotty at best. Yet Duterte's populism has proven to be resilient. He has remained extremely popular, with a September 2021 national survey reporting 81 per cent approval of his government's response to the pandemic and 91 per cent of respondents expressing trust in his leadership. The irony of Duterte's populist resilience amid his poor pandemic response serves to highlight his mastery of political deployment within a weak state. Two significant inputs are required to deploy state capacity into a range of outcomes: political coalitions (including leadership, classes, and parties) and a balance of social forces. The 'politics of deployment' depends on the quality of decision-making of state leadership and the political coalitions forged to support such decision-making. Decisions, in turn, depend on the balance of social forces-the resistance or support of various sectors in society. This paper will unpack Duterte's deployment of 'brute force governance' (which he earlier employed in his bloody 'war on drugs') in addressing the COVID19 crisis in the Philippines

Clientelism and party politics in the Philippines

For more than four decades, much of the academic work on Filipino elections and party politics continued to be a postscript to the patron-client factional framework (pcf ) advanced by Carl Landé and other scholars in the 1960s. The basic argument of the pcf is that “Philippine politics revolves around interpersonal relationships – especially familial and patron-client ones – and factions composed of personal alliances” (Kerkvliet 1995: 401). While the pcf has endured time and continues to be cited by political analysts, it has also been criticized for reifying the role of socio-cultural values in structuring politics first in rural and peasant-based economies, and later, in modernizing urban communities (Kawanaka 2002, Sidel 1999).1 However, clientelism has proven to be resilient and highly adaptable to a range of political, economic, and cultural settings (Hicken 2011). Especially, though not only, in developing polities, clientelism plays a crucial role in the process of continuity and change associated with the growth – and decline – of political institutions (Archer 1989). In the Philippines, clientelism continues to shape the organization of party politics to a great extent. Since 1987, an average of 33.5 percent of all lower house representatives elected to Congress has switched parties in pursuit of resources allocated through clientelistic networks. Tellingly, 60.2 percent of these party switchers usually jumped into the party of the sitting president thereby producing monolithic (albeit short-lived) political behemoths. Fueled by presidential patronage, these monolithic parties have dominated Philippine politics under the past five administrations, notably the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Struggle of Democratic Filipinos, LDP) during the term of Corazon Aquino, followed by the Lakas NUCD-UMDP founded by Fidel Ramos, the Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (Struggle of the Patriotic Filipino Masses, LAMMP) of Joseph Estrada, and, most recently, the Liberal Party (LP) under Benigno Aquino III. Not surprisingly, 57 percent of the legislators from the dominant party belong to political clans. Around 160 of these political clans have had two or more members who have served in Congress, and they account for more than 400 of the 2,407 men and women who have been elected to the national legislature since 1907. Since the formation of the first political parties under American colonial rule, political parties have continued to exist (in one form or another), even under extremely undemocratic periods of Philippine history such as the Japanese Occupation during the Second World War and the period of dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos.2 But they never evolved into strong and credible political entities, even after the restoration of democracy in 1986. This absence of strong and credible political parties, caused to a large extent by the persistence of clientelistic networks, continues to exact a prime democratic deficit on the Philippine political system. What accounts for the persistence of clientelism in Philippine party politics? Following recent developments in the theory and practice of clientelistic politics, this chapter will present an institutional view of clientelism and delineate current mechanisms for clientelistic practices by political parties in the Philippines. Specifically, it seeks to provide an overview of how clientelism shapes party organization and how party organization may determine the kind of clientelistic strategies a party would pursue