386 research outputs found
Making Consensus Tractable
We study a model of consensus decision making, in which a finite group of
Bayesian agents has to choose between one of two courses of action. Each member
of the group has a private and independent signal at his or her disposal,
giving some indication as to which action is optimal. To come to a common
decision, the participants perform repeated rounds of voting. In each round,
each agent casts a vote in favor of one of the two courses of action,
reflecting his or her current belief, and observes the votes of the rest.
We provide an efficient algorithm for the calculation the agents have to
perform, and show that consensus is always reached and that the probability of
reaching a wrong decision decays exponentially with the number of agents.Comment: 18 pages. To appear in Transactions on Economics and Computatio
Bundling Customers: How to Exploit Trust Among Customers to Maximize Seller Profit
We consider an auction of identical digital goods to customers whose
valuations are drawn independently from known distributions. Myerson's classic
result identifies the truthful mechanism that maximizes the seller's expected
profit.
Under the assumption that in small groups customers can learn each others'
valuations, we show how Myerson's result can be improved to yield a higher
payoff to the seller using a mechanism that offers groups of customers to buy
bundles of items.Comment: 11 pages, 1 figure. After posting the first version of this paper we
learned that much of its mathematical content already appears in the
literature, for example in "Multiproduct nonlinear pricing" by Armstrong
(1996), although in a slightly different context of bundling products, rather
than customer
Stabilizer Rigidity in Irreducible Group Actions
We consider irreducible actions of locally compact product groups, and of
higher rank semi-simple Lie groups. Using the intermediate factor theorems of
Bader-Shalom and Nevo-Zimmer, we show that the action stabilizers, and all
irreducible invariant random subgroups, are co-amenable in their normal
closure. As a consequence, we derive rigidity results on irreducible actions
that generalize and strengthen the results of Bader-Shalom and Stuck-Zimmer.Comment: 25 page
Symbolic dynamics on amenable groups: the entropy of generic shifts
Let be a finitely generated amenable group. We study the space of shifts
on over a given finite alphabet . We show that the zero entropy shifts
are generic in this space, and that more generally the shifts of entropy
are generic in the space of shifts with entropy at least . The same is shown
to hold for the space of transitive shifts and for the space of weakly mixing
shifts.
As applications of this result, we show that for every entropy value there is a weakly mixing subshift of with entropy . We
also show that the set of strongly irreducible shifts does not form a
in the space of shifts, and that all non-trivial, strongly
irreducible shifts are non-isolated points in this space
Efficient Bayesian Social Learning on Trees
We consider a set of agents who are attempting to iteratively learn the
'state of the world' from their neighbors in a social network. Each agent
initially receives a noisy observation of the true state of the world. The
agents then repeatedly 'vote' and observe the votes of some of their peers,
from which they gain more information. The agents' calculations are Bayesian
and aim to myopically maximize the expected utility at each iteration.
This model, introduced by Gale and Kariv (2003), is a natural approach to
learning on networks. However, it has been criticized, chiefly because the
agents' decision rule appears to become computationally intractable as the
number of iterations advances. For instance, a dynamic programming approach
(part of this work) has running time that is exponentially large in \min(n,
(d-1)^t), where n is the number of agents.
We provide a new algorithm to perform the agents' computations on locally
tree-like graphs. Our algorithm uses the dynamic cavity method to drastically
reduce computational effort. Let d be the maximum degree and t be the iteration
number. The computational effort needed per agent is exponential only in O(td)
(note that the number of possible information sets of a neighbor at time t is
itself exponential in td).
Under appropriate assumptions on the rate of convergence, we deduce that each
agent is only required to spend polylogarithmic (in 1/\eps) computational
effort to approximately learn the true state of the world with error
probability \eps, on regular trees of degree at least five. We provide
numerical and other evidence to justify our assumption on convergence rate.
We extend our results in various directions, including loopy graphs. Our
results indicate efficiency of iterative Bayesian social learning in a wide
range of situations, contrary to widely held beliefs.Comment: 11 pages, 1 figure, submitte
Complete Characterization of Functions Satisfying the Conditions of Arrow's Theorem
Arrow's theorem implies that a social choice function satisfying
Transitivity, the Pareto Principle (Unanimity) and Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) must be dictatorial. When non-strict preferences are
allowed, a dictatorial social choice function is defined as a function for
which there exists a single voter whose strict preferences are followed. This
definition allows for many different dictatorial functions. In particular, we
construct examples of dictatorial functions which do not satisfy Transitivity
and IIA. Thus Arrow's theorem, in the case of non-strict preferences, does not
provide a complete characterization of all social choice functions satisfying
Transitivity, the Pareto Principle, and IIA.
The main results of this article provide such a characterization for Arrow's
theorem, as well as for follow up results by Wilson. In particular, we
strengthen Arrow's and Wilson's result by giving an exact if and only if
condition for a function to satisfy Transitivity and IIA (and the Pareto
Principle). Additionally, we derive formulas for the number of functions
satisfying these conditions.Comment: 11 pages, 1 figur
There are no monotone homomorphisms out of the convolution semigroup
We prove that there is no nonzero way of assigning real numbers to probability measures on R in a way which is monotone under first-order stochastic dominance and additive under convolution
Unimodularity of Invariant Random Subgroups
An invariant random subgroup is a random closed subgroup whose law
is invariant to conjugation by all elements of . When is locally compact
and second countable, we show that for every invariant random subgroup there almost surely exists an invariant measure on . Equivalently, the
modular function of is almost surely equal to the modular function of ,
restricted to .
We use this result to construct invariant measures on orbit equivalence
relations of measure preserving actions. Additionally, we prove a mass
transport principle for discrete or compact invariant random subgroups.Comment: 23 pages, one figur
Opinion Exchange Dynamics
We survey a range of models of opinion exchange. From the introduction: "The
exchange of opinions between individuals is a fundamental social interaction...
Moreover, many models in this field are an excellent playground for
mathematicians, especially those working in probability, algorithms and
combinatorics. The goal of this survey is to introduce such models to
mathematicians, and especially to those working in discrete mathematics,
information theory, optimization, probability and statistics."Comment: 62 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with
arXiv:1207.589
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