Strategic logic of elite purges in dictatorships

Why do some leaders eliminate rivals from authoritarian regimes and therefore diminish elites' capabilities to remove them via coups, while others do not? By examining both dictators' incentives and opportunities to weaken regime elites, I show that dictators are more likely to eliminate rivals when elites' capabilities to oust dictators via coup is temporarily low. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, my theory predicts that dictators are more likely to weaken elites' capabilities as the threat of coup decreases rather than when coup risk is high. Furthermore, I argue that successful coups that put new dictators in power temporarily diminish elites' capabilities to remove dictators and, thus, provide a window of opportunity for the dictators to take steps to consolidate power. Empirical results using a new dataset on purges of militaries from 1969 to 2003 provide strong evidence for my hypotheses

Coup risk, coup-proofing strategy and leader survival

Under what conditions do political leaders take strategies that allow them to reduce militaries' capabilities to successfully organize a coup? There is a broad consensus among previous studies that political leaders who face a high risk of coup will employ "coup-proofing" strategies. A closer look at their theory and empirical analyses, however, suggests that the presumed relationship between coup risk and coup-proofing should be reexamined. Drawing on insights from formal studies on authoritarian power-sharing, this article proposes that political leaders are less likely to undertake coup-proofing efforts as the coup risk they face increases because militaries can deter leaders from weakening them by threatening a coup. The statistical models in this article estimate a latent coup risk by properly aggregating multiple indicators that capture militaries' willingness and ability to organize a coup. The empirical results strongly support the proposition: Coup-proofing efforts taken by leaders decrease in coup risk

Purging militaries : introducing the Military Purges in Dictatorships (MPD) dataset

The principal threat most autocratic leaders face stems from within the regime. To control militaries and mitigate the risk of coups d’état, many autocratic leaders repeatedly purge strong officers from the military. What are the causes and consequences of such purges? Despite its importance, scholars rarely have studied the question, as they have lacked a systematic and comprehensive dataset. The Military Purges in Dictatorships (MPD) dataset contains information on the dates and characteristics of 1,007 military purges, and covers 566 political leaders in 116 authoritarian countries over the period 1965 to 2005. In this article, I describe MPD, compare it with other datasets, present descriptive statistics on the data, and suggest its applications. By coding the timing and various characteristics of military purges, MPD facilitates empirical study of the relationships between autocratic leaders and their militaries, and thus is useful for researchers studying political violence, repression, civil-military relations, coup-proofing, leader survival, and regime transition

The causes and outcomes of coup during civil war

Though approximately one in four coup attempts takes place during an ongoing civil war, scholars have not yet analyzed how the incidence of civil war affects coup attempts and outcomes. We conduct the first empirical analysis of the relationship between ongoing civil war and coup activity, finding (1) war increases the risk of a coup attempt, though (2) war-time coup attempts are significantly less likely to be successful, and (3) the risk of war-time coup is much higher when states face stronger rebel groups that pose greater threats to the political survival of the incumbent government. We attribute these findings to the pernicious effect of ongoing war on the welfare of the military elites and soldiers who have the greatest capacity to execute a coup attempt. As war diminishes their welfare and creates uncertainty about the future of the state, potential plotters become more willing to accept riskier coup attempts than they might plot during peace-time. Coup motivations are greatest when incumbents are more likely to lose their wars, and this causes coup plotters to attempt more and riskier coups when rebels are relatively strong

Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict

Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coupproofing is so dangerous, why do we observe leaders engaging in these strategies? We argue that a specific type of coup-proofing–purges–deters domestic unrest by demonstrating the strength of the regime via the removal of powerful but undesirable individuals from office. The strategic and intentional nature of purges signals to opposition forces that the regime is capable of not only identifying its enemies but also eliminating these threats. Furthermore, the removal of high-profile officers often leads to their elimination from forums in which they could join existing rebel groups or mount new resistance to the regime, additionally decreasing the risk of renewed fighting. We use original data on military purges in non-democracies from 1969-2003 to assess quantitatively how this type of coup-proofing activity affects the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence. We find support for our expectation that military purges of high-ranking officials do in fact help the regime to avoid further civil conflict. Purges appear to provide real benefits to dictators seeking to preserve stability, at least in post-conflict environments

The rise predicts the fall : how the method of leader entry affects the method of leader removal in dictatorships

How does the way a non-democratic leader takes power affect the stability of her government? Prior research identifies irregular leader entries—those violating the regime's norms for leader selection—to be especially likely to foreshadow subsequent unconstitutional transitions. This paper shows how some forms of irregular leader entry can actually protect leaders from most threats of forced removal from power. When leaders use a strong and loyal coalition of supporters to overthrow their predecessors and their entire ruling regimes, as they do in successful rebellions, popular uprisings, and major regime changing coups, they explicitly prove their strength to any potential rivals. These leaders are substantially less likely to be ousted than leaders who take power in ways that do not convey strength so convincingly, such as normal succession and elite reshuffling. We analyze an original dataset of non democratic leader transitions and show that accounting for the strength demonstrated during a leader’s entry to power substantially improves our ability to predict how and when the leader will eventually leave office

Who punishes the leader? Leader culpability and coups during civil war

Who punishes leaders via coups during civil war? By distinguishing between different types of internal audiences within the government and their attempts to remove a leader forcefully, I illuminate the mechanisms that explain variation in who punishes the leader during wartime. I claim that whether leaders are culpable for the initiation of the war has an important implication for whether they are punished by members of the ruling coalition (i.e., those with access to decision-making and political power), or by those outside the ruling coalition. Empirical evidence supports my hypotheses: (i) culpable leaders are more likely to experience coup attempts led by those outside the leaders' ruling coalition, should the war go poorly; and (ii) nonculpable leaders are more likely to experience coups executed by members of their ruling coalition. The findings have important implications for how leaders respond to audience pressures as they consider whether to fight or settle

Coup-proofing and civil war

Political leaders face threats to their power from both within and outside the regime. Leaders can be removed via a coup d’etat undertaken by militaries that are part of the state apparatus. At the same time, leaders can lose power when they confront excluded opposition groups in civil wars. The difficulty for leaders, though, is that efforts to address one threat might leave them vulnerable to the other threat due to the role of the military as an institution of violence capable of exercising coercive power. On one hand, leaders need to protect their regimes from rebels by maintaining strong militaries. Yet, militaries that are strong enough to prevail against rebel forces are also strong enough to execute a coup successfully. On the other hand, leaders who cope with coup threats by weakening their militaries’ capabilities to organize a coup also diminish the very capabilities that they need to defeat their rebel challengers. This unfortunate trade-off between protection by the military and protection from the military has been the long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations and coup-proofing. Though most research on this subject focused primarily on rulers’ maneuvers to balance the threats posed by the military and the threats coming from foreign adversaries, a more recent scholarship started to explore how leaders’ efforts to cope with coup threats will influence the regime’s abilities to address the domestic threats coming from rebel groups, and vice versa. This new wave of research focuses on two related vectors. First, scholars address whether leaders who pursue coup-proofing strategies that weaken their militaries’ capabilities increase the regime’s vulnerability to rebel threats and the future probability of civil war. Second, scholars examine how the magnitude of threats posed by rebel groups will determine leaders’ strategies toward the militaries, and how these strategies affect both the militaries’ influence over government policy and the future probability of coup onsets. These lines of research contribute to the conflict literature by examining the causal mechanisms through which civil conflict influences coup propensity and vice versa. The literatures on civil war and coups have developed independently without much consideration of each other, and systematic analyses of the linkage between them have only just began

Spatial dynamics of election violence : how repression spreads dissent around elections

How does political violence spread around election times within countries? Though election times are periods possibly most vulnerable to the contagion of violence, we know very little about how election violence spreads spatially. We argue that government-sponsored election violence in one area will increase the levels of election violence inflicted by anti-systemic actors in another area with similar political or socioeconomic characteristics. Government violence in one area increases the expectation that repression would soon start in another area that looks similar to the targeted area, prompting oppositions in these areas to take actions preemptively. We test our arguments using subnational data on India’s election violence from 1991 to 2009, finding that government election violence in one state increases opposition-led election violence in another state with similar political and socioeconomic characteristics in India. Our results are robust when using a stationary causal directed acyclic graph approach and recover the bias-corrected spatial effects

The Rise Predicts the Fall: How the Method of Leader Entry Affects the Method of Leader Removal in Dictatorships

How does the way a nondemocratic leader takes power affect the stability of their government? Prior research argues that irregular leader entries—those that violate the regime's norms for leader selection—are especially likely to foreshadow subsequent unconstitutional transitions. This article contends that some forms of irregular leader entry can actually protect leaders from subsequently being forcibly removed from office. When leaders use a strong and loyal coalition of supporters to overthrow not only their predecessors, but their entire ruling regimes, they demonstrate their strength to any potential rivals. Thus, leaders that gain power through, for example, successful rebellions, popular uprisings, and major regime-changing coups, deter subsequent challenges. They are substantially less likely to be ousted than leaders who take power in ways—such as via normal succession or reshuffling among ruling elites—that do not convey strength so convincingly. We assess our claims by analyzing an original dataset of nondemocratic leader transitions. We show that accounting for the strength demonstrated during a leader's entry to power substantially improves our ability to predict how, and when, that leader will eventually leave office