75 research outputs found
Some results on Sprout
Sprout is a lightweight stream cipher proposed by Armknecht and Mikhalev at FSE 2015. It has a Grain-like structure with two State Registers of size 40 bits each, which is exactly half the state size
of Grain v1. In spite of this, the cipher does not appear to lose in security against generic Time-Memory-Data Tradeoff attacks due to the novelty of its design. In this paper, we first present improved results on Key Recovery with partial knowledge of the internal state. We show that if 50 of the 80 bits of the internal state are guessed then the remaining bits along with the Secret Key can be found in a reasonable time using a SAT solver. Thereafter we show that it is possible to perform a distinguishing attack on the full Sprout stream cipher in the multiple IV setting using around randomly chosen IVs on an average. The attack requires around bits of memory. Thereafter we will show that for every Secret Key, there exist around IVs for which the LFSR used in Sprout enters the all zero state during the Keystream generating phase. Using this observation, we will first show that it is possible to enumerate Key-IV pairs that produce keystream bits with period as small as 80. We will then outline a simple Key recovery attack that takes time equivalent to encryptions with negligible memory requirement. This although is not the best attack reported against this cipher in terms of the Time complexity, it is the best in terms of the memory required to perform the attack
A Dynamic Cube Attack on round Grain v1
As far as the Differential Cryptanalysis of reduced round Grain v1 is concerned, the best results were those published by Knellwolf et al. in Asiacrypt . In an extended version of the paper, it was shown that it was possible to retrieve {\bf (i)} expressions in the Secret Key bits for a variant of Grain v1 that employs rounds (in place of ) in its Key Scheduling process using chosen IVs and {\bf (ii)} expression in Secret Key bits for a variant that employs rounds in its Key Scheduling using chosen IVs. However, the second attack on rounds, had a success probability of around \%, which is to say that the attack worked for only around one half of the Secret Keys.
In this paper we propose a dynamic cube attack on round Grain v1, that has a success probability of \%, and thus we report an improvement of rounds over the previous best attack on Grain v1 that attacks the entire Keyspace. We take the help of the tool {\sf Grain}, proposed by Banik at ACISP 2014, to track the differential trails induced in the internal state of Grain v1 by any difference in the IV bits, and we prove that a suitably introduced difference in the IV leads to a distinguisher for the output bit produced in the round. This, in turn, helps determine the values of expressions in the Secret Key bits
Exploring Energy Efficiency of Lightweight Block Ciphers
Abstract. In the last few years, the field of lightweight cryptography has seen an influx in the number of block ciphers and hash functions being proposed. One of the metrics that define a good lightweight design is the energy consumed per unit operation of the algorithm. For block ciphers, this operation is the encryption of one plaintext. By studying the energy consumption model of a CMOS gate, we arrive at the conclusion that the total energy consumed during the encryption operation of an r-round unrolled architecture of any block cipher is a quadratic function in r. We then apply our model to 9 well known lightweight block ciphers, and thereby try to predict the optimal value of r at which an r-round unrolled architecture for a cipher is likely to be most energy efficient. We also try to relate our results to some physical design parameters like the signal delay across a round and algorithmic parameters like the number of rounds taken to achieve full diffusion of a difference in the plaintext/key
Compact Circuits for Efficient Möbius Transform
The Möbius transform is a linear circuit used to compute the evaluations of a Boolean function over all points on its input domain. The operation is very useful in finding the solution of a system of polynomial equations over GF(2) for obvious reasons. However the operation, although linear, needs exponential number of logic operations (around n · 2nâ1 bit xors) for an n-variable Boolean function. As such, the only known hardware circuit to efficiently compute the Möbius Transform requires silicon area that is exponential in n. For Boolean functions whose algebraic degree is bound by some parameter d, recursive definitions of the Möbius Transform exist that requires only O(nd+1) space in software. However converting the mathematical definition of this space-efficient algorithm into a hardware architecture is a non-trivial task, primarily because the recursion calls notionally lead to a depth-first search in a transition graph that requires context switches at each recursion call for which straightforward mapping to hardware is difficult. In this paper we look to overcome these very challenges in an engineering sense. We propose a space efficient sequential hardware circuit for the Möbius Transform that requires only polynomial circuit area (i.e. O(nd+1)) provided the algebraic degree of the Boolean function is limited to d. We show how this circuit can be used as a component to efficiently solve polynomial equations of degree at most d by using fast exhaustive search. We propose three different circuit architectures for this, each of which uses the Möbius Transform circuit as a core component. We show that asymptotically, all the solutions of a system of m polynomials in n unknowns and algebraic degree d over GF(2) can be found using a circuit of silicon area proportional to m · nd+1 and circuit depth proportional to 2 · log2(n â d).
In the second part of the paper we introduce a fourth hardware solver that additionally aims to achieve energy efficiency. The main idea is to reduce the solution space to a small enough value by parallel application of Möbius Transform circuits over the first few equations of the system. This is done so that one can check individually whether the vectors of this reduced solution space satisfy each of the remaining equations of the system using lower power consumption. The new circuit has area also bound by m · nd+1 and has circuit depth proportional to d · log2 n. We also show that further optimizations with respect to energy consumption may be obtained by using depth-bound Möbius circuits that exponentially decrease run time at the cost of additional logic area and depth
Compact Circuits for Efficient Mobius Transform
Möbius transform is a linear circuit used to compute the evaluations of a
Boolean function over all points on its input domain. The operation is very useful in finding the solution of a system of polynomial equations over GF (2) for obvious reasons. However the operation, although linear, needs exponential number of logic operations (around bit xors) for an -variable Boolean function. As such the only known hardware circuit to efficiently compute the Möbius Transform requires
silicon area that is exponential in . For Boolean functions whose algebraic degree is bound by some parameter , recursive definitions of the Möbius Transform exist that requires only space in software. However converting the mathematical definition of this space-efficient algorithm into a hardware architecture is a non-trivial
task, primarily because the recursion calls notionally lead to a depth-first search in a transition graph that require context switches at each recursion call for which straightforward mapping in hardware is difficult. In this paper we look to overcome these very challenges in an engineering sense. We propose a space efficient sequential hardware circuit for the Möbius Transform that requires only polynomial circuit area (i.e. ) provided the algebraic degree of the Boolean function is limited to . We show that how this circuit can be used as a component to efficiently solve polynomial equations of degree at most by using fast exhaustive search. We propose three different circuit architectures for this, each of which used the Möbius Transform circuit as a core component. We show that asymptotically, all the solutions of a system of polynomials in unknowns and algebraic degree over GF (2) can be found using a circuit of silicon area proportional to and physical time proportional to
Some cryptanalytic results on Lizard
Lizard is a lightweight stream cipher proposed by Hamann, Krause and Meier in IACR ToSC 2017. It has a Grain-like structure with two state registers of size 90 and 31 bits. The cipher uses a 120 bit Secret Key and a 64 bit IV. The authors claim that Lizard provides 80 bit security against key recovery attacks and a 60-bit security against distinguishing attacks. In this paper, we present an assortment of results and observations on Lizard. First, we show that by doing random trials it is possible to a set of triplets such that the Key-IV pairs and produce identical keystream bits. Second, we show that by performing only around random trials it is possible to obtain Key-IV pairs and that produce identical keystream bits. Thereafter, we show that one can construct a distinguisher for Lizard based on IVs that produce shifted keystream sequences. The process takes around random IV encryptions
and around bits of memory. Finally, we propose a key recovery attack on a version of Lizard with the number of initialization rounds reduced to 223 (out of 256) based on IV collisions
Cryptanalysis of Plantlet
Plantlet is a lightweight stream cipher designed by Mikhalev, Armknecht and MĂŒller in \texttt{IACR ToSC} 2017. It has a Grain-like structure with two state registers of size and bits. In spite of this, the cipher does not seem to lose in security against generic Time-Memory-Data Tradeoff attacks due to the novelty of its design. The cipher uses a 80-bit secret key and a 90-bit IV.
In this paper, we first present a key recovery attack on Plantlet that requires around Plantlet encryptions. The attack leverages the fact that two internal states of Plantlet that differ in the 43rd LFSR location are guaranteed to produce keystream that are either equal or unequal in 45 locations with probability 1. Thus an attacker can with some probability guess that when 2 segments of keystream blocks possess the 45 bit difference just mentioned, they have been produced by two internal states that differ only in the 43rd LFSR location. Thereafter by solving a system of polynomial equations representing the keystream bits, the attacker can find the secret key if his guess was indeed correct, or reach some kind of contradiction if his guess was incorrect. In the latter event, he would repeat the procedure for other keystream blocks with the given difference. We show that the process when repeated a finite number of times, does indeed yield the value of the secret key.
In the second part of the paper, we observe that the previous attack was limited to internal state differences that occurred at time instances that were congruent to . We further observe that by generalizing the attack to include internal state differences that are congruent to all equivalence classed modulo 80, we lower the total number of keystream bits required to perform the attack and in the process reduce the attack complexity to Plantlet encryptions
Differential Fault Attack against Grain family with very few faults and minimal assumptions
The series of published works, related to Differential Fault Attack
(DFA) against the Grain family, require (i) quite a large number (hundreds) of faults (around , where for Grain v1 and for Grain-128, Grain-128a) and also (ii) several assumptions on location and timing of the fault injected. In this paper we present a significantly improved scenario from the adversarial point of view for DFA against the Grain family of stream ciphers. Our model is the most realistic one so far as it considers that the cipher to be re-keyed a very few times and fault can be injected at any random location and at any random point of time, i.e., no precise control is needed over the location and timing
of fault injections. We construct equations based on the algebraic description of the cipher by introducing new variables so that the degrees of the equations do not increase. In line of algebraic cryptanalysis, we accumulate such equations based on the fault-free and faulty key-stream bits and solve them using the SAT Solver
Cryptominisat-2.9.5 installed with SAGE 5.7. In a few minutes we can recover the state of Grain v1, Grain-128 and Grain-128a with as little as 10, 4 and 10 faults respectively (and may be improved further with more computational efforts)
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