Exploring the Invisible Curriculum: Clinical Fieldwork in American Law Schools

The Harvard Report makes a number of recommendations to cure problems in legal education. I mean to focus on but one of them. The committee\u27s Final Report concludes that clinical experience ought to be a substantial part of legal education. It discusses suggestions on how this can best be accomplished at Harvard. My focus is narrower. I will address the possibilities of developing the extemship model, ratherthan the in-house model, to resolve some of these deeply troubling curricular problems. This article will probably raise more questions than it answers, but it will continue the process of replacing educational neglect with inquiry and evaluation. My exploration has three parts. First, as with any explorer, I will briefly review where we have been before. I will initially focus on the history of tension in legal education between the law schools and the bar, and on the clinical and non-clinical faculties within law schools. Second, based on a national study conducted in 1982-83, and other data, I will examine the nature and extent of fieldwork programs in American law schools, and something of their rela-tionship to other components of the clinical and professional skills training curriculum. Third, I will try to identify the potential strengths and weaknesses of these programs as they currently operate. I will not only look to pedagogy, but to issues of resources, management, control and relationship. What money and personnel are devoted by law schools to these programs? Who makes the key decisions and choices necessary to implement and run them? What is the relationship among law school faculty, administrators, students, and personnel at the field placement? Finally, drawing upon developments in clinical education generally, I will explore whether there are innovations or approaches which will maximize the potential of extemships as an integral part of legal education. In particular, I will focus on strengthening two critical elements of the process: curricular design and control, and supervision

“The Hysteria of Our Times”: Loyalty Oaths in California

In the years following World War II, the United States government, as well as many of the states, including California, enacted an almost endless stream of laws designed to weed out, isolate, sanction, and punish anyone thought to share any ideas or associations that could be labeled subversive. This historical period, called the “American inquisition,” saw the enactment and enforcement of a wide variety of laws meant to accomplish these purposes. People were subject to criminal prosecution for their beliefs, associations or advocacy; denial of, or discharge from, employment; denial of government benefits or licenses; and exclusion from publicly funded housing. One of the many tools used to identify or uncover suspected subversives was to extract oaths of loyalty that normally required the target to disclaim, or admit, to any belief, advocacy or association—past, present, or future— that the government deemed suspicious. Both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court, rendered many decisions concerning the validity of these “loyalty oaths.” In Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, Justice Jesse Carter said in his dissent that “even if one should be so caught up in the hysteria of our times that he fails to perceive the intrinsic unconstitutionality of [this oath statute], he still must recognize the fact that the decision of the majority . . . is erroneous.” In an earlier case Justice Carter observed, also in dissent, that the majority opinion brought “into sharp focus the loyalty oath hysteria which has pervaded this country and particularly this state during the past five or six years.

Variations on the Theme of Dombrowski v. Pfister: Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings Affecting First Amendment Rights

One of the most rapidly changing and complex areas of the law revolves around the propriety and wisdom of federal court ((interference with state court proceedings involving first amendment rights. Mr. Stickgold examines the doctrine being evolved in this area, centering the discussion around Dombrowski v. Pfister and cases that have followed it. The author reports that several courts have not followed the Dombrowski mandates, and consequently, fundamental first amendment freedoms are not adequately protected

Variations on the Theme of Dombrowski v. Pfister: Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings Affecting First Amendment Rights

One of the most rapidly changing and complex areas of the law revolves around the propriety and wisdom of federal court ((interference with state court proceedings involving first amendment rights. Mr. Stickgold examines the doctrine being evolved in this area, centering the discussion around Dombrowski v. Pfister and cases that have followed it. The author reports that several courts have not followed the Dombrowski mandates, and consequently, fundamental first amendment freedoms are not adequately protected

“The Hysteria of Our Times”: Loyalty Oaths in California

In the years following World War II, the United States government, as well as many of the states, including California, enacted an almost endless stream of laws designed to weed out, isolate, sanction, and punish anyone thought to share any ideas or associations that could be labeled subversive. This historical period, called the “American inquisition,” saw the enactment and enforcement of a wide variety of laws meant to accomplish these purposes. People were subject to criminal prosecution for their beliefs, associations or advocacy; denial of, or discharge from, employment; denial of government benefits or licenses; and exclusion from publicly funded housing. One of the many tools used to identify or uncover suspected subversives was to extract oaths of loyalty that normally required the target to disclaim, or admit, to any belief, advocacy or association—past, present, or future— that the government deemed suspicious. Both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court, rendered many decisions concerning the validity of these “loyalty oaths.” In Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, Justice Jesse Carter said in his dissent that “even if one should be so caught up in the hysteria of our times that he fails to perceive the intrinsic unconstitutionality of [this oath statute], he still must recognize the fact that the decision of the majority . . . is erroneous.” In an earlier case Justice Carter observed, also in dissent, that the majority opinion brought “into sharp focus the loyalty oath hysteria which has pervaded this country and particularly this state during the past five or six years.