Implementation of Policy Instruments for Chlorinated Solvents: A Comparison of Design Standards, Bans, and Taxes to Phase Out Trichloroethylene

This paper studies the Swedish prohibition of the hazardous solvent Trichloroethylene (TCE). Sweden is alone in completely prohibiting its use. The ban has been at best a partial success and illustrates the dilemmas of policymaking. Use has declined but not stopped, largely because the decision to ban TCE was challenged in the courts. Recently, the EU Court of Justice decided in favor of Sweden’s right to have a ban. This article analyzes abatement cost data to show that the cost of replacing TCE is low for most plants, although there appear to be a few firms for which it may be quite high. A crosscountry comparison indicates that the Swedish ban was less effective than the very strict technical requirements in Germany or the tax used in Norway. A tax (or deposit refund scheme) would be a good mechanism to achieve a swift phaseout.hazardous chemicals, regulation, environmental tax, solvents,

Tradable Permits in Developing Countries: Evidence from Air Pollution in Santiago, Chile

Santiago was one of the first cities outside the OECD to implement a tradable permit program to control air pollution. This paper looks closely at the program’s performance over the past ten years, stressing its similarities and discrepancies with trading programs implemented in developed countries, and analyzing how it has reacted to regulatory adjustments and market shocks. Studying Santiago’s experience allows us to discuss the drawbacks and advantages of applying tradable permits in less developed countries.air pollution, environmental policy, tradable permits, developing countries

Monitoring and Enforcement: Is Two-Tier Regulation Robust?

The regulation of industrial pollution is clearly difficult in a rapidly industrializing, low-income setting. In addition to the general lack of resources for monitoring and enforcement, authorities must deal with the asymmetric nature of the information and multiple nonpoint sources of pollution. In this study we look at efforts to regulate chemical plants in Ankleshwar, in the Indian state of Gujarat. The plants are located in an industrial estate, which provides interesting preconditions for a form of two-tier regulation, in which an industry association becomes an intermediary between the government and individual firms: it monitors its members’ pollution and promotes compliance with the government’s environmental regulations. The Indian agency responsible for environmental protection cannot effectively control the many small individual plants within such estates. The local industry association is much better informed and has an incentive to regulate its members to maintain a good reputation but does not possess much formal authority, and its voluntary monitoring and abatement program is akin to managing a common property resource. We study four preconditions for the success of such management: suitable design principles, effective monitoring, objective implementation of rules, and enforcement. We show that these conditions are satisfied at least to some extent in Ankleshwar and that the fines decrease pollution.Industrial estate, two-tier monitoring, common property resource, industry association, nonpoint sources of pollution

Output-Based Refunding of Emission Payments: Theory, Distribution of Costs, and International Experience

In this paper, we discuss the effect of refunding environmental charges. Taxes often are resisted by polluters because they imply both abatement and tax costs. We show that when charges are refunded, the incentives for abatement are essentially the same as for a tax, but the output reduction that often accompanies a tax scheme is forgone. We describe and examine the refund emissions payment (REP) scheme as a policy instrument for emissions abatement and compare it with taxes and permits with regard to allocative properties, distribution of costs, property rights, and, consequently, the politics of implementation. As an empirical example, the Swedish charge on nitrogen oxides is analyzed.

An Even Sterner Review: Introducing Relative Prices into the Discounting Debate

The Stern Review has had a major influence on the policy discussion on climate change. One reason is that the report has raised the estimated cost of unmitigated climate damages by an order of magnitude compared to most earlier estimates, leading to a call for strong and urgent action on climate change. Not surprisingly, severe criticism has been levied against the report by authors who think that these results hinge mainly on the use of a discount rate that is too low. Here we discuss the Ramsey rule for the discount rates and its implications for the economics of climate change. While we find no strong objections to the discounting assumptions adopted in the Stern Review, our main point is that the conclusions reached in the review can be justified on other grounds than by using a low discount rate. We argue that nonmarket damages from climate change are probably underestimated and that future scarcities that will be induced by the changing composition of the economy and climate change should lead to rising relative prices for certain goods and services, raising the estimated damage of climate change and counteracting the effect of discounting. We build our analysis on earlier research (Hoel and Sterner 2007) that has shown that the Ramsey discounting formula is somewhat modified in a two-sector economy with differential growth rates. Most importantly, such a model is characterized by changing relative prices, something that has major implications for a correct valuation of future climate damages. We introduce these results into a slightly modified version of the DICE model (Nordhaus 1994) and find that taking relative prices into account can have as large an effect on economically warranted abatement levels as can a low discount rate.discounting, relative prices, Ramsey, climate damage

Discounting and Relative Consumption

This paper analyzes optimal social discount rates where people derive utility from relative consumption. We identify and compare three separate discount rates -- the social rate (taking positional externalities into account), the private rate, and the conventional Ramsey rate. Two main findings resulted for the standard case with a positive growth rate -- 1) the social discount rate exceeds the private discount rate if the degree of positionality increases with consumption, and 2) the social discount rate is smaller than the Ramsey rate if preferences are quasi-concave in own and reference consumption, and exhibit risk aversion with respect to reference consumption. Numerical calculations demonstrate that the latter difference may be substantial and economically important for such issues as global warming.discounting, relative consumption, Ramsey rule, degree of positionality, keeping up with the Joneses

Public Disclosure of Industrial Pollution: The PROPER Approach for Indonesia?

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the Program for Pollution Control Evaluation and Rating (PROPER) in Indonesia. PROPER, the first major public disclosure program in the developing world, was launched in June 1995; though it collapsed in 1998 with the Asian financial crisis, it is currently being revived. There have been claims of success for this pioneering scheme, yet little formal analysis has been undertaken. We analyze changes in emissions concentrations (mg/L) using panel data techniques with plant-level data for participating firms and a control group. The results show that there was indeed a positive response to PROPER, especially among firms with poor environmental compliance records. The response was immediate, and firms pursued further emissions reductions in the following months. The total estimated reductions in biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and chemical oxygen demand (COD) were approximately 32%.environmental policy, pollution control, public disclosure, Asia, Indonesia

Understanding the resistance to carbon taxes: Drivers and barriers among the general public and fuel-tax protesters

Carbon taxes are generally well accepted in countries with significant experience thereof but there is still public resistance to raising them. We study attitudes toward carbon taxation and other environmental policy instruments in Sweden. We survey a national sample of the population as well as members of a large political movement that protests fuel taxes. Our results show that the motivations in both groups are alike: educational level, rural versus urban domicile, political orientation, and especially trust in government correlate with opinions on carbon taxes; household income does not appear to matter. Lack of trust in government and lack of belief in the Pigouvian mechanism appear as especially important motivations for protesters\u27 opposition. We find support for revenue refunding, but greater support, in both groups, for earmarking for climate use. (c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

Bioeconomic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Before and After CAMPFIRE

This paper formulates a bioeconomic model to analyze community incentives for wildlife management under benefit-sharing programs like the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. Two agents influence the wildlife stock: a parks agency determines hunting quotas, and a local community chooses to either aid or discourage outside poachers. Wildlife generates revenues from hunting licenses and tourism; it also intrudes on local agriculture. We consider two benefit-sharing regimes: shares of wildlife tourism rents and shares of hunting licenses. Resource sharing does not necessarily improve community welfare or incentives for wildlife conservation. Results depend on the exact design of the benefit shares, the size of the benefits compared with agricultural losses, and the way in which the parks agency sets hunting licenses.bioeconomic, CAMPFIRE, community, poaching, wildlife, benefit sharing

Have Countries with Lax Environmental Regulations a Comparative Advantage in Polluting Industries?

We aim to study whether lax environmental regulations induce comparative advantages, causing the least-regulated countries to specialize in polluting industries. The study is based on Trefler and Zhu’s (2005) definition of the factor content of trade. For the econometrical analysis, we use a cross-section of 71 countries in 2000 to examine the net exports in the most polluting industries. We try to overcome three weaknesses in the empirical literature: the measurement of environmental endowments or environmental stringency, the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables, and the influence of the industrial level of aggregation. As a result, we do find some evidence in favor of the pollution-haven effect. The exogeneity of the environmental endowments was rejected in several industries, and we also find that industrial aggregation matters.comparative advantage, environmental regulation, trade, pollution haven, Porter hypothesis