Congress is from Mars & Courts are from Venus: Reconceptualizing our Understanding of Interbranch Relations

In this Article, we argue for a reconceptualization of how to understand legislative-judicial relations in the United States. We propose that the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the U.S. government broadly reflect gender-stereotypical relations and divisions of labor in terms of both function and design. Congress was intended to be agentic and public, securely positioned as the public, lawmaking body; it fits the prototypical definition of Arendt’s “space of appearance.” The Legislative Branch can be conceptualized as men in a patriarchal culture, given agency and invited to action. In contrast, the courts reside in a more private sphere, toiling away in relative obscurity, removed from the public eye. Much like women in a prototypical patriarchal culture, courts’ work is both reactionary and mandatory—and often undervalued. The broader implication is that Congress takes advantage of its public nature to shout loudly and do little while transferring the work—and many times the blame—to the courts. Part I provides an overview of our theoretical reconceptualization of the court-Congress relationship, while Part II provides empirical support for our theoretical claims. Part III then discusses the implications of these empirical realities for the work of each branch and the views of the public

Congress is from Mars & Courts are from Venus: Reconceptualizing our Understanding of Interbranch Relations

In this Article, we argue for a reconceptualization of how to understand legislative-judicial relations in the United States. We propose that the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the U.S. government broadly reflect gender-stereotypical relations and divisions of labor in terms of both function and design. Congress was intended to be agentic and public, securely positioned as the public, lawmaking body; it fits the prototypical definition of Arendt’s “space of appearance.” The Legislative Branch can be conceptualized as men in a patriarchal culture, given agency and invited to action. In contrast, the courts reside in a more private sphere, toiling away in relative obscurity, removed from the public eye. Much like women in a prototypical patriarchal culture, courts’ work is both reactionary and mandatory—and often undervalued. The broader implication is that Congress takes advantage of its public nature to shout loudly and do little while transferring the work—and many times the blame—to the courts. Part I provides an overview of our theoretical reconceptualization of the court-Congress relationship, while Part II provides empirical support for our theoretical claims. Part III then discusses the implications of these empirical realities for the work of each branch and the views of the public

Where One Sits Affects Where Others Stand: Bias, the Bar, and Nominees to Federal District Courts

The American Bar Association\u27s Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary has evaluated potential federal judges since the 1950s. Here, we compare nominations to the circuit and district courts and find clear differences in how these two groups of nominees are evaluated the ABA. We propose these differences are a function of the lesser policymaking role and greater institutional constraints of district court judges, and the differences between trial and appellate court judges lead the ABA to favor different types of qualifications when evaluating nominees to these two types of courts

Bias and the Bar: Evaluating the ABA Ratings of Federal Judicial Nominees

The vetting of potential federal judges by the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association (ABA) is politically controversial. Conservatives allege the Standing Committee is biased against Republican nominees. The ABA and its defenders argue the ABA rates nominees objectively based on their qualifications. The authors investigate whether accusations of liberal bias have merit. They analyze all individuals nominated to the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1977 to 2008. Using genetic matching methods and ordered logit models, the authors find evidence of bias against Republican nominees in the ABA’s ratings. They conclude by discussing the implications of these results. </jats:p

Where One Sits Affects Where Others Stand: Bias, the Bar, and Nominees to Federal District Courts

The American Bar Association\u27s Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary has evaluated potential federal judges since the 1950s. Here, we compare nominations to the circuit and district courts and find clear differences in how these two groups of nominees are evaluated the ABA. We propose these differences are a function of the lesser policymaking role and greater institutional constraints of district court judges, and the differences between trial and appellate court judges lead the ABA to favor different types of qualifications when evaluating nominees to these two types of courts