Continuous and Step-level Pay-off Functions in Public Good Games: A Conceptual Analysis

Conflicts between individuals’ and collective interests are ubiquitous in social life. Numerous experimental studies have investigated the resolution of such conflicts using public good games with either continuous or step-level payoff functions. A conceptual analysis using both classic game theory and social exchange theory shows that these two types of games are fundamentally different. A continuous function game is a social dilemma in that it contains a conflict between individual and collective interests whereas a step-level game is primarily a social coordination game. Thus, we conclude that one can not safely generalize results from step-level to continuous form games. Additionally, our analysis shows that the distinction between continuous and single-step games can be blurred by segmenting a continuous function into steps or adding steps to a single-step game. We identify characteristics of the payoff function that conceptually mark the transition from a dilemma to a coordination problem.

Continuous and step-level pay-off functions in public good games : a conceptual analysis

Conflicts between individuals’ and collective interests are ubiquitous in social life. Numerous experimental studies have investigated the resolution of such conflicts using public good games with either continuous or step-level payoff functions. A conceptual analysis using both classic game theory and social exchange theory shows that these two types of games are fundamentally different. A continuous function game is a social dilemma in that it contains a conflict between individual and collective interests whereas a step-level game is primarily a social coordination game. Thus, we conclude that one can not safely generalize results from step-level to continuous form games. Additionally, our analysis shows that the distinction between continuous and single-step games can be blurred by segmenting a continuous function into steps or adding steps to a single-step game. We identify characteristics of the payoff function that conceptually mark the transition from a dilemma to a coordination problem

Information Flow and Influence during Collective Search, Discussion, and Choice

If decision-relevant information is distributed among team members, the group is inclined to focus on shared information and to neglect unshared information, resulting often in suboptimal decisions. This classical finding is robust in experimental settings, in which the distribution of information is created artificially by an experimenter. The current paper looks at information sharing effects when access to information is not restricted, and decision makers are very familiar with the decision task. We analyzed archival search and discussion data obtained from business executives completing a personnel selection exercise. Information popularity in the population from which groups were composed predicted number of group members accessing items during information searches and whether the group discussed the items. The number of group members who accessed an item predicted whether information was repeated during discussion, and repetition predicted which items were included on an executive summary. Moreover, cognitively central group members were more influential than cognitively peripheral members. One implication is that collective decision making amplifies what is commonly known at the expense of disseminating what is not.Information Sharing, Cognitive Centrality, Group Decision Making, Collective Choice, Archival Data

Information flow and influence during collective search, discussion, and choice

If decision-relevant information is distributed among team members, the group is inclined to focus on shared information and to neglect unshared information, resulting often in suboptimal decisions. This classical finding is robust in experimental settings, in which the distribution of information is created artificially by an experimenter. The current paper looks at information sharing effects when access to information is not restricted, and decision makers are very familiar with the decision task. We analyzed archival search and discussion data obtained from business executives completing a personnel selection exercise. Information popularity in the population from which groups were composed predicted number of group members accessing items during information searches and whether the group discussed the items. The number of group members who accessed an item predicted whether information was repeated during discussion, and repetition predicted which items were included on an executive summary. Moreover, cognitively central group members were more influential than cognitively peripheral members. One implication is that collective decision making amplifies what is commonly known at the expense of disseminating what is not

A Model of Social Influence During Group Discussion: An Application With Four- and Six-Person Mock Juries

88 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1977.U of I OnlyRestricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETD