Analysis of limit order markets

This dissertation consists of three essays analyzing the strategies of traders who participate in limit order markets from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. In the first essay, I examine the implications of asymmetric information on the strategies of traders facing a multi-period limit order market. In the second essay, we examine liquidity provision on a limit order market using a simple order-choice model where traders with extreme liquidity needs place market orders and traders with less extreme liquidity needs place limit orders or stay out of the market. In the third essay, I solve the dynamic problem of an investor in a limit order market who manages his order over the trading day.Business, Sauder School ofFinance, Division ofGraduat

Pirated for Profit

This paper explains why a software manufacturer may permit limited piracy of its software. Piracy can be viewed as a form of price discrimination in which the manufacturer sells some of the software at a price of zero. In the presence of significant network externalities for the software, it may be profit maximizing for the software manufacturer to tolerate piracy by home consumers, most of whom have a low willingness to pay. This can increase the demand for the software by business users.

Liquidity and central clearing: Evidence from the CDS market

An international initiative to increase the use of central clearing for OTC derivatives emerged as one of the reactions to the 2008 financial crisis. The move to central clearing is a fundamental change in the structure of the market. Central clearing will help control counterparty credit risk, but it also has potential implications for market liquidity. We analyze the relationship between liquidity and central clearing using information on credit default swap clearing at ICE Trust and ICE Clear Europe. We find that the central counterparty chooses the most liquid contracts for central clearing, consistent with liquidity characteristics being important in determining the safety and efficiency of clearing. We further find that the introduction of central clearing is associated with a slight increase in the liquidity of a contract. This is consistent with two countervailing effects. On one hand, central clearing will likely increase collateral requirements relative to the pre-reform bilaterally-cleared market, thereby increasing clearing costs and possibly reducing the liquidity of the market. On the other hand, improved management of counterparty credit risk, increased transparency and operational efficiencies at central counterparties could bring more competition into OTC derivative markets and serve to increase liquidity

When lower risk increases profit: Competition and control of a central counterparty

We model the behavior of dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives markets where a small number of dealers trade with a continuum of heterogeneous clients (hedgers). Imperfect competition and (endogenous) default induce a familiar trade-off between competition and risk. Increasing the number of dealers servicing the market decreases the price paid by hedgers but lowers revenue for dealers, increasing the probability of a default. Restricting entry maximizes welfare when dealers' efficiency is high relative to their market power. A Central Counter-Party (CCP) offering novation tilts the trade-off toward more competition. Free-entry is optimal for all level of dealers' efficiency if they can constrain risk-taking by its members. In this model, dealers can choose CCP rules to restrict entry and increase their benefits. Moreover, dealers impose binding risk constraints to increase revenues at the expense of the hedgers. In other words, dealers can use risk controls to commit to a lower degree of competition. These theoretical results provide one rationalization of ongoing efforts by regulators globally to promote fair and risk-based access to CCPs