Environmental tax and trade liberalization in a mixed duopoly

This paper studies the environmental tax and trade liberalization in a mixed duopolistic market wherein environmental damage is associated with consumption. In particular, we consider the effect of privatization on environmental tax and the effect of trade liberalization on the environment in an importing country. The results show that the optimal environmental tax in a mixed duopoly is higher than the Pigouvian level and the optimal tax in a pure duopoly. Furthermore, trade liberalization does not alter the environment.

The Effects of the EU ETS on Companies: Research by Conducting Interviews in European Companies

We study the effects of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS)?which was introduced in January 2005?on companies by conducting interviews in some German and UK firms. In this paper, we demonstrate that although the introduction of the EU ETS has increased awareness of the importance of efforts to reduce global warming and emission costs, it has had little influence on the companies CO2 abatement efforts during the first period.

Dynamic environmental taxes in an international duopoly

This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in a Cournot duopoly. Based on the assumption of linear demand functions, we demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady-state equilibrium is lower in a dynamic environmental tax game than in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behavior of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the first period, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax; this is due to the decrease in the effect of the rent-shifting

Environmental Tax and Trade Liberalization in a Mixed Duopoly

This paper studies the environmental tax and trade liberalization in a mixed duopolistic market wherein environmental damage is associated with consumption. In particular, we consider the effect of privatization on environmental tax and the effect of trade liberalization on the environment in an importing country. The results show that the optimal environmental tax in a mixed duopoly is higher than the Pigouvian level and the optimal tax in a pure duopoly. Furthermore, trade liberalization does not alter the environment

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京都大学0048新制・課程博士博士(経済学)甲第11214号経博第202号新制||経||197(附属図書館)22823UT51-2004-U420京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済動態分析専攻(主査)教授 植田 和弘, 教授 塚谷 恒雄, 助教授 依田 高典学位規則第4条第1項該当Doctor of EconomicsKyoto UniversityDA

Environmental Tax, Trade, and Privatization

The analysis presented in this paper explores the interaction among privatization, environmental, and trade policies. In particular, we consider the optimal environmental tax and tariff, and the effects of privatization of a public firm in international duopolistic markets with environmental damage. There are three main results. First, the optimal environmental tax is lower than the marginal environmental damage and the optimal tariff is strictly positive regardless of whether or not the home public firm is privatized. Second, privatization leads to the increase in the optimal environmental taxes and tariffs in both countries. Third, under the optimal environmental tax and tariff, privatization results in the reduction of social welfare and in environmental improvement

Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly

This paper explores the optimal environmental tax and level of privatization in an international duopolistic market. We show that when the government is able to control the environmental tax and the extent of privatization, the optimal environmental tax is lower than the standard Pigouvian level. We also show that the optimal level of privatization of state-owned enterprises is partial privatization. Further, the optimal level of privatization is inversely dependent on the cleanup cost of past environmental contamination. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006Environmental policy, International trade, Privatization, F12, L33, Q58,

Environmental policy instruments and foreign ownership

Environmental policy, Foreign ownership, Oligopoly,

The Effects of the EU ETS on Companies: Research by Conducting Interviews in European Companies

We study the effects of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS)?which was introduced in January 2005?on companies by conducting interviews in some German and UK firms. In this paper, we demonstrate that although the introduction of the EU ETS has increased awareness of the importance of efforts to reduce global warming and emission costs, it has had little influence on the companies CO2 abatement efforts during the first period